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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Should the Utah Supreme Court deny appellant's petition 
for writ of certiorari where appellant has failed to establish a 
special or important reason or consideration justifying this 
Court's review? 
2. Should the Utah Supreme Court deny appellant's petition 
for writ of certiorari where appellant failed to raise to the Court 
of Appeals the argument she now asserts for the first time in her 
petition? 
3. Even if this Court decides to review appellant's petition 
for writ of certiorari setting forth arguments not raised to the 
Court of Appeals belowf has not the Court of Appeals applied the 
well-recognized and controlling abuse of discretion and harmless 
error standards of review involving jury voir dire issues? 
COURT OF APPEALS' OPINIONS 
The Court of Appeals' initial opinion is reported at Evans v. 
Doty, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1991), attached 
hereto as Appendix A. And the Court of Appeals' modified opinion 
is attached hereto as Appendix B and is cited as Evans v. Doty, 175 
Utah Adv. Rep. 80 (Ct. App. Dec. 12, 1991). 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to review the Court of Appeals decision filed 
December 12, 1991, is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1991). 
NO PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS. STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES OR REGULATIONS CONTROL THIS MATTER 
Statement of the Case 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a medical malpractice action 
relating to the surgical repair by cardio-thoracic surgeon 
Dr. Donald B. Doty of Salt Lake City of a patent ductus defect in 
the heart of a two-year-old infant with downs syndrome. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. A complaint 
in this action was filed on November 4, 1986. Appellee timely 
filed an answer, and the case was set for jury trial on May 9, 
1989, with the Honorable John Rokich presiding. 
On May 9, 1989, the potential jurors were subjected to an 
extensive voir dire examination by Judge Rokich and the jury was 
selected after two hours of questioning. After a total 
deliberation time of 33 minutes, the jury returned a unanimous 
verdict in favor of appellee, Dr. Donald Doty. The jury was then 
polled, and each juror confirmed this independent and unanimous 
decision. (Tr. Vol. 8, p. 858; R. p. 262-63.) A formal judgment 
on the verdict was entered on May 25, 1989. Appellant filed a 
motion for new trial or J.N.O.V., which, after full briefing and 
oral argument, was denied by the court by minute entry dated 
August 17, 1989. In denying this motion the court found that 
"there was substantial evidence to support their verdict." (R. 
p. 326, see Add. A.) A formal order was entered on September 12, 
1989. (R. p. 327-30.) Appellant filed a notice of appeal on 
October 12, 1989. (R. p. 331-32.) 
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The Court of Appeals filed its opinion on October 16, 1991. 
See Evans v. Doty, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1991). 
On or about November 6, 1991, plaintiff filed her petition for 
rehearing in the Utah Court of Appeals. (See Appendix C.) On or 
about November 27, 1991, appellee filed his court-ordered response 
to appellant's petition for rehearing. (See Appendix D.) 
C. Statement of Facts. Appellant Corinne Evans was born 
January 6, 1982, six weeks premature and suffering from downs 
syndrome and a yet to be diagnosed heart defect known as patent 
ductus arteriosus. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 5.) Without surgical closure 
of the patent ductus, appellant would have eventually died from 
pulmonary hypertension. (Tr. Vol. 4, p. 23, Vol. 6, p. 59.) 
Respondent Dr. Donald Doty, a pediatric cardio-thoracic 
surgeon, was selected to operate on the appellant to correct the 
patent ductus arteriosus, and the surgery was timely performed on 
March 30, 1984, when appellant was two years, two months old. (Tr. 
Vol. 21, p. 22, Vol. 3, p. 23.) 
All experts, including Dr. Achtel for appellant, agreed that 
the patent ductus repair itself was successful, despite a nerve 
injury to one vocal cord. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 651, Vol. e, p. 71, 126, 
Vol. 6, p. 59, 60, Vol. 4, p. 70.) 
At trial each expert said it was a known complication of a 
patent ductus arteriosus surgery that damage or injury to the 
recurrent laryngeal nerve could occur. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 29, Vol. 5, 
p. 22, Vol. 4, p. 20, Vol. 6, p. 46.) The experts said that a bad 
result or injury to the nerve does not mean there was negligence 
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involved with the surgery. (Tr. Vol. 6, p. 55, Vol. 3, p. 29, Vol. 
4, p. 20, Vol. 5, p. 23.) 
Prior to trial, plaintiff submitted the following proposed 
list of voir dire questions which she alleges that the trial court 
erred in not using: 
13. Have you read magazine or newspaper 
articles or other literature about 
medical negligence? 
14. Did any of you read Time magazine in 
March 1986? 
15. Have you ever signed any petition on the 
issue of negligence? 
16. Have you seen anything in your doctor's 
office about negligence? 
17. Have you discussed this subject with 
family, doctor or friends? 
(R. 137-44.) 
In lieu of appellant's proposed questions, Judge John A. 
Rokich asked the panel: 
Now, of utmost importance to me in this 
trial is that we get eight fair - and -
impartial jurors. This may be the only time 
these litigants get to have their day in 
court, and I'm a firm believer that those who 
want to be in court have their day in court 
and they are tried by eight fair - and -
impartial people. And so, keep that in mind. 
Also, as you answer these questions, keep 
in mind the only basis for your decision in 
this case, the eight of you who are selected, 
is from the testimony elicited from the mouths 
of people, witnesses, under oath, and only 
those documents that I admit into evidence. 
You are not to take into consideration any 
other extraneous matters to make your 
decision. 
So, with that in mind, your test for 
being fair and impartial is whether you can 
sit here and listen to the evidence and make 
your decision and afford these individuals 
here today as litigants a fair - and -
impartial trial. So, that's our system and I 
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trust that you will keep that in mind so when 
these people leave this courtroom, regardless 
of how the outcome of the verdict is, at least 
they know they were treated fairly and 
impartially by this court and by the jurors. 
(Tr. Vol. 7, p. 7.) Sometime later the judge asked the venire: 
Now, many of you have heard and read 
articles, and there have been television 
programs, with regard to negligence on the 
part of doctors. Do any of you have any 
strong feelings as a result of seeing or 
reading anything about medical negligence that 
would make it so that you couldn't be fair and 
impartial here today? 
(Tr. Vol. 7, p. 31.) Two jurors indicated that they were biased, 
and those jurors were immediately removed for cause by the court. 
(Tr. Vol. 7, p. 31.) The judge also asked: "Now, do any of you 
have any strange feelings about anyone bringing a lawsuit against 
a doctor?" (Tr. Vol. 7, p. 36.) None did. The judge also stated: 
So, my role is to instruct you on the 
law. Since I have to instruct you on the law, 
I have to ask you, despite the fact that you 
may not agree with the law, are you willing to 
follow the law as instructed by this court? 
If not, please raise your hand. 
(Tr. Vol. 7, p. 26.) None did. After the above (and other) 
questions were asked, the judge stated: 
Now, I have one or two more questions and 
that is, and I mentioned this before, but will 
you be willing to try this case fairly and 
impartially based upon the evidence presented 
in this case without bias or prejudice for or 
against any party? If you can't do that, 
please raise your hand. 
(Tr. Vol. 7, p. 37.) One juror indicated that she could be biased, 
and the court removed her for cause. 
In her docketing statement on appeal, plaintiff expressly 
accepted and urged the court to apply the "abuse of discretion" 
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standard of review in considering whether the trial court erred in 
refusing to allow plaintiff's counsel to question prospective 
jurors during voir dire examination. Plaintiff did not explicitly 
raise as an issue in her docketing statement the appropriateness of 
the voir dire given. (See Docketing Statement dated October 26, 
1989, attached as Appendix E.) 
In her initial brief to the Utah Court of Appeals, appellant 
expressly urged the Court of Appeals to apply the "abuse of 
discretion" standard of review in considering whether the trial 
court failed to "allow the plaintiff to voir dire the jurors 
concerning their exposure to information relating to a claimed 
insurance crisis and to tort reform arguments." (See Plaintiff's 
Appellate Brief dated June 29, 1990, attached as Appendix F.) The 
only other issues plaintiff raised in that brief dealt with whether 
the trial court abused its discretion in failing to allow plaintiff 
to voir dire a jury concerning his wife's employment and whether 
the court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for 
a new trial where plaintiff claimed the jury verdict was contrary 
to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. (See Appendix F.) 
In its response brief, defendant/appellee argued that the 
trial court had not abused its discretion during voir dire and that 
if it did, such error was harmless. (See Appellee's Brief at 
Appendix G.) After the Court of Appeals issued its opinion 
plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing, raising as the only two 
issues that (1) "a defect in the jury selection process is per se 
reversible error"; and (2) "plaintiff presented a prima facie case 
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and is entitled to a trial before an unbiased jury." (See 
Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing at Appendix C.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Since plaintiff has failed to set forth special and important 
reasons meriting this Court's granting plaintiff's petition for 
writ of certiorari, said petition should be denied. In the 
alternative, since plaintiff failed to raise to the Court of 
Appeals the argument she now urges on petition for writ of 
certiorari, said petition should be denied. Also, inasmuch as the 
Court of Appeals appropriately applied the well-recognized and 
controlling abuse of discretion and harmless error standards of 
review involving jury voir dire issues, there is no reason for this 
Court's granting plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari and 
reviewing this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
This Court Should Not Grant Plaintiff's 
Petition for Certiorari Since Plaintiff Has Not 
Established Any Special or Important Reason 
Justifying this Court's Review 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth 
some of the considerations governing this Court's review of writs 
of certiorari. Although, as expressly stated in the Court's rules, 
the listed considerations are "neither controlling nor wholly 
[measure] the Supreme Court's discretion," they are indicative of 
the character of reasons that this Court considers in determining 
whether a writ of certiorari will be reviewed. Given such 
"character of reasons," it is clear that plaintiff has failed to 
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set forth any "special and important reason" justifying this 
Court's review. Indeed, plaintiff has not established in her 
petition for writ of certiorari that the Court of Appeals' decision 
is somehow in conflict with the decision of another panel from that 
court. Also, plaintiff has not established that the Court of 
Appeals' decision is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme 
Court on the same issue. Rather, plaintiff has argued that the 
mere existence of unrelated and clearly distinguishable cases from 
the Supreme Court merit review of the Court of Appeals' underlying 
decision in this case. Unfortunately for plaintiff, however, this 
Court's own decisions on jury voir dire issues are wholly 
supportive and in harmony with the Court of Appeals' decision 
below. See, e.g. , State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448-49 (Utah 
1988); and cases cited in Appellee's Response to Appellant's 
Petition for Rehearing at Appendix D pp. 5-13. Certainly plaintiff 
cannot argue that the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
so far departs "from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower 
court as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of 
supervision" (see Utah R. App. P. 46(c)); and since the issue of 
jury voir dire has previously been settled by the Supreme Court, 
there is no reason to consider this petition for writ of certiorari 
under Rule 46(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure or 
similar conditions not expressly listed in that rule. 
In short, since plaintiff has offered no special or important 
reason justifying this Court's issuance of a writ of certiorari in 
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this case, this Court should deny plaintiff's petition for such 
writ. 
POINT II 
Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
Should be Denied Since She Failed to Raise 
to the Court of Appeals the Argument 
She Now Asserts for the First Time in Her Petition 
This Court has long upheld the rule that it will generally 
refuse to consider issues not presented to the trial court below. 
See Zions First National Bank v. National American Title Insurance, 
749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988) (and cases cited therein). In that 
case, the appellant had argued that there was no "sound policy 
reason" for this Court not considering the issue first raised on 
appeal since the issue was arguably a legal question. However, 
this Court ruled: 
[Appellant's] position ignores one of the 
reasons for refusing to consider any matter 
for the first time on appeal, even a matter of 
law. Although we may not defer to a trial 
court's conclusions on a legal question, we 
certainly may derive great benefit from the 
trial judge's views on the issue and may be 
persuaded by those views. This provides ample 
justification for refusing to consider 
[appellant's] claims. 
Id. at 654. 
Further, in Allisen v. American Legion Post 134, 763 P.2d 806 
(Utah 1988), this Court likewise concluded that it would not 
consider a theory of recovery raised on appeal where a different 
theory was alleged under the complaint and the trial court had 
limited its ruling to the theory raised in the plaintiff's 
complaint. See id. at 807-809. Similarly, the Court of Appeals 
has heretofore considered the inefficacy and inappropriateness of 
a petitioner raising issues for the first time in a petition for 
rehearing. In State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) , that Court ruled that it will "ordinarily . . . not consider 
arguments presented for the first time on petition for rehearing, 
and [it is] especially loathe to revisit a decision once rendered 
when the party seeking reconsideration intentionally did not 
present [the Court] with particular arguments in a more timely 
fashion." (Citation omitted.) This rationale fully comports with 
the Court's "standing aversion to considering for the first time at 
some later stage issues that could have been raised at an earlier 
stage." Jd. And this rule applies to theories, arguments and 
claims posed in a petition for rehearing that are at least 
tangentially connected to but were not raised in regard to 
arguments or theories considered previously on appeal. See id. 
Importantly, although the Court of Appeals in Sampson granted 
the petition for rehearing therein, it did so only after 
considering (1) the burden the petitioner held when confronted with 
"multiple issues of . . . magnitude" in what was a criminal case; 
(2) the significance of the issue presented; (3) and the fact that 
the United States Supreme Court in the interim had evidently issued 
an opinion with "helpful authority" "not available at the time of 
initial argument." See id. at 1113. Nevertheless, that Court 
stressed that the circumstances of granting that petition for 
rehearing were "unique" and future parties were explicitly 
cautioned "that the complexity of issues, the length of briefs, or 
tactical choice to initially avoid issues on appeal will normally 
not suffice to induce [the court] to consider issues raised for the 
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first time on a request to reconsider a decision already made." 
Id. at 1113 n.21. 
Certainly, this correct principle of law likewise applies in 
cases where a petitioner seeks to raise for the first time in her 
petition for writ of certiorari arguments not raised before to the 
Court of Appeals. The rationale for application of such a rule in 
this instance compares with that this Court has previously 
articulated involving issues not raised at trial below, namely, 
that although this Court might not defer to the Court of Appeals, 
conclusion on a legal question, it certainly might have derived 
great benefit from the Court of Appeals' views on the issue and may 
have been persuaded by the views. Compare Zions First National 
Bank, 749 P.2d at 654 (possible benefit derived from trial court's 
views). Certainly, plaintiff should not be benefitted by her 
decision to not raise arguments to the Court of Appeals which she 
now wishes to address in the petition for writ of certiorari. 
Applying this correct principle of appellate review to this 
case compels the denial of plaintiff's petition for writ of 
certiorari. Indeed, nowhere in plaintiff's presentation to the 
Court of Appeals did she argue that the abuse of discretion 
standard of review cannot be applied when considering voir dire 
issues. Instead, plaintiff herself expressly urged the Court of 
Appeals to apply the very abuse of discretion standard she now 
fortuitously criticizes and conclude that the trial court erred in 
connection with jury voir dire. (See Plaintiff's Brief at pp. 2, 
6-9, attached as Appendix F.) Plaintiff herself also implicitly 
urged the Court of Appeals to apply the harmless error analysis and 
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conclude that notwithstanding this correct standard of review the 
error in limiting the jury voir dire was not harmless under these 
specific facts. See Plaintiff's Brief at page 12, attached as 
Appendix F. And plaintiff even urged the Court of Appeals to apply 
on appeal its opinion in Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. App. 
1959), which cites with approval and adopts a decision by the 
Montana Supreme Court applying the harmless error analysis to the 
very claims of improper jury voir dire plaintiff raises here. (See 
Appendix F at pages 10-11 arguing application of Doe v. Haven, 772 
P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), adopting the Montana Supreme Court's 
decision in Borkoski v. Yost, 182 Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688 (1979), 
which applies the harmless error analysis to jury voir dire issues 
directly relevant to this case.) 
Further, although in his response brief to the Court of 
Appeals appellee Dr. Doty explicitly stressed in a separately 
identified argument that the abuse of discretion standard should 
apply and that any error in the trial court's exercise of its 
discretion concerning voir dire was harmless, see Appellee's 
Response Brief at pages 17-18, attached as Appendix G, plaintiff 
utterly ignored this argument on appeal to the Court of Appeals and 
failed to respond or challenge the same in her reply brief. 
Notwithstanding the above, however, plaintiff now argues for 
the first time that (1) the Court of Appeals improperly used the 
abuse of discretion standard (see Appellee's Petition for Writ at 
6); (2) "using a harmless error or abuse of discretion test as 
applied by the Court of Appeals in this case is inadequate and 
improper" (see Petition at 9); and (3) "the Court of Appeals 
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applied a standard of review which is contrary to reason and 
violates prior decisions of this court." (See Plaintiff's Petition 
for Writ at 12.) Clearly these arguments are either raised for the 
first time in plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari and 
should not be considered by this Court or are expressly at odds 
with the very standards of review and arguments plaintiff urged 
upon the Court of Appeals in her initial brief below. 
Similarly, although in its initial published opinion the Court 
of Appeals articulated the correct application of the harmless 
error analysis that "given the totality of the circumstances" it 
was not convinced the jury verdict would have been different "if 
the trial judge inquired as to the panel's exposure to tort reform 
propaganda" (see Appendix A at 15), and although it stressed that 
consideration of the "totality of the circumstances" was key in the 
harmless error analysis, plaintiff did not raise in her petition 
for rehearing that the "totality of the circumstances" standard 
should not be applied. Nevertheless, now for the first time in her 
petition for writ of certiorari plaintiff claims that this standard 
is incorrect. (See Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 
pages 9-12.) 
Clearly, in her petition for writ of certiorari plaintiff is 
doing exactly what she did in her petition for rehearing below, 
namely, to grasp at any new argument, even those ignored before or 
urged by plaintiff herself previously, to obtain a reversal of the 
jury's verdict. This Court should not sanction this tactic and 
should accordingly deny plaintiff's petition for writ of 
certiorari. 
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POINT III 
Even if this Court Chooses to Analyze Issues Raised 
by Plaintiff for the First Time in Her Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari, the Court of Appeals Applied 
the Well-Recognized and Controlling Abuse of Discretion 
and Harmless Error Standards of Review Involving 
Jury Voir Dire Issues 
Even if this Court chooses to consider plaintiff's new 
arguments (1) raised for the first time in her petition for writ of 
certiorari; and (2) at odds with the very arguments plaintiff urged 
upon the Court of Appeals, plaintiff's petition for writ of 
certiorari should not be granted since the arguments underlying the 
same are not well grounded in law. It is a well-recognized 
appellate review principle that the abuse of discretion standard 
applies together with the harmless error analysis in considering 
whether a trial judge's failure to pose questions on voir dire to 
the jury necessitates a retrial. Indeed, as concisely set forth by 
the Court of Appeals below, "A trial court abuses its discretion 
when 'considering the totality of the questioning, counsel [is not] 
afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary 
to evaluate jurors.'" State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 
1988) , cited by Evans v. Doty at 3 (see Appendix A) . Clearly, this 
Court has previously adopted this standard notwithstanding 
plaintiff's claims to the contrary. See, e.g., State v. Bishop. 
753 P.2d at 448. Although plaintiff claims in her petition for 
writ of certiorari that this rule is distinguishable, plaintiff is 
incorrect. The rule was concisely stated, and although the jury 
voir dire in Bishop did not deal with insurance issues, the case 
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itself dealt with a much more serious subject, the capital homicide 
verdict involving the defendant. 
Similarly, as the Court of Appeals noted in this action below: 
A new trial is not always necessary simply 
because the trial court refuses to ask jurors 
an appropriate question submitted by one of 
the parties to the litigation. See McDonouqh 
Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 
553 (1984) ("[I]t ill serves the important end 
of finality to wipe the slate clean simply to 
recreate the peremptory challenge process 
because counsel lacked an item of information 
. . . ."; United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 
1155, 1164 (2d Cir. 1989) (All circuits agree 
that whether refusal to ask potential jurors 
questions "does not always constitute 
reversible error; that question hinges upon" a 
number of factors including "the extent to 
which the [topic] is covered in other 
questions on voir dire and on the charge to 
the jury . . . . " ) ; State v. Malmrose, 649 
P.2d 56, 60 (Utah 1982) ("Traditionally, the 
trial court is given considerable latitude as 
to the manner and form of conducting the voir 
dire examination and is only restricted in 
that discretion from committing prejudicial 
error."); State v. Hall, 797 P.2d 470 (Utah 
App. 1990) ("For a court's exercise of 
discretion in disallowing voir dire questions 
to be overturned, appellant must show that the 
abuse of discretion rose to a level of 
reversible error."); Hornsby v. Corporation of 
the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah 
App. 1988) ("Only " [substantial impairment of 
the right to informed exercise of peremptory 
challenges" constitutes an abuse of discretion 
mandating reversal.). 
See Appendix B at pages 12-13 n.6. Further, for expediency and 
economy this Court is referred to Appellee's Response to 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at Appendix D, pp. 5 to 13, 
setting forth the overwhelming case law supportive of the standards 
applied by the Court of Appeals herein and this Court in analogous 
situations. 
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Given the foregoing and a review of the pertinent and 
controlling case law on the issue including that from this very 
Court as cited in Appendix D at pages 5-13, there can be no 
question that the Court of Appeals applied the proper standard of 
review in this case as set forth by court rule, case law urged by 
the plaintiff herself on appeal and previous decisions by Utah 
Appellate Courts. 
POINT IV 
Plaintiff's Argument Raised for the First Time 
in Her Petition for Rehearing to the Court of Appeals 
Concerning the Prima Facie Case She Allegedly Presented 
Likewise Lacks Merit 
As set forth for the Utah Court of Appeals, although plaintiff 
otherwise essentially argues that the Court of Appeals improperly 
invaded the province of the jury by holding that a second jury 
would reach the same result as the first, in actuality that court 
ruled that (1) due deference must be accorded the jury and its 
decision; (2) plaintiff did not meet her burden of marshaling the 
evidence supporting the verdict before she would be allowed to 
demonstrate that the evidence may be insufficient to support the 
same; and (3) it was not convinced that had the trial judge 
inquired on voir dire as plaintiff requested, the jury verdict in 
this case with this jury and this evidence "would be different." 
See Evans v. Doty, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. at 48. Contrary to 
plaintiff's evident opinion, such conclusions properly recognize 
the sanctity of the jury process and its verdict and the 
jurisprudential error that occurs when an appellate court "second-
guesses" the same. 
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Further, plaintiff has offered no legal support for her 
allegation that the mere presentation of a prima facie case somehow 
entitles her to a new trial before an unbiased jury. And plaintiff 
has likewise improperly leaped to the conclusion that this jury was 
biased when the record is devoid of evidence to support this claim. 
Finally, plaintiff seems to misunderstand the critical 
principle controlling this Court's review on appeal and her failure 
to meet her responsibilities in respect to that standard of review. 
Indeed, a review of plaintiff's argument identifies it as merely a 
restatement of plaintiff's claim in her initial brief that "the 
trial court abuse[d] its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial where the jury verdict was contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence and was apparently based on 
speculation." See Appendix F at page 2. However, as repeatedly 
set forth by this Court and noted by the Court of Appeals herein, 
before plaintiff could attack the verdict and claim it was based on 
speculation, plaintiff must have marshaled all the evidence in 
support of the verdict. See, e.g., Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 
766 (Utah 1955). Nevertheless, plaintiff failed to marshal the 
evidence below and now merely recites in her petition for a writ of 
certiorari evidence which she believes allegedly supports 
allegations raised in her complaint. Indeed, it is as if plaintiff 
again expects that by merely recanting evidence allegedly in 
support of her claim she can somehow convince this Court to 
(1) ignore the Court of Appeals' correct application of this 
controlling standard of review, (2) speculate as she does that the 
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jury should have properly returned a verdict for her and (3) grant 
her a petition for writ of certiorari. 
Given the inaccuracy and meritless nature of plaintiff's 
second point in her petition for writ of certiorari
 f this Court 
should also deny plaintiff's petition as to that claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has failed to set forth a special or important 
reason justifying this Court's review of her petition for a writ of 
certiorari. In addition, arguments raised for the first time by 
plaintiff in her petition for writ of certiorari should not be 
considered and the petition for writ of certiorari should likewise 
be denied since a plain and simple review of the Court of Appeals' 
decisions unequivocally demonstrates that the Court of Appeals 
applied the correct abuse of discretion and harmless error 
standards of review involving plaintiff's claims regarding issues 
of jury voir dire. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *3 day of February, 1992. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
BY ^--^-f^^ 
David H. Epperson 
Jaryl L. Rencher 
Attorneys for Defendant Dr. Doty 
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APPENDIX A 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
This is an appeal in a medical malpractice action following 
a jury verdict in favor of the defendant doctor. On appeal, 
plaintiff asserts that: (1) during voir dire, the trial judge 
refused to ask prospective jurors questions sufficient to allow 
the plaintiff to exercise her peremptory challenges; and (2) 
there is insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict and, 
therefore, plaintiff is entitled to a new trial. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Plaintiff, Corinne Evans, was born in January 1982, six 
weeks premature and suffering from Downs Syndrome. In October, 
1983, Corinne was hospitalized for severe pneumonia. During her 
hospital stay, doctors discovered Corinne also suffered from 
extreme pulmonary hypertension. Tests revealed the hypertension 
was caused by a patent ductus arteriosus. The ductus arteriosus 
is a blood vessel which bypasses the non-functioning lungs of an 
infant prior to birth. At birth, the ductus normally closes 
spontaneously. In Corinne7s case, however, the ductus failed to 
completely close, resulting in the defect. 
Corinne7s parents selected the defendant, Doctor Donald J. 
Doty, to operate on Corinne to correct the condition. Dr. Doty 
is a certified cardio-thoracic surgeon. Dr. Doty had performed 
more than one hundred patent ductus repairs, and has written 
extensively about the procedure. 
Dr. Doty successfully repaired the ductus. However, during 
surgery, Corinne7s recurrent laryngeal nerve, which runs near the 
ductus, was permanently damaged. As a result, Corinne7s left 
vocal cord was paralyzed. Following surgery, Corinne, through 
her parents, commenced this law suit, claiming Dr. Doty 
negligently injured the nerve during surgery. 
During voir dire Corinne7s attorney submitted many 
questions; in fact, the voir dire lasted two hours. However, 
over Corinne7s attorney's objections, the trial judge refused to 
ask several questions designed to probe the jurors7 exposure to 
tort reform propaganda. After a four-day trial the jury returned 
a verdict finding Dr. Doty was not negligent. 
VOIR DIRE 
First, Corinne claims the trial judge improperly refused to 
ask potential jurors certain questions during voir dire and, as a 
result, the voir dire was insufficient to allow her counsel to 
intelligently exercise her peremptory challenges. Corinne does 
not claim the trial judge failed to remove certain jurors for 
cause.1 
1. At trial, Corinne7s attorney apparently objected to the 
impaneling of one juror on the grounds that the juror7s spouse 
was employed by an insurance company, and also that counsel had 
not been allowed to question the juror concerning this 
employment. The only mention of this issue on appeal is in a 
short statement in the "issues" portion of Corinne7s brief. 
Because Corinne has not sufficiently briefed or argued this issue 
on appeal, we decline to address its merits. Generally, this 
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This court reviews challenges to a trial judge's voir dire 
under an "abuse of discretion" standard. Doe v. Hafen. 772 P.2d 
456, 457-58 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 
1990). A trial court abuses its discretion when, "considering 
the totality of the questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an 
adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to 
evaluate jurors." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 
1988) . 
Even if we determine the court abused its discretion in 
restricting voir dire, this does not end our inquiry. In order 
to reverse, we must also find the error was sufficiently 
prejudicial to plaintiff to merit a new trial. Utah R. Civ. P. 
61 (1991) ;2 see State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989); 
Borkoski v. Yost. 182 Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688, 695 (1979). 
Further, the party seeking the new trial has the burden of 
showing that the error was not harmless. Ashton v. Ashton, 733 
P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987). 
Voir dire has two distinct and equally important purposes: 
the first is to detect actual juror bias—the basis of a "for-
cause" challenge; and the second is to allow parties to collect 
sufficient information to intelligently exercise peremptory 
challenges. See Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 
445, 447 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 
court will not manufacture a legal argument for an appellant who 
fails to brief or argue an issue. See English v. Standard 
Optical Co. , 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 41, 44 (1991); Cardin v. 
Morrison-Knudsen. 603 P.2d 862, 865 (Wyo. 1979). 
2. Rule 61 reads: 
No error in either the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect 
in any ruling or order or in anything done or 
omitted by the court or by any of the 
parties, is grounds for granting a new trial 
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears to 
the court inconsistent with substantial 
justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect 
in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties. 
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1990); Hafen. 772 P.2d at 457, In this case we are concerned 
with the second category. As we recently stated, a Mtrial judge 
should liberally allow questions 'designed to discover attitudes 
and biases, both conscious and subconscious,' even though such 
questions go beyond that needed for challenges for cause." 
Hafen, 772 P.2d at 457 (quoting State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 
845 (Utah 1988)). The Utah Supreme Court has elaborated on the 
purpose of peremptory challenges: 
Although a trial judge has some discretion in 
limiting voir dire examinations, . . . that 
discretion should be liberally exercised in 
favor of allowing counsel to elicit 
information from prospective jurors. . . . 
Indeed, the fairness of a trial may depend on 
the right of counsel to ask voir dire 
questions designed to discover attitudes and 
biases, both conscious and subconscious, even 
though they would not have supported a 
challenge for cause. . . . Juror attitudes 
revealed during voir dire may indicate dimly 
perceived, yet deeply rooted, psychological 
biases or prejudices that may not rise to the 
level of a for-cause challenge but 
nevertheless support a peremptory challenge• 
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988)(emphasis added). 
Accordingly, it is not enough for a trial judge to ask 
questions merely to discover a potential juror,s overt biases. 
The judge must also allow counsel the opportunity to hear 
responses to questions that may indicate hidden or subconscious 
attitudes. Without such an opportunity, the prospect of 
impaneling a fair and impartial jury is diminished. 
At trial, Corinne's counsel submitted a list of proposed 
voir dire questions including several general questions probing 
the prospective jurors' exposure to tort reform information. 
Additionally, Corinne's counsel identified and offered a specific 
example of such propaganda, a cover article in the March 24, 1986 
issue of Time magazine entitled "Sorry, Your Policy Is 
Cancelled." Corinne asked the court to question the potential 
jurors about any exposure to this magazine article. Some of the 
specific questions Corinne proposed included: 
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Have you read magazine or newspaper articles 
or other literature about medical negligence? 
Did any of you read Time magazine in March, 1986? 
Have you ever signed any petition on the issue of 
negligence? 
Have you seen anything in your doctor's office about 
negligence? 
Have you discussed [medical negligence] with your 
family doctor or friends? 
Rather than asking the prospective jurors Corinne's 
requested questions in the area of exposure to "tort reform" 
material, the trial judge asked: 
Now, many of you have heard and read 
articles, and there have been television 
programs, with regard to negligence on the 
part of doctors. Do any of you have any 
strong feelings as a result of seeing or 
reading anything about medical negligence 
that would make it so that you couldn,t be 
fair and impartial here today? 
Now, do any of you have any strong feelings about 
anyone bringing a lawsuit against a doctor? 
Following the first question, two jurors indicated their 
inability to be fair and impartial, and the trial judge dismissed 
them for cause. There was no response to the other question. At 
the conclusion of the two-hour voir dire, the judge impaneled the 
jury over plaintiff's objections. 
Dr. Doty claims the trial judge properly refused to ask the 
questions posed by Corinne's attorney as these questions would 
have improperly introduced the issue of insurance. Though 
Corinne,s requested questions did not directly refer to 
insurance, Dr. Doty claims that because they focused on potential 
"tort-reform" bias, the questions indirectly suggested that Dr. 
Doty carried liability insurance and thus were properly excluded 
on that basis. 
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Recently, many jurisdictions have been faced with the issue 
of when a plaintiff may infuse insurance into voir dire 
questioning. The issue of insurance-related voir dire 
questioning has arisen in three distinct situations. First, 
plaintiffs have sought to inquire into prospective jurors' 
relationships with insurance companies. See, e.g., Broberg, 782 
P.2d at 200; Hafen, 772 P.2d at 458; Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 
381, 105 P.2d 176 (1940); Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P.2d 
224, 227-32 (1932). Second, plaintiffs have requested permission 
to determine whether jurors have been exposed to a specific, 
identifiable media report or advertising campaign; often where 
insurance companies have funded such a campaign to convince the 
public of the "evils" of modern tort law and the impact of large 
jury awards on insurance premiums. See, e.g., Ostler, 781 P.2d 
at 447; Yost, 594 P.2d at 689-90. Finally, plaintiffs have 
sought to inquire of jurors as to their general knowledge about 
and attitudes toward medical negligence and tort reform without 
regard to a specific advertising campaign or news media report. 
See, e.g. , Hafen, 772 P.2d at 458-59; Barton v. Owen, 139 Cal. 
Rptr. 494, 508, 71 Cal. App. 3d 484, 508-09 (1977). In this 
case, both the second and third categories described above are at 
issue. 
The underlying concern in each of these situations is 
whether discussing insurance in front of jurors may lead the 
jurors to infer that the defendant carries liability insurance.3 
3. The traditional logic is that a jury may be more likely to 
find for the plaintiff or increase a plaintiff's damage award if 
the jury knows the defendant has insurance. Balle v. Smith, 17 
P.2d at 229. This per se "insurance" rule developed during a 
time when liability insurance was uncommon. "When the rule 
against disclosure of insurance originated doubtless the 
existence of such protection for defendants was exceptional and a 
'hush, hush' policy could be effective." McCormick, Evidence § 
201 at 481 (2d ed. 1972). 
More recently, however, courts have begun to question this 
traditional "insurance" rule. Causey v. Cornelius, 164 Cal. App. 
2d 269, 330 P.2d 468, 472 (1958). The Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals has noted: 
The word "insurance" is not outlawed from the 
courtroom as a word of magical evil. Jurors 
are not unaware that insurance is at large in 
the world and its mention will not open to 
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Utah courts have never adopted a rule that discussion of 
insurance is per se improper, but instead have recognized that 
whether a plaintiff may discuss insurance with the jury must be 
evaluated from the particular facts of the individual case. 
[P]laintiff in a personal injury or death 
case, if acting in good faith for the purpose 
of ascertaining the qualifications of jurors, 
and not merely for the purpose of informing 
them that defendant is insured, may in one 
form or another inquire of prospective jurors 
on voir dire examination with reference to 
their interest in or connection with 
insurance companies. 
Balle, 17 P.2d at 229. More recently, this court has recognized 
that the issue of insurance voir dire questioning involves a 
delicate balancing of the respective interests of the parties, 
them a previously unknown realm. It is in 
fact more realistic for the judge to dissolve 
the phantom by open talk in the courtroom 
than to have it run loose in the unconfined 
speculations of the jury room. The court has 
wide control over the voir dire and can 
adequately safeguard the inquiry by 
explaining to the jurors the limited scope 
and purpose of the examination and thus 
eliminate any implication of the existence or 
relevance of insurance in the case before it. 
Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 1965). 
There can be little question that even unsophisticated 
jurors will suspect the existence of insurance. w[T]he general 
prevalence of liability insurance for automobile injuries is 
known to the jurors; hence, for the law to forbid any disclosure 
of it in the course of the trial seems to be merely a piece of 
hypocritical futility.11 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 282a at 169 
(Chadbourn rev. 1979); see also Silver State Disposal Co. v. 
Shellev. 105 Nev. 309, 774 P.2d 1044, 1047 (1989) (jurors are 
likely aware of insurance coverage). Accordingly, the underlying 
rationale for the insurance rule has been greatly eroded as, 
today, corporations and individuals almost universally purchase 
insurance. 
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and that plaintiffs must conduct any insurance-related inquiry in 
good faith, Brobera, 782 P.2d at 200-01. 
Both Corinne and Dr. Doty principally rely on the reasoning 
in the 1979 Montana Supreme Court case of Borkoski v. Yost. 594 
P.2d 688 (Mont. 1979) , as determinative of whether tort-reform 
inquiry should be allowed during voir dire.4 In Yost, a medical-
malpractice action, the plaintiff sought to pursue a line of 
inquiry during voir dire to determine the existence of juror bias 
as a result of a specific national advertising campaign by 
insurance companies. The advertising campaign had run in several 
national magazines during the time when the jury was impaneled. 
Plaintiff's counsel requested 
permission to examine prospective jurors with 
a line of inquiry to determine whether any 
prospective jurors have been exposed to, have 
observed, or are aware of the national 
campaign by leading insurance companies, 
directed particularly at prospective jurors, 
to the effect that large jury verdicts are in 
fact paid by the general public at large and 
constituted "windfalls" to the recipients. 
Id. at 690 (emphasis added). The trial court denied plaintiff's 
motion, but did allow plaintiff's counsel to "inquire as to each 
juror whether or not they feel that doctors are unnecessarily or 
professional people are unnecessarily oppressed by suits or large 
verdicts." id. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
defendants. 
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court held that the trial 
court should have allowed the line of questioning as to the 
insurance companies' advertising campaign. The court held that: 
[I]n appropriate cases, an attorney upon voir 
dire may inquire of prospective jurors 
whether they have any business relationship 
with insurance companies and whether they are 
policyholders of an insurance company named 
as a defendant or of a mutual insurance 
4. This court has previously considered Yost persuasive. See 
Hafen, 772 P.2d at 459. 
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company involved in the case. [Further], 
upon a proper showing of possible prejudice, 
an attorney may inquire whether a prospective 
juror has heard or read anything to indicate 
that jury verdicts for plaintiffs in personal 
injury cases result in higher insurance 
premiums for everyone; if so, whether the 
prospective juror believes such materials; 
and if so, whether that belief will interfere 
with the juror's ability to render a fair and 
impartial verdict. Depending on the 
responses received to these inquiries and 
subject to the discretion of the trial court, 
limited follow-up inquiries may be made. 
Id. at 694. The court adopted this rule because 
[w]hen insurance companies inject the issue 
of insurance into the consciousness of every 
potential juror through a high priced 
advertising campaign, . . . they threaten 
every plaintiff's right to an impartial jury. 
. . . In such cases, it is only fair that 
attorneys have some means to secure this 
right for their clients. Liberal voir dire 
is the best means to this end. 
Id. (citations omitted). The Yost court was dealing with a 
particular advertising campaign. In this context the court 
explained that when, during voir dire, a party inquires about 
particular advertisements and specifically interjects the issue 
of high insurance premiums, the questions are proper only where 
counsel first asks certain general introductory questions. 
Counsel must first ask questions to determine if the prospective 
juror has read anything that might affect the juror's 
impartiality, or whether the juror regularly reads any of the 
magazines or publications that have printed the prejudicial 
material. If "no positive responses are received to these 
introductory inquiries, there is no reason to pursue further the 
line of inquiry we have approved above." Id. at 695. Finally, 
the Yost Court imposed a "good faith" requirement on plaintiff's 
counsel: counsel cannot merely be attempting to suggest to 
jurors that the defendant carries liability insurance. Id. 
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The Yost court, however, found the trial court's refusal to 
allow the inquiry on voir dire was harmless error. The court 
pointed out that the ad campaign complained about by the 
plaintiff focused on the size of the jury award, and at no point 
suggested "that juries should not find a party negligent in the 
first place." Id. Thus, the Yost court apparently believed that 
any bias created by the ad campaign would only manifest itself 
when the jury considered the amount of damages. Because the Yost 
jury found no liability, the court found the error harmless. 
The Yost court was not faced specifically with the issue of 
what questions about general tort reform are permissible when the 
plaintiff cannot show the existence of a specific tort-crisis 
advertising campaign or article, but instead wants to uncover 
information about the potential juror's exposure to general 
information on medical negligence and tort reform for the purpose 
of exercising peremptory challenges. Despite the Yost court's 
failure to address this issue, however, its approach suggests 
that general inquiry about tort reform and its effect on juror 
impartiality—that does not mention or discuss insurance 
unnecessarily—would be appropriate. £d. at 695. 
Dr. Doty claims that the trial judge did not err in voir 
dire because the judge asked appropriate introductory questions 
as instructed by Yost and as adopted in Doe v. Hafen. 772 P.2d 
456 (Utah App. 1989) . In Hafen, a motorcycle-automobile 
collision injury action, the trial court asked the jury "whether 
anyone had read or experienced anything that would affect the 
amount of compensation they would be willing to award in a 
verdict." Id. at 458. The plaintiff objected to this 
"generalized" voir dire question, arguing that the question was 
insufficient "to reach any deep-rooted bias caused by 'tort 
reform propaganda.'"5 Id. Rather, plaintiff wanted the judge to 
ask "specifically whether the prospective jurors had read any 
such 'tort reform propaganda.'" Id. 
5. In Hafen, the plaintiff also objected to the trial court's 
refusal to ask the jurors (1) certain general background 
questions such as their level of education and the types of 
magazines they read, and (2) whether any jurors had an employment 
or financial relationship with an insurance company. These 
questions, however, raise different concerns and issues than 
those presented by the instant case. 
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The Hafen court upheld the trial court's refusal to ask the 
proposed "tort reform" questions under an abuse of discretion 
standard. The court ruled that the question the trial court 
asked was sufficient. Id. at 459. We do not disagree with the 
holding of Hafen. However, in reaching its conclusion, the Hafen 
court relied upon Yost's treatment of questions concerning 
specific media accounts (i.e. the second category of insurance 
questions)as supporting its decision that the plaintiff must ask 
one of two alternative general questions, to determine potential 
juror bias, before proceeding with more specific "tort reform 
bias" questions about specific articles: 
[Yost] held that before any specific 
questioning about the articles would be 
allowed, either of two alternative types of 
preliminary questions must be asked: 
"[W]hether the prospective juror has heard of 
or read anything . . . which might affect his 
ability to sit as an impartial juror . . . or 
. . . whether the prospective juror reads any 
of the magazines or newspapers in which it 
has been demonstrated that the . . • articles 
had appeared." 
We adopt the analysis in [Yost] and apply it 
to the instant case. 
Id. at 458-59 (quoting Yost, 594 P.2d at 695)(citations omitted). 
We find the Hafen panel's reliance on the Yost analysis 
somewhat confusing. Unlike Hafen, which dealt with the third 
category on insurance questions, Yost dealt with the second voir 
dire "insurance" category where the plaintiff clearly established 
that the defendant's insurance company had launched a specific, 
contemporaneous tort reform advertising campaign. 
In Hafen, the plaintiff was merely attempting to discover, 
by a generalized tort-reform question not tied to insurance 
premiums, whether potential jurors had been exposed to tort-
reform information in general. This was precisely the type of 
preliminary question approved in Yost. See 594 P.2d at 695. In 
short, Hafen's reading of Yost failed to distinguish between the 
second and third category of voir dire insurance-tort reform 
questions, and oversimplified the analysis of insurance-tort 
reform voir dire questions by grouping these two categories 
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together. Thus, to the extent the Hafen opinion can be read as 
per se not allowing general questions as to whether juror have 
read or seen media reports concerning medical negligence or tort 
reform where insurance is not specifically interjected, we reject 
it. 
In view of this analytical framework, we now turn to the 
case before us. Corinne's objections to the court's voir dire 
were two-fold. First, Corinne objected to the trial court's 
failure to inquire as to the juror's knowledge of a specific Time 
magazine article on tort reform and insurance premiums. Second, 
Corinne's counsel objected to the trial court's failure to ask 
general questions designed to discover if any potential juror had 
been exposed to medical negligence or tort reform information in 
general. In this case, both of these objections go to the issue 
of Corinne's ability to intelligently exercise peremptory 
challenges. 
Under the first issue—whether the trial court should have 
questioned jurors concerning the Time magazine article—the Yost 
analysis is instructive because, like Yost, this issue fits into 
the second "insurance" voir dire category outlined above. In 
Yost, plaintiff's counsel demonstrated that defendant's insurance 
company, the real party in interest, had participated in a 
contemporaneous, nation-wide advertising campaign designed to 
influence the public concerning the "evils" of large jury awards. 
Yost, 594 P.2d at 694. Because the advertising raising was 
ongoing at the time the jury was impaneled, the Yost court held 
that plaintiff's counsel had established sufficient foundation 
that counsel should have been allowed to question jurors as to 
their exposure to the campaign. The Yost court held that in such 
circumstances, before an attorney may question jurors as to their 
exposure to advertisements and media reports, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the jurors are likely to have been recently 
exposed to such propaganda. .Id. We adopt Yost's reasoning, and 
thus hold that before a plaintiff may inquire as to a juror's 
exposure to a specific article or advertisement raising 
specifically the issue of the need for tort reform and its 
relationship to high insurance premiums, the plaintiff must lay a 
foundation showing that the juror is likely to have been exposed 
to the material, and further that the material was published 
recently enough so that the juror will likely remember reading 
it. 
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In this case, the Time article was three-years old when the 
jury was impaneled. Thus, jurors were not likely to remember 
having read the article. Corinne's proposed question asked 
jurors whether they had "read Time magazine in March, 1986." We 
find it unlikely that, in 1989, any jurors would be able to 
accurately respond to such a question. Accordingly, because 
jurors were unlikely to have recently read the Time article or to 
remember having read it, we do not find the trial court abused 
its discretion in failing to inquire about the specific article. 
Corinne's second objection, however, is more problematic. 
Corinne's counsel presented several general questions inquiring 
as to jurors' exposure to information on tort reform and lawsuits 
against doctors. The questions fit the third "insurance" voir 
dire category described above. As explained, determining whether 
an insurance voir dire question such as this should be asked 
requires a balancing of the relative interests of the parties in 
light of the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In 
tort cases, and more particularly in medical malpractice cases, 
we cannot ignore the reality that potential jurors may have 
developed tort-reform biases as a result of an overall exposure 
to such propaganda. See Yost 594 P.2d at 694. Accordingly, in 
cases such as this one, the plaintiff has a legitimate interest 
in discovering which jurors may have read or heard information 
generally on medical negligence or tort reform. 
Here, the trial judge did ask questions sufficient to ferret 
out actual tort reform biases. However, Corinne claims that the 
court's questions did not allow her sufficient information to 
exercise her peremptory challenges. Specifically, Corinne wanted 
to know which of the potential jurors had been exposed to tort 
reform propaganda—even if the potential jurors believed that 
such exposure had not changed their attitudes or biased them. We 
conclude she should have been allowed such an opportunity. The 
judge stated: "many of you have heard and read articles, and 
there have been television programs, with regard to negligence on 
the part of doctors. Do any of you have any strong feelings as a 
result of seeing or reading anything about medical negligence 
that would make it so that you couldn't be fair and impartial 
here today?" Had the trial judge first asked jurors which of 
them could recall exposure to such articles and programs, Corinne 
would have had an opportunity to identify jurors who had been 
exposed to such information. Further, this is the type of 
general preliminary question approved in Yost. See id. at 695. 
However, rather than seek responses to such a question, the trial 
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judge instead focused on the issue of for-cause type bias by 
asking whether jurors felt they could be impartial and fair. The 
trial judge's line of questions ignored Corinne's need to gather 
information to assist in exercising her peremptory challenges. 
Reason suggests that exposure to tort-reform propaganda may 
foster a subconscious bias within certain prospective jurors, 
and, had Corinne been able to identify those jurors exposed to 
such propaganda, she could have more intelligently exercised her 
peremptory challenges. Furthermore, we note that Corinne's 
requested questions made no mention of insurance premiums and 
thus, the risk of prejudicing Dr. Doty's interests under this 
proposed inquiry was much less than in Yost. In sum, we believe 
the trial court should have asked the potential jurors some of 
the questions proposed by Corinne about their exposure to tort-
reform and medical negligence propaganda—not just if they had 
been biased by the exposure. 
Our conclusion that the voir dire was unduly restrictive 
does not end our inquiry. Next, we must determine if the error 
was sufficiently prejudicial to Corinne to merit a new trial. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that harmless errors are those 
"which, although properly preserved below and presented on 
appeal, are sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there 
is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome 
of the proceedings." State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 
1989). 
Initially, Dr. Doty contends that because the jury found no 
cause of action for negligence, any voir dire error must be 
considered harmless* Dr. Doty relies on Yost, which held that 
because the jury found for the defendant on the issue of 
liability, any failure of the judge to question the jurors 
regarding tort-reform propaganda was harmless. Yost, 594 P.2d at 
695. Dr. Doty, however, fails to recognize an important 
distinguishing factor between Yost and this case. As explained 
above, Yost dealt with a very specific and unique situation—the 
direct impact of an identifiable and contemporaneous nation-wide 
advertising campaign on potential jurors. Because the 
advertising campaign in Yost advocated lowering jury awards, and 
did not focus on liability, the Yost court believed that a biased 
jury would manifest their bias by first finding liability and 
then improperly limiting the damage award. Accordingly, the Yost 
court held that when the jury found for the defendant, such 
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finding was not a result of bias created by the advertising 
campaign. 
In this case, any jury tort-reform bias cannot be traced 
directly to a single, recent advertising campaign, but may have 
arisen from an overall exposure to media reports and insurance 
advertisements. To adopt the Yost conclusion, as advocated by 
Dr. Doty, would be an over-simplification of the harmless-error 
rule. We cannot assume that a jury would manifest its bias by 
only reducing damages. It is equally likely that a biased jury 
might act on its bias by finding the defendant not negligent. 
Notwithstanding Dr. Doty's misreading of Yost, we believe 
the trial court's error in denying Corinne's general tort-reform 
medical negligence questions was harmless. Given the totality of 
the circumstances, we are not convinced that had the trial judge 
inquired as to the panel's exposure to tort-reform propaganda, 
thus allowing plaintiff to more intelligently exercise peremptory 
challenges, the jury verdict would be different. In light of the 
extensive, two-hour voir dire, the strong evidence supporting the 
jury's verdict, and considering the totality of the 
circumstances, we cannot say that Corinne has met her burden of 
showing prejudicial error. 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Finally, Corinne contends the trial court should have 
granted her motion for a new trial as there was insufficient 
evidence to support the jury's verdict. "To successfully attack 
the verdict, an appellant must marshall all the evidence 
supporting the verdict and then demonstrate that, even viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to that verdict, the 
evidence is insufficient to support it." Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 
P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). ffWe accord due deference to the jury 
as the fact finder and do not substitute ourselves in this role.11 
Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 793 (Utah App. 
1987), cert, dismissed, Israel Pagan Estate v. Capital Thrift & 
Loan, 771 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1989). Corinne has not met her burden 
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of marshalling the evidence, and therefore we affirm the jury 
verdict finding Dr. Doty was not negligent.6 
puk& £L 171- 3ti£*p&J 
Judith M. Billings, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
^ ^ c ^ r S • '^^rrn^grfr'ccjf*'*^ 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Jydge 
Norman H. Jackson/•'Judge 
6. Although Corinne has failed to marshall the evidence in 
support of her sufficiency of the evidence claim, review of the 
trial record shows that, even had Corinne properly marshalled the 
evidence, there nevertheless is ample evidence to support the 
jury's verdict in favor of Dr. Doty. At trial, Dr. Doty's 
counsel called two expert witnesses to testify, and counsel also 
read the deposition of another expert witness to the jury. 
Further, Dr. Doty himself offered expert testimony. Both of Dr. 
Doty's well-qualified experts testified that the injury Corinne 
sustained to her nerve during surgery could have occurred in the 
absence of negligence, and that such nerve injury is a risk that 
sometimes cannot be avoided with this surgical procedure. One of 
Dr. Doty's experts testified that during his surgical experience, 
he had had several patients who sustained comparable nerve injury 
during similar procedures that were adequately performed. The 
jury also heard the deposition of another expert surgeon who 
stated that he has seen similar injuries numerous times in 
practice without any medical negligence. Finally, Dr. Doty 
testified that he performed Corinne's surgery in compliance with 
a reasonable and prudent standard of care. Dr. Doty opined that 
the nerve likely was damaged as a result of tension brought to 
bear on the nerve because the ductus was large and because the 
patient suffered from high blood pressure. 
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APPENDIX B 
I-BLfclLJ 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
~This is an appeal in a medical malpractice action following 
a jury verdict in favor of the defendant doctor. On appeal, 
plaintiff asserts that: (1) during voir dire, the trial judge 
refused to ask prospective jurors questions sufficient to allow 
the plaintiff to exercise her peremptory challenges; and (2) 
there is insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict and, 
therefore, plaintiff is entitled to a new trial. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Plaintiff, Corinne Evans, was born in January 1982, six 
weeks premature and suffering from Downs Syndrome. In October, 
1. This amended opinion replaces the opinion in Case No. 900132-
CA issued on October 16, 1991. 
1983, Corinne was hospitalized for severe pneumonia. During her 
hospital stay, doctors discovered Corinne also suffered from 
extreme pulmonary hypertension. Tests revealed the hypertension 
was caused by a patent ductus arteriosus. The ductus arteriosus 
is a blood vessel which bypasses the non-functioning lungs of an 
infant prior to birth. At birth, the ductus normally closes 
spontaneously. In Corinne's case, however, the ductus failed to 
completely close, resulting in the defect. 
Corinne7s parents selected the defendant, Doctor Donald J. 
Doty, to operate on Corinne to correct the condition. Dr. Doty 
is a certified cardio-thoracic surgeon. Dr. Doty had performed 
more than one hundred patent ductus repairs, and has written 
extensively about the procedure. 
Dr. Doty successfully repaired the ductus. However, during 
surgery, Corinne7s recurrent laryngeal nerve, which runs near the 
ductus, was permanently damaged. As a result, Corinne's left 
vocal cord was paralyzed. Following surgery, Corinne, through 
her parents, commenced this law suit, claiming Dr. Doty 
negligently injured the nerve during surgery. 
During voir dire Corinne's attorney submitted many 
questions; in fact, the voir dire lasted two hours. However, 
over Corinne7s attorney's objections, the trial judge refused to 
ask several questions designed to probe the jurors7 exposure to 
tort reform propaganda. After a four-day trial the jury returned 
a verdict finding Dr. Doty was not negligent. 
VOIR DIRE 
First, Corinne claims the trial judge improperly refused to 
ask potential jurors certain questions during voir dire and, as a 
result, the voir dire was insufficient to allow her counsel to 
intelligently exercise her peremptory challenges. Corinne does 
not claim the trial judge failed to remove certain jurors for 
cause.2 
2. At trial, Corinne7s attorney apparently objected to the 
impaneling of one juror on the grounds that the juror's spouse 
was employed by an insurance company, and also that counsel had 
not been allowed to question the juror concerning this 
employment. The only mention of this issue on appeal is in a 
short statement in the "issues" portion of Corinne7s brief. 
Because Corinne has not sufficiently briefed or argued this issue 
on appeal, we decline to address its merits. Generally, this 
court will not manufacture a legal argument for an appellant who 
fails to brief or argue an issue. See English v. Standard 
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This court reviews challenges to a trial judge's voir dire 
under an "abuse of discretion" standard. Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 
456, 457-58 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 
1990) . A trial court abuses its discretion and thus commits 
reversible error when, "considering the totality of the 
questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an adequate opportunity to 
gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors." State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988). 
Voir dire has two distinct and equally important purposes: 
the first is to detect actual juror bias—the basis of a "for-
cause" challenge; and the second is to allow parties to collect 
sufficient information to intelligently exercise peremptory 
challenges. See Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P. 2d 
445, 447 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 
1990); Hafen, 772 P.2d at 457. In this case we are concerned 
with the second category. As we recently stated, a "trial judge 
should liberally allow questions 'designed to discover attitudes 
and biases, both conscious and subconscious,' even though such 
questions go beyond that needed for challenges for cause." 
Hafen, 772 P.2d at 457 (quoting State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 
845 (Utah 1988)). The Utah Supreme Court has elaborated on the 
purpose of peremptory challenges: 
Although a trial judge has some discretion in 
limiting voir dire examinations, . . . that 
discretion should be liberally exercised in 
favor of allowing counsel to elicit 
information from prospective jurors. . . . 
Indeed, the fairness of a trial may depend on 
the right of counsel to ask voir dire 
questions designed to discover attitudes and 
biases, both conscious and subconscious, even 
though thev would not have supported a 
challenge for cause. . . . Juror attitudes 
revealed during voir dire may indicate dimly 
perceived, yet deeply rooted, psychological 
biases or prejudices that may not rise to the 
level of a for-cause challenge but 
nevertheless support a peremptory challenge. 
State v. Worthen. 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988)(emphasis added). 
Accordingly, it is not enough for a trial judge to ask 
questions merely to discover a potential jurors overt biases. 
The judge must also allow counsel the opportunity to hear 
Optical Co., 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 41, 44 (1991); Cardin v. 
Morrison-Knudsen. 603 P.2d 862, 865 (Wyo. 1979). 
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responses to questions that may indicate hidden or subconscious 
attitudes. Without such an opportunity, the prospect of 
impaneling a fair and impartial jury is diminished. 
At trial, Corinne's counsel submitted a list of proposed 
voir dire questions including several general questions probing 
the prospective jurors' exposure to tort reform information. 
Additionally, Corinne's counsel identified and offered a specific 
example of such propaganda, a cover article in the March 24, 1986 
issue of Time magazine entitled "Sorry, Your Policy Is 
Cancelled." Corinne asked the court to question the potential 
jurors about any exposure to this magazine article. Some of the 
specific questions Corinne proposed included: 
Have you read magazine or newspaper articles 
or other literature about medical negligence? 
Did any of you read Time magazine in March, 1986? 
Have you ever signed any petition on the issue of 
negligence? 
Have you seen anything in your doctor's office about 
negligence? 
Have you discussed [medical negligence] with your 
family doctor or friends? 
Rather than asking the prospective jurors Corinne's 
requested questions in the area of exposure to "tort reform" 
material, the trial judge asked: 
Now, many of you have heard and read 
articles, and there have been television 
programs, with regard to negligence on the 
part of doctors. Do any of you have any 
strong feelings as a result of seeing or 
reading anything about medical negligence 
that would make it so that you couldn't be 
fair and impartial here today? 
Now, do any of you have any strong feelings about 
anyone bringing a lawsuit against a doctor? 
Following the first question, two jurors indicated their 
inability to be fair and impartial, and the trial judge dismissed 
them for cause. There was no response to the other question. At 
the conclusion of the two-hour voir dire, the judge impaneled the 
jury over plaintiff's objections. 
4 
Dr. Doty claims the trial judge properly refused to ask the 
questions posed by Corinne's attorney as these questions would 
have improperly introduced the issue of insurance. Though 
Corinne's requested questions did not directly refer to 
insurance, Dr. Doty claims that because they focused on potential 
"tort-reform" bias, the questions indirectly suggested that Dr. 
Doty carried liability insurance and thus were properly excluded 
on that basis. 
Recently, many jurisdictions have been faced with the issue 
of when a plaintiff may infuse insurance into voir dire 
questioning. The issue of insurance-related voir dire 
questioning has arisen in three distinct situations. First, 
plaintiffs have sought to inquire into prospective jurors7 
relationships with insurance companies. See, e.g., Broberg, 782 
P.2d at 200; Hafen, 772 P.2d at 458; Saltas v. Affleck. 99 Utah 
381, 105 P.2d 176 (1940); Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P.2d 
224, 227-32 (1932). Second, plaintiffs have requested permission 
to determine whether jurors have been exposed to a specific, 
identifiable media report or advertising campaign; often where 
insurance companies have funded such a campaign to convince the 
public of the "evils" of modern tort law and the impact of large 
jury awards on insurance premiums. See, e.g., Ostler, 781 P.2d 
at 447; Yost, 594 P.2d at 689-90. Finally, plaintiffs have 
sought to inquire of jurors as to their general knowledge about 
and attitudes toward medical negligence and tort reform without 
regard to a specific advertising campaign or news media report. 
See, e.g., Hafen, 772 P.2d at 458-59; Barton v. Owen, 139 Cal. 
Rptr. 494, 508, 71 Cal. App. 3d 484, 508-09 (1977). In this 
case, both the second and third categories described above are at 
issue. 
The underlying concern in each of these situations is 
whether discussing insurance in front of jurors may lead the 
jurors to infer that the defendant carries liability insurance.3 
3. The traditional logic is that a jury may be more likely to 
find for the plaintiff or increase a plaintiff's damage award if 
the jury knows the defendant has insurance. Balle v. Smith, 17 
P.2d at 229. This per se "insurance" rule developed during a 
time when liability insurance was uncommon. "When the rule 
against disclosure of insurance originated doubtless the 
existence of such protection for defendants was exceptional and a 
'hush, hush' policy could be effective." McCormick, Evidence § 
201 at 481 (2d ed. 1972). 
More recently, however, courts have begun to question this 
traditional "insurance" rule. Causey v. Cornelius. 164 Cal. App. 
2d 269, 330 P.2d 468, 472 (1958). The Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals has noted: 
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Utah courts have never adopted a rule that discussion of 
insurance is per se improper, but instead have recognized that 
whether a plaintiff may discuss insurance with the jury must be 
evaluated from the particular facts of the individual case. 
[P]laintiff in a personal injury or death 
case, if acting in good faith for the purpose 
of ascertaining the qualifications of jurors, 
and not merely for the purpose of informing 
them that defendant is insured, may in one 
form or another inquire of prospective jurors 
on voir dire examination with reference to 
their interest in or connection with 
insurance companies. 
Balle, 17 P.2d at 229. More recently, this court has recognized 
that the issue of insurance voir dire questioning involves a 
delicate balancing of the respective interests of the parties, 
and that plaintiffs must conduct any insurance-related inquiry in 
good faith. Broberg, 782 P.2d at 200-01. 
The word "insurance" is not outlawed from the 
courtroom as a word of magical evil. Jurors 
are not unaware that insurance is at large in 
the world and its mention will not open to 
them a previously unknown realm. It is in 
fact more realistic for the judge to dissolve 
the phantom by open talk in the courtroom 
than to have it run loose in the unconfined 
speculations of the jury room. The court has 
wide control over the voir dire and can 
adequately safeguard the inquiry by 
explaining to the jurors the limited scope 
and purpose of the examination and thus 
eliminate any implication of the existence or 
relevance of insurance in the case before it. 
Kiernan v. Van Schaik. 347 F.2d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 1965). 
There can be little question that even unsophisticated 
jurors will suspect the existence of insurance. "[T]he general 
prevalence of liability insurance for automobile injuries is 
known to the jurors; hence, for the law to forbid any disclosure 
of it in the course of the trial seems to be merely a piece of 
hypocritical futility." 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 282a at 169 
(Chadbourn rev. 1979); see also Silver State Disposal Co. v. 
Shelley, 105 Nev. 309, 774 P.2d 1044, 1047 (1989) (jurors are 
likely aware of insurance coverage). Accordingly, the underlying 
rationale for the insurance rule has been greatly eroded as, 
today, corporations and individuals almost universally purchase 
insurance. 
900132-CA 6 
Both Corinne and Dr. Doty principally rely on the reasoning 
in the 1979 Montana Supreme Court case of Borkoski v. Yost, 594 
P.2d 688 (Mont. 1979), as determinative of whether tort-reform 
inquiry should be allowed during voir dire.4 In Yost, a medical-
malpractice action, the plaintiff sought to pursue a line of 
inquiry during voir dire to determine the existence of juror bias 
as a result of a specific national advertising campaign by 
insurance companies. The advertising campaign had run in several 
national magazines during the time when the jury was impaneled. 
Plaintiff's counsel requested 
permission to examine prospective jurors with 
a line of inquiry to determine whether any 
prospective jurors have been exposed to, have 
observed, or are aware of the national 
campaign by leading insurance companies, 
directed particularly at prospective jurors, 
to the effect that large jury verdicts are in 
fact paid by the general public at large and 
constituted "windfalls" to the recipients. 
Id. at 690 (emphasis added). The trial court denied plaintiff's 
motion, but did allow plaintiff's counsel to "inquire as to each 
juror whether or not they feel that doctors are unnecessarily or 
professional people are unnecessarily oppressed by suits or large 
verdicts." Id. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
defendants. 
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court held that the trial 
court should have allowed the line of questioning as to the 
insurance companies' advertising campaign. The court held that: 
[I]n appropriate cases, an attorney upon voir 
dire may inquire of prospective jurors 
whether they have any business relationship 
with insurance companies and whether they are 
policyholders of an insurance company named 
as a defendant or of a mutual insurance 
company involved in the case. [Further], 
upon a proper showing of possible prejudice, 
an attorney may inquire whether a prospective 
juror has heard or read anything to indicate 
that jury verdicts for plaintiffs in personal 
injury cases result in higher insurance 
premiums for everyone; if so, whether the 
prospective juror believes such materials; 
4. This court has previously considered. Yost persuasive. See 
Hafen, 772 P.2d at 459. 
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and if so, whether that belief will interfere 
with the juror's ability to render a fair and 
impartial verdict. Depending on the 
responses received to these inquiries and 
subject to the discretion of the trial court, 
limited follow-up inquiries may be made. 
Id. at 694. The court adopted this rule because 
[w]hen insurance companies inject the issue 
of insurance into the consciousness of every 
potential juror through a high priced 
advertising campaign, . . . they threaten 
every plaintiff's right to an impartial jury. 
. . . In such cases, it is only fair that 
attorneys have some means to secure this 
right for their clients. Liberal voir dire 
is the best means to this end. 
Id. (citations omitted). The Yost court was dealing with a 
particular advertising campaign. In this context the court 
explained that when, during voir dire, a party inquires about 
particular advertisements and specifically interjects the issue 
of high insurance premiums, the questions are proper only where 
counsel first asks certain general introductory questions. 
Counsel must first ask questions to determine if the prospective 
juror has read anything that might affect the juror's 
impartiality, or whether the juror regularly reads any of the 
magazines or publications that have printed the prejudicial 
material. If "no positive responses are received to these 
introductory inquiries, there is no reason to pursue further the 
line of inquiry we have approved above." Id. at 695. Finally, 
the Yost Court imposed a "good faith" requirement on plaintiff's 
counsel: counsel cannot merely be attempting to suggest to 
jurors that the defendant carries liability insurance. Id. 
^he Yost court, however, found the trial court's refusal to 
allow the inquiry on voir dire was harmless error. The court 
pointed out that the ad campaign complained about by the 
plaintiff focused on the size of the jury award, and at no point 
suggested "that juries should not find a party negligent in the 
first place." Id. Thus, the Yost court apparently believed that 
any bias created by the ad campaign would only manifest itself 
when the jury considered the amount of damages. Because the Yost 
jury found no liability, the court found the error harmless. 
The Yost court was not faced specifically with the issue of 
what questions about general tort reform are permissible when the 
plaintiff cannot show the existence of a. specific tort-crisis 
advertising campaign or article, but instead wants to uncover 
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information about the potential juror's exposure to general 
information on medical negligence and tort reform for the purpose 
of exercising peremptory challenges. Despite the Yost court's 
failure to address this issue, however, its approach suggests 
that general inquiry about tort reform and its effect on juror 
impartiality—that does not mention or discuss insurance 
unnecessarily—would be appropriate. Id. at 695. 
Dr. Doty claims that the trial judge did not err in voir 
dire because the judge asked appropriate introductory questions 
as instructed by Yost and as adopted in Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 
456 (Utah App. 1989) . In Hafen, a motorcycle-automobile 
collision injury action, the trial court asked the jury "whether 
anyone had read or experienced anything that would affect the 
amount of compensation they would be willing to award in a 
verdict." Id. at 458. The plaintiff objected to this 
"generalized" voir dire question, arguing that the question was 
insufficient "to reach any deep-rooted bias caused by 'tort 
reform propaganda.'"5 Id. Rather, plaintiff wanted the judge to 
ask "specifically whether the prospective jurors had read any 
such 'tort reform propaganda.'" Id. 
The Hafen court upheld the trial court's refusal to ask the 
proposed "tort reform" questions under an abuse of discretion 
standard. The court ruled that the question the trial court 
asked was sufficient. Id. at 459. We do not disagree with the 
holding of Hafen. However, in reaching its conclusion, the Hafen 
court relied upon Yost's treatment of questions concerning 
specific media accounts (i.e. the second category of insurance 
questions)as supporting its decision that the plaintiff must ask 
one of two alternative general questions, to determine potential 
juror bias, before proceeding with more specific "tort reform 
bias" questions about specific articles: 
[Yost] held that before any specific 
questioning about the articles would be 
allowed, either of two alternative types of 
preliminary questions must be asked: 
"[W]hether the prospective juror has heard of 
or read anything . . . which might affect his 
ability to sit as an impartial juror . . . or 
5. In Hafen, the plaintiff also objected to the trial court's 
refusal to ask the jurors (1) certain general background 
questions such as their level of education and the types of 
magazines they read, and (2) whether any jurors had an employment 
or financial relationship with an insurance company. These 
questions, however, raise different concerns and issues than 
those presented by the instant case. 
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. . . whether the prospective juror reads any 
of the magazines or newspapers in which it 
has been demonstrated that the . . . articles 
had appeared." 
We adopt the analysis in [Yost] and apply it 
to the instant case. 
Id. at 458-59 (quoting Yost. 594 P.2d at 695)(citations omitted). 
We find the Hafen panel's reliance on the Yost analysis 
somewhat confusing. Unlike Hafen. which dealt with the third 
category on insurance questions, Yost dealt with the second voir 
dire "insurance" category where the plaintiff clearly established 
that the defendant's insurance company had launched a specific, 
contemporaneous tort reform advertising campaign. 
In Hafen, the plaintiff was merely attempting to discover, 
by a generalized tort-reform question not tied to insurance 
premiums, whether potential jurors had been exposed to tort-
reform information in general. This was precisely the type of 
preliminary question approved in Yost. See 594 P.2d at 695. In 
short, Hafen's reading of Yost failed to distinguish between the 
second and third category of voir dire insurance-tort reform 
questions, and oversimplified the analysis of insurance-tort 
reform voir dire questions by grouping these two categories 
together. Thus, to the extent the Hafen opinion can be read as 
per se not allowing general questions as to whether juror have 
read or seen media reports concerning medical negligence or tort 
reform where insurance is not specifically interjected, we reject 
it. 
In view of this analytical framework, we now turn to the 
case-before us. Corinne's objections to the court's voir dire 
were two-fold. First, Corinne objected to the trial court's 
failure to inquire as to the juror's knowledge of a specific Time 
magazine article on tort reform and insurance premiums. Second, 
Corinne's counsel objected to the trial court's failure to ask 
general questions designed to discover if any potential juror had 
been exposed to medical negligence or tort reform information in 
general. In this case, both of these objections go to the issue 
of Corinne's ability to intelligently exercise peremptory 
challenges. 
Under the first issue—whether the trial court should have 
questioned jurors concerning the Time magazine article—the Yost 
analysis is instructive because, like Yost, this issue fits into 
the second "insurance" voir dire category outlined above. In 
Yost, plaintiff's counsel demonstrated that defendant's insurance 
company, the real party in interest, had participated in a 
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contemporaneous, nation-wide advertising campaign designed to 
influence the public concerning the "evils" of large jury awards. 
YostP 594 P.2d at 694. Because the advertising raising was 
ongoing at the time the jury was impaneled, the Yost court held 
that plaintiff's counsel had established sufficient foundation 
that counsel should have been allowed to question jurors as to 
their exposure to the campaign. The Yost court held that in such 
circumstances, before an attorney may question jurors as to their 
exposure to advertisements and media reports, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the jurors are likely to have been recently 
exposed to such propaganda. Id. We adopt Yost's reasoning, and 
thus hold that before a plaintiff may inquire as to a juror's 
exposure to a specific article or advertisement raising 
specifically the issue of the need for tort reform and its 
relationship to high insurance premiums, the plaintiff must lay a 
foundation showing that the juror is likely to have been exposed 
to the material, and further that the material was published 
recently enough so that the juror will likely remember reading 
it. 
In this case, the Time article was three years old when the 
jury was impaneled. Thus, jurors were not likely to remember 
having read the article. Corinne's proposed question asked 
jurors whether they had "read Time magazine in March, 1986." We 
find it unlikely that, in 1989, any jurors would be able to 
accurately respond to such a question. Accordingly, because 
jurors were unlikely to have recently read the Time article or to 
remember having read it, we do not find the trial court abused 
its discretion in failing to inquire about the specific article. 
Corinne's second objection, however, is more problematic. 
Corinne's counsel presented several general questions inquiring 
as to jurors' exposure to information on tort reform and lawsuits 
against doctors. The questions fit the third "insurance" voir 
dire category described above. As explained, determining whether 
an insurance voir dire question such as this should be asked 
requires a balancing of the relative interests of the parties in 
light of the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In 
tort cases, and more particularly in medical malpractice cases, 
we cannot ignore the reality that potential jurors may have 
developed tort-reform biases as a result of an overall exposure 
to such propaganda. See Yost 594 P.2d at 694. Accordingly, in 
cases such as this one, the plaintiff has a legitimate interest 
in discovering which jurors may have read or heard information 
generally on medical negligence or tort reform. 
Here, the trial judge did ask questions sufficient to ferret 
out actual tort reform biases. However, Corinne claims that the 
court's questions did not allow her sufficient information to 
exercise her peremptory challenges. Specifically, Corinne wanted 
900132-CA 11 
to know which of the potential jurors had been exposed to tort 
reform propaganda—even if the potential jurors believed that 
such exposure had not changed their attitudes or biased them. We 
conclude she should have been allowed such an opportunity. The 
judge stated: "many of you have heard and read articles, and 
there have been television programs, with regard to negligence on 
the part of doctors. Do any of you have any strong feelings as a 
result of seeing or reading anything about medical negligence 
that would make it so that you couldn't be fair and impartial 
here today?11 Had the trial judge first asked jurors which of 
them could recall exposure to such articles and programs, Corinne 
would have had an opportunity to identify jurors who had been 
exposed to such information. Further, this is the type of 
general preliminary question approved in Yost. See id. at 695. 
However, rather than seek responses to such a question, the trial 
judge instead focused on the issue of for-cause type bias by 
asking whether jurors felt they could be impartial and fair. The 
trial judge's line of questions ignored Corinne's need to gather 
information to assist in exercising her peremptory challenges. 
Reason suggests that exposure to tort-reform propaganda may 
foster a subconscious bias within certain prospective jurors, 
and, had Corinne been able to identify those jurors exposed to 
such propaganda, she could have more intelligently exercised her 
peremptory challenges. Furthermore, we note that Corinne's 
requested questions made no mention of insurance premiums and 
thus, the risk of prejudicing Dr. Doty's interests under this 
proposed inquiry was much less than in Yost. In sum, we believe 
the trial court should have asked the potential jurors some of 
the questions proposed by Corinne about their exposure to tort-
reform and medical negligence propaganda—not just if they had 
been biased by the exposure. 
. Our conclusion that the trial judge should have allowed 
additional questions during voir dire does not end our inquiry. 
The failure to ask an appropriate question on voir dire does not 
always constitute an abuse of discretion requiring reversal.6 We 
6. A new trial is not always necessary simply because the trial 
court refuses to ask jurors an appropriate question submitted by 
one of the parties to the litigation. See McDonough Power 
Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984) ("[I]t ill 
serves the important end of finality to wipe the slate clean 
simply to recreate the peremptory challenge process because 
counsel lacked an item of information . . . . " ) ; United States v. 
Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1164 (2d Cir. 1989) (All circuits agree that 
whether refusal to ask potential jurors questions "does not 
always constitute reversible error; that, question hinges upon" a 
number of factors including "the extent to which the [topic] is 
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only reverse if "considering the totality of the questioning, 
counsel [is not] afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the 
information necessary to evaluate jurors." State v. Bishop. 753 
P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988). 
Initially, Dr. Doty contends that because the jury found no 
cause of action for negligence, any voir dire error must be 
considered harmless. Dr. Doty relies on Yost, which held that 
because the jury found for the defendant on the issue of 
liability, any failure of the judge to question the jurors 
regarding tort-reform propaganda was harmless. Yost. 594 P.2d at 
695. Dr. Doty, however, fails to recognize an important 
distinguishing factor between Yost and this case. As explained 
above, Yost dealt with a very specific and unique situation—the 
direct impact of an identifiable and contemporaneous nation-wide 
advertising campaign on potential jurors. Because the 
advertising campaign in Yost advocated lowering jury awards, and 
did not focus on liability, the Yost court believed that a biased 
jury would manifest their bias by first finding liability and 
then improperly limiting the damage award. Accordingly, the Yost 
court held that when the jury found for the defendant, such 
finding was not a result of bias created by the advertising 
campaign. 
In this case, any jury tort-reform bias cannot be traced 
directly to a single, recent advertising campaign, but may have 
arisen from an overall exposure to media reports and insurance 
advertisements. To adopt the Yost conclusion, as advocated by 
Dr. Doty, would be an over-simplification of the harmless-error 
rule. We cannot assume that a jury would manifest its bias by 
only reducing damages. It is equally likely that a biased jury 
might act on its bias by finding the defendant not negligent. 
-Notwithstanding Dr. Doty's misreading of Yost, we believe 
the trial court's error in denying Corinne's general tort-reform 
covered in other questions on voir dire and on the charge to the 
jury . . . . " ) ; State v. Malmrose. 649 P.2d 56, 60 (Utah 1982) 
("Traditionally, the trial court is given considerable latitude 
as to the manner and form of conducting the voir dire examination 
and is only restricted in that discretion from committing 
prejudicial error."); State v. Hall. 797 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 
1990) ("For a court's exercise of discretion in disallowing voir 
dire questions to be overturned, appellant must show that the 
abuse of discretion rose to a level of reversible error."); 
Hornsbv v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop. 758 P.2d 929, 933 
(Utah App. 1988) (Only " [substantial impairment of the right to 
informed exercise of peremptory challenges" constitutes an abuse 
of discretion mandating reversal.). 
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medical negligence question did not rise to the level of an abuse 
of discretion. Given the totality of the questioning allowed and 
in light of the extensive, two-hour voir dire, we cannot say the 
trial court abused its discretion such that we must reverse. The 
trial court asked many questions that would allow Corinne to 
intelligently exercise her peremptory challenges, including an 
inquiry into the jurors' occupations, background, and feelings 
about medical malpractice law in general. Further, when the 
trial court asked potential jurors if they could not be impartial 
because of an exposure to tort-reform information, two indicated 
they could not be impartial and the trial court excused them. 
Accordingly, an examination of the totality of questioning leads 
us to conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
conducting voir dire. 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Finally, Corinne contends the trial court should have 
granted her motion for a new trial as there was insufficient 
evidence to support the jury's verdict. "To successfully attack 
the verdict, an appellant must marshall all the evidence 
supporting the verdict and then demonstrate that, even viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to that verdict, the 
evidence is insufficient to support it.11 Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 
P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). "We accord due deference to the jury 
as the fact finder and do not substitute ourselves in this role." 
Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon. 746 P.2d 785, 793 (Utah App. 
1987) , cert, dismissed, Israel Pagan Estate v. Capital Thrift & 
Loan, 771 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1989). Corinne has not met her burden 
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of marshalling the evidence, and therefore we affirm the jury 
verdict finding Dr. Doty was not negligent,7 
Judith M. Billings, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
<=s***^ £ y* 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
,£&7S0****?&^ ^ 7t^^¥^^ 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
7. Although Corinne has failed to marshall the evidence in 
support of her sufficiency of the evidence claim, review of the 
trial record shows that, even had Corinne properly marshalled the 
evidence, there nevertheless is ample evidence to support the 
jury's verdict in favor of Dr. Doty. At trial, Dr. Doty's 
counsel called two expert witnesses to testify, and counsel also 
read-the deposition of another expert witness to the jury. 
Further, Dr. Doty himself offered expert testimony. Both of Dr. 
Doty's well-qualified experts testified that the injury Corinne 
sustained to her nerve during surgery could have occurred in the 
absence of negligence, and that such nerve injury is a risk that 
sometimes cannot be avoided with this surgical procedure. One of 
Dr. Doty's experts testified that during his surgical experience, 
he had had several patients who sustained comparable nerve injury 
during similar procedures that were adequately performed. The 
jury also heard the deposition of another expert surgeon who 
stated that he has seen similar injuries numerous times in 
practice without any medical negligence. Finally, Dr. Doty 
testified that he performed Corinne's surgery in compliance with 
a reasonable and prudent standard of care. Dr. Doty opined that 
the nerve likely was damaged as a result of tension brought to 
bear on the nerve because the ductus was. large and because the 
patient suffered from high blood pressure. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CORINNE EVANS, by and through 
her guardians ad litem J. BLAKE 
EVANS and DONALEE J. EVANS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DR. DONALD B. DOTY, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Case No. 900132-CA 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH 
Appellant hereby petitions this Court for a rehearing. The 
Court's opinion is reported at Evans v. Doty. 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 
43 (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1991). By his signature below, counsel 
for appellant certifies that this petition is presented in good 
faith and not for delay. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In its well-reasoned opinion, this Court properly held that 
the trial court unfairly restricted the voir dire examination of 
the jury, and thus impaired plaintiff's right to intelligently 
exercise peremptory challenges. This Court misapprehended, 
however, the test to determine whether the error was harmless. The 
Court invaded the province of the jury by opining that a properly 
selected jury would likely have reached the same result. Prior 
decisions of this Court, the Utah Supreme Court, and the United 
States Supreme Court establish that actual prejudice is not 
necessary. If there was any evidence which would support a verdict 
for plaintiff, plaintiff is entitled to present that evidence to 
a property selected jury. Substantial evidence in this case showed 
defendant negligently injured plaintiff, and would have supported 
a verdict for plaintiff. The case should be remanded for a new 
trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A DEFECT IN THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS 
IS PER SE REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
This Court properly held that the trial court unfairly 
deprived plaintiff of her right to intelligently exercise peremp-
tory challenges: 
However, Corinne claims that the court's 
questions did not allow her sufficient infor-
mation to exercise her peremptory challenges. 
Specifically, Corinne wanted to know which of 
the potential jurors had been exposed to tort 
reform propaganda—even if the potential 
jurors believed that such exposure had not 
changed their attitudes or biased them. We 
conclude she should have been allowed such an 
opportunity. . . . The trial judge's line of 
questions ignored Corinne's need to gather 
information to assist in exercising her per-
emptory challenges. 
171 Utah Adv. Rep. at 47, slip op. at 13-14. 
This Court then considered whether the error was harmless, 
applying a test from State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989): 
Our conclusion that the voir dire was 
unduly restrictive does not end our inquiry. 
Next, we must determine if the error was 
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sufficiently prejudicial to Corinne to merit 
a new trial. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled 
that harmless errors are those "which, al-
though properly preserved below and presented 
on appeal, are sufficiently inconsequential 
that we conclude there is no reasonable like-
lihood that the error affected the outcome of 
the proceedings." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116, 120 (Utah 1989). 
171 Utah Adv. Rep. at 47, slip op. at 14. 
Verde and the cases cited therein all involve the exclusion 
or admission of evidence. A different test applies where the jury 
selection process is impugned. 
A hearing before an unbiased tribunal is a basic element of 
due process. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Miller v. 
City of Mission, Kansas. 705 F.2d 368, 372 (10th Cir. 1983). 
Peremptory challenges promote selection of an unbiased jury by 
allowing a party to exclude jurors based on "real or imagined 
partiality." Swain v. Alabama. 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965), quoted 
in Hornsby v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 758 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). "Indeed, the fairness of a trial may depend on the right 
of counsel to ask voir dire questions designed to discover at-
titudes and biases, both conscious and subconscious . . . ." State 
v. Worthen, 765 .2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988). 
Because an unbiased tribunal is such an important right, the 
Utah Supreme Court has long held that any impairment of peremptory 
challenges is reversible error. Empirical proof of prejudice is 
not required. State v. Bailev, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980). The 
3 
convincing weight of the evidence is irrelevant. In Crawford v. 
Manning. 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975), the Court stated: 
It is no excuse to say that the verdict 
was unanimous and since six of the eight 
jurors could find a verdict, the error was 
harmless. By exercising one of their per-
emptory challenges upon this prospective 
juror, plaintiffs had only two remaining. The 
juror which remained because the plaintiffs 
had no challenge to remove him may have been 
a hawk amid seven doves and imposed his will 
upon them. 
Similarly, one of the jurors in the instant case may have had 
strong unexpressed feelings about tort litigation and may have 
imposed his will on the other jurors. 
Although Crawford involved a peremptory challenge used to 
remove a jurur who should have been removed for cause, the same 
rule applies when voir dire examination is improperly limited. 
"Substantial impairment of the right to informed exercise of 
peremptory challenges is reversible error." Hornsbv. 758 P.2d at 
929 (citing Swain, 380 U.S. at 219, and State v. Ball. 685 P.2d 
1055, 1060 (Utah 1984)). The trial court in Hornsbv curtailed the 
plaintiffs right to probe the juror's religious background. This 
Court held the limitation was error, and reversed and remanded for 
a new trial. There is no discussion in the opinion of the relative 
strength of the parties' evidence. The jury selection process was 
flawed, so reversal was necessary. Moran v. Jones. 75 Ariz. 175, 
253 P.2d 891, 894-95 (1953). 
Any other rule would improperly invade the jury's province. 
A directed verdict can be granted at trial only where reasonable 
minds could reach only one conclusion based on the evidence. 
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Management Comm. of Gravstone Pines Homeowners Assoc, v. Gravstone 
Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982). This Court must 
follow the same rule in determining whether the improper curtail-
ment of voir dire is prejudicial. This Court may "direct" or 
determine the verdict that a hypothetical new jury would reach only 
if the evidence supports only one conclusion. If there is evidence 
which would have supported a verdict for the plaintiff, and if the 
jury was improperly selected, this Court cannot properly hold that 
a different jury would have returned a defense verdict. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF PRESENTED A PRIMA FACIE CASE 
AND IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL 
BEFORE AN UNBIASED JURY. 
Defendant Doty operated on Corinne Evans, then two years two 
months old, to correct a patent ductus arteriosus. (Tr. vol. 2 
(Doty), p. 22; tr. vol. 3 (Glade) p. 23.) Her recurrent laryngeal 
nerve was damaged during the surgery (tr. Vol. 5 (Gay) p. 23; tr. 
vol 2 (Doty) p. 25), resulting in permanent paralysis of her left 
vocal cord. (Tr. vol. 3 (Glade) p. 33.) The paralyzed vocal cord 
fails to open when Corinne breathes (Tr. vol. 1 (White) p. 42), and 
as a result Corinne required constant oxygen therapy for two and 
a half years (id. p. 66; tr. vol. 3 (Glade) p. 42, 53), and 
continues to need night-time oxygen. (Tr. vol. 1 (White) p. 24-
25; Tr. vol. 3 (Glade) p. 69, 122-23.) 
The recurrent laryngeal nerve runs along the ductus arteri-
osus. (Tr. vol. 2 (Doty) p. 33.) Dr. Doty tied off the ductus 
without first locating the nerve. (Trial exhibit 9-P.) This 
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failure was negligent and caused Corinne's injury, (Tr. vol. 6 
(Achtel) pp. 21, 27, 28, 34, 37.) Dr. Doty acknowledged the 
possibility that he had cut the nerve (tr. vol. 2 (Doty) pp. 83-
84), and admitted that cutting the nerve would have constituted 
negligence. (Id. p. 84.) He further acknowledged that "I have no 
way of knowing if I did [cut the nerve] or not.11 fid.) 
An unbiased jury, based on this evidence, could properly 
return a verdict for Corinne. This Court improperly invaded the 
province of the jury by holding that a second jury would reach the 
same result as the first. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court properly held that the trial court's limitation of 
voir dire prevented plaintiff from intelligently exercising her 
peremptory challenges. The jury was improperly selected. This 
Court should not usurp the jury's role by predicting what a 
different jury would decide. The case must be remanded for a new 
trial. 
DATED this &^ day of November, 1991. 
JACKSON HOWARD, and ~7l 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: U 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
This is an appeal in a medical malpractice 
action following a jury verdict in favor of the 
defendant doctor. On appeal, plaintiff asserts 
that: (1) during voir dire, the trial judge 
refused to ask prospective jurors questions 
sufficient to allow the plaintiff to exercise her 
peremptory challenges; and (2) there is insuf-
ficient evidence to support the jury verdict 
and, therefore, plaintiff is entitled to a new 
trial. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Plaintiff, Corinne Evans, was born in 
January 1982, six weeks premature and suff-
ering from Downs Syndrome. In October, 
1983, Corinne was hospitalized for severe 
pneumonia. During her hospital stay, doctors 
discovered Corinne also suffered from extreme 
pulmonary hypertension. Tests revealed the 
hypertension was caused by a patent ductus 
arteriosus. The ductus arteriosus is a blood 
vessel which bypasses the non-functioning 
lungs of an infant prior to birth. At birth, the 
ductus normally closes spontaneously. In 
Corinne's case, however, the ductus failed to 
completely close, resulting in the defect. 
Corinne's parents selected the defendant, 
Doctor Donald J. Doty, to operate on Corinne 
to correct the condition. Dr. Doty is a certi-
fied cardio-thoracic surgeon. Dr. Doty had 
performed more than one hundred patent 
ductus repairs, and has written extensively 
about the procedure. 
v. Doty
 A~ 
Adv. Reo. 43 5 £ 
Dr. Doty successfully repaired the ductus. 
However, during surgery, Corinne's recurrent 
laryngeal nerve, which runs near the ductus, 
was permanently damaged. As a result, 
Corinne's left vocai cord was paralyzed. Fol-
lowing surgery, Corinne, through her parents, 
commenced this law suit, claiming Dr. Doty 
negligently injured the nerve during surgery. 
During voir dire Corinne's attorney subm-
itted many questions; in fact* the voir dire 
lasted two hours. However, over Corinne's 
attorney's objections, the trial judge refused 
to ask several questions designed to probe the 
jurors' exposure to tort reform propaganda. 
After a four-day trial the jury returned a 
verdict finding Dr. Doty was not negligent. 
VOIR DIRE 
First, Corinne claims the trial judge impr-
operly refused to ask potential jurors certain 
questions during voir dire and, as a result, the 
voir dire was insufficient to allow her counsel 
to intelligently exercise her peremptory chall-
enges. Corinne does not claim the trial judge 
failed to remove certain jurors for cause.1 
This court reviews challenges to a trial 
judge's voir dire under an "abuse of discre-
tion" standard. Doe v. Ha/en, 772 P.2d 456, 
457-58 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 800 
P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). A trial court abuses its 
discretion when, "considering the totality of 
the questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an 
adequate opportunity to gain the information 
necessary to evaluate jurors." State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439,448 (Utah 1988). 
Even if we determine the court abused its 
discretion in restricting voir dire, this does not 
end our inquiry. In order to reverse, we must 
also find the error was sufficiently prejudicial 
to plaintiff to merit a new trial. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 61 (1991);2 see State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116, 120 (Utah 1989); Borkoski v. Yost, 182 
Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688, 695 (1979). Further, 
the party seeking the new trial has the burden 
of showing that the error was not harmless. 
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 
1987). 
Voir dire has two distinct and equally imp-
ortant purposes: the first is to detect actual 
juror bias-the basis of a "for-cause" 
challenge; and the second Is to allow parties to 
collect sufficient information to intelligently 
exercise peremptory challenges. See Ostler v. 
Albina Transfer Co.. Inc., 781 P.2d 445, 447 
(Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 
(Utah 1990); Hafen. Ill P.2d at 457. In this 
case we are concerned with the second cate-
gory. As we recently stated, a "trial judge 
should liberally allow questions 'designed to 
discover attitudes and biases, both conscious 
and subconscious/ even though such quest-
ions go beyond that needed for challenges for 
cause." Hafen, 772 P.2d at 457 (quoting State 
v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988)). 
The Utah Supreme Court has elaborated on 
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the purpose of peremptory challenges: 
Although a trial judge has some 
discretion in limiting voir dire exa-
minations, ... that discretion should 
be liberally exercised in favor of 
allowing counsel to elicit informa-
tion from prospective jurors— 
Indeed, the fairness of a trial may 
depend on the right of counsel to 
ask voir dire questions designed to 
discover attitudes and biases, both 
conscious and subconscious, even 
though they would not have supp-
orted a challenge for cause.... Juror 
attitudes revealed during voir dire 
may indicate dimly perceived, yet 
deeply rooted, psychological biases 
or prejudices that may not rise to 
the level of a for-cause challenge 
but nevertheless support a peremp-
tory challenge. 
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 
1988)(emphasis added). 
Accordingly, it is not enough for a trial 
judge to ask questions merely to discover a 
potential juror's overt biases. The judge must 
also allow counsel the opportunity to hear 
responses to questions that may indicate 
hidden or subconscious attitudes. Without 
such an opportunity, the prospect of impane-
ling a fair and impartial jury is diminished. 
At trial, Corinne's counsel submitted a list 
of proposed voir dire questions including 
several general questions probing the prospe-
ctive jurors' exposure to tort reform inform-
ation. Additionally, Corinne's counsel ident-
ified and offered a specific example of such 
propaganda, a cover article in the March 24, 
1986 issue of Time magazine entitled "Sorry, 
Your Policy Is Cancelled." Corinne asked the 
court to question the potential jurors about 
any exposure to this magazine article. Some of 
the specific questions Corinne proposed incl-
uded: 
Have you read magazine or news-
paper articles or other literature 
about medical negligence? 
Did any of you read Time magazine 
in March, 1986? 
Have you ever signed any petition 
on the issue of negligence? 
Have you seen anything in your 
doctor's office about negligence? 
Have you discussed [medical negli-
gence] with your family doctor or 
friends? 
Rather than asking the prospective jurors 
Corinne's requested questions in the area of 
exposure to "tort reform" material, the trial 
judge asked: 
Now, many of you have heard and 
read articles, and there have been 
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television programs, with regard to 
negligence on the part of doctors. 
Do any of you have any strong 
feelings as a result of seeing or 
reading anything about medical 
negligence that would make it so 
that you couldn't be fair and imp-
artial here today? 
Now, do any of you have any 
strong feelings about anyone brin-
ging a lawsuit against a doctor? 
Following the first question, two jurors indi-
cated their inability to be fair and impartial, 
and the trial judge dismissed them for cause. 
There was no response to the other question. 
At the conclusion of the two-hour voir dire, 
the judge impaneled the jury over plaintiffs 
objections. 
Dr. Doty claims the trial judge properly 
refused to ask the questions posed by 
Corinne's attorney as these questions would 
have improperly introduced the issue of insu-
rance. Though Corinne's requested questions 
did not directly refer to insurance, Dr. Doty 
claims that because they focused on potential 
"tort-reform" bias, the questions indirectly 
suggested that Dr. Doty carried liability insu-
rance and thus were properly excluded on that 
basis. 
Recently, many jurisdictions have been 
faced with the issue of when a plaintiff may 
infuse insurance into voir dire questioning. 
The issue of insurance-related voir dire 
questioning has arisen in three distinct situat-
ions. First, plaintiffs have sought to inquire 
into prospective jurors' relationships with 
insurance companies. See, e.g., Broberg, 782 
P.2d at 200; Hafen, 772 P.2d at 458; Saltas v. 
Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P.2d 176 (1940); Balle 
v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P.2d 224, 227-
32 (1932). Second, plaintiffs have requested 
permission to determine whether jurors have 
been exposed to a specific, identifiable media 
report or advertising campaign; often where 
insurance companies have funded such a 
campaign to convince the public of the "evils" 
of modern tort law and the impact of large 
jury awards on insurance premiums. See, e.g., 
Ostler, 781 P.2d at 447; Yost, 594 P.2d at 689-
90. Finally, plaintiffs have sought to inquire 
of jurors as to their general knowledge about 
and attitudes toward medical negligence and 
ton reform without regard to a specific adv-
ertising campaign or news media report. See, 
e.g., Hafen, Til P.2d at 458-59; Barton v. 
Owen, 139 Cal. Rptr. 494, 508, 71 Cal. App. 
3d 484, 508-09 (1977). In this case, both the 
second and third categories described above 
are at issue. 
The underlying concern in each of these 
situations is whether discussing insurance in 
front of jurors may lead the jurors to infer 
that the defendant carries liability insurance.3 
Utah courts have never adopted a rule that 
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discussion of insurance is per se improper, but 
instead have recognized that whether a plain-
tiff may discuss insurance with the jury must 
be evaluated from the particular facts of the 
individual case. 
[P]laintiff in a personal injury or 
death case, if acting in good faith 
for the purpose of ascertaining the 
qualifications of jurors, and not 
merely for the purpose of informing 
them that defendant is insured, may 
in one form or another inquire of 
prospective jurors on voir dire 
examination with reference to their 
interest in or connection with insu-
rance companies. 
Balk, 17 P.2d at 229. More recently, this 
court has recognized that the issue of insur-
ance voir dire questioning involves a delicate 
balancing of the respective interests of the 
parties, and that plaintiffs must conduct any 
insurance-related inquiry in good faith. 
Brobcrg, 782 P.2d at 200-01. 
Both Corinne and Dr. Doty principally rely 
on the reasoning in the 1979 Montana 
Supreme Court case of Borkoski v. Yosu 594 
P.2d 688 (Mont. 1979), as determinative of 
whether ton-reform inquiry should be 
allowed during voir dire.4 In Yost* a medical-
malpractice action, the plaintiff sought to 
pursue a line of inquiry during voir dire to 
determine the existence of juror bias as a 
result of a specific national advertising cam-
paign by insurance companies. The advertising 
campaign had run in several national magaz-
ines during the time when the jury was impa-
neled. Plaintiffs counsel requested 
permission to examine prospective 
jurors with a line of inquiry to 
determine whether any prospective 
jurors have been exposed to, have 
observed, or are aware of the nati-
onal campaign by leading insurance 
companies, directed particularly at 
prospective jurors, to the effect that 
large jury verdicts are in fact paid 
by the general public at large and 
constituted "windfalls" to the reci-
pients. 
Id. at 690 (emphasis added). The trial court 
denied plaintiffs motion, but did allow plai-
ntiffs counsel to "inquire as to each juror 
whether or not they feel that doctors are 
unnecessarily or professional people are unn-
ecessarily oppressed by suits or large verdicts." 
Id. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
defendants. 
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court 
held that the trial court should have allowed 
the line of questioning as to the insurance 
^companies' advertising campaign. The court 
held that: 
[Tin appropriate cases, an attorney 
upon voir dire may inquire of pro-
spective jurors whether they have 
any business relationship with ins-
urance companies and whether they 
are policyholders of an insurance 
company named as a defendant or 
of a mutual insurance company 
involved in the case. [Further], 
upon a proper showing of possible 
prejudice, an attorney may inquire 
whether a prospective juror has 
heard or read anything to indicate 
that jury verdicts for plaintiffs in 
personal injury cases result in 
higher insurance premiums for 
everyone; if so, whether the prosp-
ective juror believes such materials; 
and if so, whether that belief will 
interfere with the juror's ability to 
render a fair and impartial verdict. 
Depending on the responses rece-
ived to these inquiries and subject 
to the discretion of the trial court, 
limited follow-up inquiries may be 
made. 
Id. at 694. The court adopted this rule because 
[wjhen insurance companies inject 
the issue of insurance into the 
consciousness of every potential 
juror through a high priced adver-
tising campaign, ... they threaten 
every plaintiffs right to an impar-
tial jury.... In such cases, it is only 
fair that attorneys have some means 
to secure this right for their clients. 
Liberal voir dire is the best means 
to this end. 
Id. (citations omitted). The Yost court was 
dealing with a particular advertising campaign. 
In this context the court explained that when, 
during voir dire, a party inquires about part-
icular advertisements and specifically interjects 
the issue of high insurance premiums, the 
questions are proper only where counsel first 
asks certain general introductory questions. 
Counsel must first ask questions to determine 
if the prospective juror has read anything that 
might affect the juror's impartiality, or 
whether the juror regularly reads any of the 
magazines or publications that have printed 
the prejudicial material. If "no positive resp-
onses are received to these introductory inqu-
iries, there is no reason to pursue further the 
line of inquiry we have approved above." Id. 
at 695. Finally, the Yost Court imposed a 
"good faith" requirement on plaintiffs 
counsel: counsel cannot merely be attempting 
to suggest to jurors that the defendant carries 
liability insurance. Id. 
The Yost court, however, found the trial 
court's refusal to allow the inquiry on voir 
dire was harmless error. The court pointed out 
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that the ad campaign complained about by the 
plaintiff focused on the size of the jury award, 
and at no point suggested "that juries should 
not find a party negligent in the first place." Id. 
Thus, the Yost court apparently believed 
that any bias created by the ad campaign 
would only manifest itself when the jury 
considered the amount of damages. Because 
the Yost jury found no liability, the court 
found the error harmless. 
The Yost court was not faced specifically 
with the issue of what questions about general 
tort reform are permissible when the plaintiff 
cannot show the existence of a specific tort-
crisis advertising campaign or article, but 
instead wants to uncover information about 
the potential juror's exposure to general inf-
ormation on medical negligence and tort 
reform for the purpose of exercising peremp-
tory challenges. Despite the Yost court's 
failure to address this issue, however, its 
approach suggests that general inquiry about 
tort reform and its effect on juror impartiality-
-that does not mention or discuss insurance 
unnecessarily—would be appropriate. Id. at 
695. 
Dr. Doty claims that the trial judge did not 
err in voir dire because the judge asked appr-
opriate introductory questions as instructed by 
Yost and as adopted in Doe v. Hafen, 772 
P^d 456 (Utah App. 1989). In Hafen, a 
motorcycle-automobile collision injury 
action, the trial court asked the jury "whether 
anyone had read or experienced anything that 
would affect the amount of compensation they 
would be willing to award in a verdict/ Id. at 
458. The plaintiff objected to this 
"generalized" voir dire question, arguing that 
the question was insufficient "to reach any 
deep-rooted bias caused by 'ton reform 
propaganda.'"5 Id. Rather, plaintiff wanted 
the judge to ask "specifically whether the 
prospective jurors had read any such 'tort 
reform propaganda.*" Id. 
The Hafen court upheld the trial court's 
refusal to ask the proposed "tort reform" 
questions under an abuse of discretion stan-
dard. The court ruled that the question the 
trial court asked was sufficient. Id. at 459. We 
do not disagree with the holding of Hafen. 
However, in reaching its conclusion, the Hafen 
court relied upon Yost's treatment of 
questions concerning specific media accounts 
(i.e. the second category of insurance quest-
i o n s ^ supporting its decision that the plain-
tiff must ask one of two alternative general 
questions, to determine potential juror bias, 
before proceeding with more specific "ton 
reform bias" questions about specific anicles: 
[Yosf] held that before any specific 
questioning about the anicles would 
be allowed, either of two alternative 
types of preliminary questions must 
be asked: "[WJhether the prospec-
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tive juror has heard of or read 
anything ... which might affect his 
ability to sit as an impanial juror 
... or ... whether the prospective 
juror reads any of the magazines or 
newspapers in which it has been 
demonstrated that the ... articles 
had appeared." 
We adopt the analysis in [Yost] and 
apply it to the instant case. 
Id. at 458-59 (quoting Yost, 594 P.2d at 
695)(citations omitted). 
We find the Hafen panel's reliance on the 
yosf analysis somewhat confusing. Unlike 
Hafen, which dealt with the third category on 
insurance questions, Yost dealt with the 
second voir dire "insurance" category where 
the plaintiff clearly established that the defe-
ndant's insurance company had launched a 
specific, contemporaneous ton reform adver-
tising campaign. 
In Hafen, the plaintiff was merely attemp-
ting to discover, by a generalized tort-reform 
question nor tied to insurance premiums, 
whether potential jurors had been exposed to 
ton-reform information in general. This was 
precisely the type of preliminary question 
approved in Yost. See 594 P.2d at 695. In 
short, Ha/en's reading of Yost failed to dist-
inguish between the second and third category 
of voir dire insurance-tort reform questions, 
and oversimplified the analysis of insurance-
tort reform voir dire questions by grouping 
these two categories together. Thus, to the 
extent the Hafen opinion can be read as per se 
nor allowing general questions as to whether 
juror have read or seen media reports conce-
rning medical negligence or ton reform where 
insurance is not specifically interjected, we 
reject it. 
In view of this analytical framework, we 
now turn to the case before us. Corinne's 
objections to the court's voir dire were two-
fold. First, Corinne objected to the trial 
court's failure to inquire as to the juror's 
knowledge of a specific Time magazine article 
on tort reform and insurance premiums. 
Second, Corinne's counsel objected to the 
trial court's failure to ask general questions 
designed to discover if any potential juror had 
been exposed to medical negligence or tort 
reform information in general. In this case, 
both of these objections go to the issue of 
Corinne's ability to intelligently exercise per-
emptory challenges. 
Under the first issue-whether the trial 
court should have questioned jurors concer-
ning the Time magazine article-the Yosf 
analysis is instructive because, like Yosr, this 
issue fits into the second "insurance" voir dire 
category outlined above. In Yosr, plaintiffs 
counsel demonstrated that defendant's insur-
ance company, the real party in interest, had 
participated in a contemporaneous, nation-
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wide advertising campaign designed to influ-
ence the public concerning the "evils" of large 
jury awards. Yosr, 594 P.2d at 694. Because 
the advertising raising was ongoing at the time 
the jury was impaneled, the Yost court held 
that plaintiffs counsel had established suffi-
cient foundation that counsel should have 
been allowed to question jurors as to their 
exposure to the campaign. The Yost court held 
that in such circumstances, before an attorney 
may question jurors as to their exposure to 
advertisements and media reports, the plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the jurors are likely to 
have been recently exposed to such propag-
anda. Id. We adopt Yost's reasoning, and 
thus hold that before a plaintiff may inquire 
as to a juror's exposure to a specific article or 
advertisement raising specifically the issue of 
the need for tort reform and its relationship to 
high insurance premiums, the plaintiff must 
lay a foundation showing that the juror is 
likely to have been exposed to the material, 
and further that the material was published 
recently enough so that the juror will likely 
remember reading it. 
In this case, the Time article was three-
years old when the jury was impaneled. Thus, 
jurors were not likely to remember having 
read the article. Corinne's proposed question 
asked jurors whether they had 'read Time 
magazine in March, 1986.* We find it unlikely 
that, in 1989, any jurors would be able to 
accurately respond to such a question. Acco-
rdingly, because jurors were unlikely to have 
recently read the Time article or to remember 
having read it, we do not find the trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to inquire about 
the specific article. 
Corinne's second objection, however, is 
more problematic. Corinne's counsel prese-
nted several general questions inquiring as to 
jurors' exposure to information on tort 
reform and lawsuits against doctors. The 
questions fit the third "insurance'' voir dire 
category described above. As explained, det-
ermining whether an insurance voir dire que-
stion such as this should be asked requires a 
balancing of the relative interests of the parties 
in light of the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case. In tort cases, and more parti-
cularly in medical malpractice cases, we 
cannot ignore the reality that potential jurors 
may have developed tort-reform biases as a 
result of an overall exposure to such propag-
anda. See Yosr 594 P.2d at 694. Accordingly, 
in cases such as this one, the plaintiff has a 
legitimate interest in discovering which jurors 
may have read or heard information generally 
on medical negligence or tort reform. 
Here, the trial judge did ask questions suf-
ficient to ferret out actual tort reform biases. 
However, Corinne claims that the court's 
questions did not allow her sufficient infor-
mation to exercise her peremptory challenges. 
Specifically, Corinne wanted to know which of 
the potential jurors had been exposed to tort 
reform propaganda—even if the potential 
jurors believed that such exposure had not 
changed their attitudes or biased them. We 
conclude she should have been allowed such 
an opportunity. The judge stated: "many of 
you have heard and read articles, and there 
have been television programs, with regard to 
negligence on the part of doctors. Do any of 
you have any strong feelings as a result of 
seeing or reading anything about medical 
negligence that would make it so that you 
couldn't be fair and impartial here today?" 
Had the trial judge first asked jurors which of 
them could recall exposure to such articles and 
programs, Corinne would have had an oppo-
rtunity to identify jurors who had been 
exposed to such information. Further, this is 
the type of general preliminary question app-
roved in Yosr. See id. at 695. However, rather 
than seek responses to such a question, the 
trial judge instead focused on the issue of for-
cause type bias by asking whether jurors felt 
they could be impartial and fair. The trial 
judge's line of questions ignored Corinne's 
need to gather information to assist in exerc-
ising her peremptory challenges. 
Reason suggests that exposure to tort-
reform propaganda may foster a subconscious 
bias within certain prospective jurors, and, 
had Corinne been able to identify those jurors 
exposed to such propaganda, she could have 
more intelligently exercised her peremptory 
challenges. Furthermore, we note that 
Corinne's requested questions made no 
mention of insurance premiums and thus, the 
risk of prejudicing Dr. Dory's interests under 
this proposed inquiry was much less than in 
Yost. In sum, we believe the trial court should 
have asked the potential jurors some of the 
questions proposed by Corinne about their 
exposure to ton-reform and medical neglig-
ence propaganda-not just if they had been 
biased by the exposure. 
Our conclusion that the voir dire was 
unduly restrictive does not end our inquiry. 
Next, we must determine if the error was 
sufficiently prejudicial to Corinne to merit a 
new trial. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled 
that harmless errors are those "which, alth-
ough properly preserved below and presented 
on appeal, are sufficiently inconsequential that 
we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood 
that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 
120 (Utah 1989). 
Initially, Dr. Doty contends that because the 
jury found no cause of action for negligence, 
any voir dire error must be considered harm-
less. Dr. Doty relies on Yost, which held that 
because the jury found for the defendant on 
the issue of liability, any failure of the judge 
to question the jurors regarding tort-reform 
propaganda was harmless. Yosr, 594 P.2d at 
695. Dr. Doty, however, fails to recognize an 
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important distinguishing factor between Yost 
and this case. As explained above, Yost dealt 
with a very specific and unique situation— 
the direct impact of an identifiable and cont-
emporaneous nation-wide advertising camp-
aign on potential jurors. Because the adverti-
sing campaign in Yost advocated lowering jury 
awards, and did not focus on liability, the yosr 
court believed that a biased jury would 
manifest their bias by first finding liability and 
then improperly limiting the damage award. 
Accordingly, the Yost court held that when 
the jury found for the defendant, such finding 
was not a result of bias created by the adver-
tising campaign. 
In this case, any jury tort-reform bias 
cannot be traced directly to a single, recent 
advertising campaign, but may have arisen 
from an overall exposure to media reports and 
insurance advertisements. To adopt the Ybsr 
conclusion, as advocated by Dr. Doty, would 
be an over-simplification of the harmless-
error rule. We cannot assume that a jury 
would manifest its bias by only reducing 
damages. It is equally likely that a biased jury 
might act on its bias by finding the defendant 
not negligent. 
Notwithstanding Dr. Doty's misreading of 
ybsr, we believe the trial court's error in 
denying Corinne's general tort-reform 
medical negligence questions was harmless. 
Given the totality of the circumstances, we are 
not convinced that had the trial judge inquired 
as to the panel's exposure to tort-reform 
propaganda, thus allowing plaintiff to more 
intelligently exercise peremptory challenges, 
the jury verdict would be different. In light of 
the extensive, two-hour voir dire, the strong 
evidence supporting the jury's verdict, and 
considering the totality of the circumstances, 
we cannot say that Corinne has met her 
burden of showing prejudicial error. 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Finally, Corinne contends the trial court 
should have granted her motion for a new trial 
as there was insufficient evidence to support 
the jury's verdict. T o successfully attack the 
verdict, an appellant must marshall all the 
evidence supporting the verdict and then 
demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to that verdict, the 
evidence is insufficient to support it." Von 
Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 
1985). "We accord due deference to the jury 
as the fact finder and do not substitute ours-
elves in this role.0 Israel Pagan Estate v. 
Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 793 (Utah App. 1987), 
cerr. dismissed, Israel Pagan Estate v. Capital 
Thrift & Loan, 771 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1989). 
Corinne has not met her burden of marshal-
ling the evidence, and therefore we affirm the 
jury verdict finding Dr. Doty was not negli-
gent.* 
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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. At trial, Corinne's attorney apparently objected 
to the impaneling of one juror on the grounds that 
the juror's spouse was employed by an insurance 
company, and also that counsel had not been 
allowed to question the juror concerning this empl-
oyment. The only mention of this issue on appeal is 
in a short statement in the "issues* portion of 
Corinne's brief. Because Corinne has not sufficie-
ntly briefed or argued this issue on appeal, we 
decline to address its merits. Generally, this court 
will not manufacture a legal argument for an appe-
llant who fails to brief or argue an issue. See English 
v. Standard Optical Co., 164 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 41, 44 (1991); Cardin v. Morrison-Knudscn, 
603 P.2d 862,865 (Wyo. 1979). 
2. Rule 61 reads: 
No error in either the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence, and no error or 
defect in any ruling or order or in any-
thing done or omitted by the court or by 
any of the parties, is grounds for gran-
ting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take 
such action appears to the court incon-
sistent with substantial justice. The court 
at every stage of the proceeding must 
disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties. 
3. The traditional logic is that a jury may be more 
likely to find for the plaintiff or increase a plain-
tiffs damage award if the jury knows the defendant 
has insurance. Balle v. Smith, 17 P.2d at 229. This 
per se "insurance* rule developed during a time 
when liability insurance was uncommon. "When the 
rule against disclosure of insurance originated dou-
btless the existence of such protection for defend-
ants was exceptional and a 'hush, hush' policy 
could be effective." McCormick, Evidence §201 at 
481 (2d ed. 1972). 
More recently, however, courts have begun to 
question this traditional "insurance" rule. Causey v. 
Comcbus, 164 Cal. App. 2d 269, 330 P.2d 468, 472 
(1958). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has 
noted: 
The word 'insurance" is not outlawed 
from the courtroom as a word of 
magical evil. Jurors are not unaware 
that insurance is at large in the world 
and its mention will not open to them a 
previously unknown realm. It is in fact 
more realistic for the judge to dissolve 
the phantom by open talk in the court-
room than to have it run loose in ahe 
unconfined speculations of the jury 
room. The court has wide control over 
the voir dire and can adequately safeg-
uard the inquiry by explaining to the 
jurors the limited scope and purpose of 
the examination and thus eliminate any 
implication of the existence or relevance 
of insurance in the case before it. 
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Kieman v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 
1%5). 
There can be little question that even unsophisti-
cated jurors will suspect the existence of insurance. 
"Pine general prevalence of liability insurance for 
automobile injuries is known to the jurors; hence, 
for the law to forbid any disclosure of it in the 
course of the trial seems to be merely a piece of 
hypocritical futility." 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence 
§282a at 169 (Chadbourn rev. 1979); see also Silver 
State Disposal Co. v. Shelley, 105 Nev. 309, 774 
?.2d 1044, 1047 (1989) (jurors are likely aware of 
insurance coverage). Accordingly, the underlying 
rationale for the insurance rule has been greatly 
eroded as, today, corporations and individuals 
almost universally purchase insurance. 
4. This court has previously considered Yost persu-
asive. See Ha/en, 772 P.2d at 459. 
5. In Hafen, the plaintiff also objected to the trial 
court's refusal to ask the jurors (1) certain general 
background questions such as their level of educa-
tion and the types of magazines thev read, and (2) 
whether any jurors had an employment or financial 
relationship with an insurance company. These 
questions, however, raise different concerns and 
issues than those presented by the instant case. 
6. Although Corinne has failed to marshal the evi-
dence in support of her sufficiency of the evidence 
claim, review of the trial record shows that, even 
had Corinne properly marshaled the evidence, there 
nevertheless is ample evidence to support the jury's 
verdict in favor of Dr. Doty. At trial. Dr. Dory's 
counsel called two expert witnesses to testify, and 
counsel also read the deposition of another expert 
witness to the jury. Further, Dr. Doty himself 
offered expert testimony. Both of Dr. Dory's well-
quaiified experts testified that the injury Corinne 
sustained to her nerve during surgery could have 
occurred in the absence of negligence, and that such 
nerve injury is a risk that sometimes cannot be 
avoided with this surgical procedure. One of Dr. 
Dory's experts testified that during his surgical 
experience, he had had several patients who susta-
ined comparable nerve injury during similar proce-
dures that were adequately performed. The jury also 
heard the deposition of another expert surgeon who 
stated that he has seen similar injuries numerous 
times in practice without any medical negligence. 
Finally, Dr. Doty testified that he performed 
Corinne's surgery in compliance with a reasonable 
and prudent standard of care. Dr. Doty opined that 
the nerve likely was damaged as a result of tension 
brought to bear on the nerve because the ductus was 
large and because the patient suffered from high 
blood pressure. 
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OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Appellant West Valley City appeals from a 
judgment awarding compensation for conde-
mned property to appellee Majestic Investment 
Corporation. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Majestic Investment Corporation held inte-
rests in two parcels of property located in 
West Valley City which Majestic leased from 
Henry S. Pickrell and Barbara M. Pickreil (the 
Pickreils). Majestic built two commercial 
buildings on the property and leased them in 
turn to Prudential Federal Savings and Loan 
(Prudential) and The Lockhart Company 
(Lockhart). West Valley City brought this 
action to condemn Majestic's interests by 
right of eminent domain. West Valley City 
had previously acquired the PickreHs' interests 
in the property. 
Majestic and the Pickreils executed a lease 
for the underlying real estate (the ground 
lease) for a term of thirty-five years, com-
mencing May 1, 1975. The base rent for the 
combined parcels was S750 per month, with 
provisions for upward adjustment arthe 11th, 
21st, and 31st years of the lease. The ground 
lease contained a clause providing that in the 
event of condemnation the ground lease would 
terminate and the parties' respective rights 
and obligations would "be adjusted as of the 
time of such condemnation." The lease also 
contained a formula for calculating Majestic's 
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INTRODUCTION 
Defendant-appellee Dr. Donald B. Doty ("Dr. Doty"), by and 
through his counsel of record and pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and this Court's notification dated 
November 14, 1991, submits his response brief to plaintiff-
appellant's Petition for Rehearing. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Notwithstanding plaintiff's claims to the contrary, this Court 
should not grant plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing since (1) she 
improperly raises for the first time in her petition arguments not 
previously posed on appeal; (2) this Court applied the appropriate 
and well-recognized standard of review on appeal and correctly 
concluded that any error below was harmless; and (3) plaintiff 
misunderstands her duty on appeal and poses arguments unsupported 
by law or facts. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOP PRTOAPTNG MUST BE 
DENIED SINCE SHE FAILED TO RAISE ON APPEAL THE 
ARGUMENTS SHE NOW ASSERTS FOR THE FIRST TIME 
IN HER PETITION 
This Court has heretofore considered the efficacy and 
appropriateness of a petitioner raising issues for the first time 
in a petition for rehearing. In State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 
1112 (Utah App. 1990), this Court ruled that it will "ordinarily 
. . . not consider arguments presented for the first time on 
petition for rehearing, and [it is] especially loathe to revisit a 
decision once rendered when the party seeking reconsideration 
intentionally did not present [the Court] with particular arguments 
in a more timely fashion." (Citation omitted.) This rationale 
fully comports with the Court's "standing aversion to considering 
for the first time at some later stage issues that could have been 
raised at an earlier stage." Ld. And this rule applies to 
theories, arguments and claims posed in a petition for rehearing 
that are at least tangentially connected to but were not raised in 
regard to arguments or theories considered previously on appeal. 
See id. 
Importantly, although this Court in Sampson granted the 
petition for rehearing therein, it did so only after considering 
(1) the burden the petitioner held when confronted with "multiple 
issues of . • . magnitude" in what was a criminal case: (2) the 
significance of the issue presented; (3) and the fact that the 
United States Supreme Court in the interim had evidently issued an 
opinion with "helpful authority" "not available at the time of 
initial argument." See id. at 1113. Nevertheless, this Court 
stressed that the circumstances of granting that petition for 
rehearing were "unique" and future parties were explicitly 
cautioned "that the complexity of issues, the length of briefs, or 
tactical choice to initially avoid issues on appeal will normally 
not suffice to induce [the Court] to consider issues raised for the 
first time on a request to reconsider a decision already made." 
Id. at 1113 n.21. 
Applying this correct principle of appellate review to this 
civil case compels the denial of plaintiff's petition for rehearing 
on both grounds now raised. Indeed, nowhere in plaintiff's initial 
brief on appeal did she argue that the harmless error standard 
2 
cannot be applied when considering voir dire issues or that the 
claimed defect in the jury selection process is always per se 
reversible error given the constitutional status of the jury 
system* In fact, on page 2 of her initial brief on appeal 
plaintiff stated that "there are no constitutional provisions. 
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative of this appeal." (Emphasis added.) Also, plaintiff 
herself implicitly urged the Court at length in her brief to apply 
the harmless error analysis and conclude that notwithstanding this 
correct standard of review the error in limiting the jury voir dire 
was not harmless under these specific facts. See Plaintiff's 
Initial Brief at page 12. And plaintiff even urged the Court to 
apply on appeal its opinion in Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1959), which cites with approval and adopts a decision by the 
Montana Supreme Court applying the harmless error analysis to the 
very claims of improper jury voir dire plaintiff raised. (See 
pages 10-11 of Plaintiff's Initial Brief arguing application of Doe 
v. Hafen. 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), adopting the Montana 
Supreme Court's decision in Borkoski v. Yost. 182 Mont. 28, 594 
P.2d 688 (1979), which applies the harmless error analysis to jury 
voir dire issues directly relevant to this case.) 
Further, although in his response brief, appellee Dr. Doty 
explicitly stressed in a separately identified argument that any 
error in the trial court's exercise of its discretion concerning 
voir dire was harmless and that this standard applied, see 
Appellee's Response Brief at pages 17-18, plaintiff utterly ignored 
this argument on appeal and failed to respond or challenge the same 
3 
in her reply brief. In short, although plaintiff for the first 
time in her petition now wishes this Court to consider that a test 
different from the harmless error analysis "applies where the jury 
selection process is impugned,H see Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing at page 3, she (1) failed and chose not to raise this 
argument on appeal even though appellee specifically emphasized the 
same and (2) cannot even meet the Sampson standard for considering 
the argument now, which standard this Court has even claimed will 
"normally not suffice to induce [it] to consider issues raised for 
the first time on a request to reconsider a decision already made." 
Similarly, as to plaintiff's second point in her Petition for 
Rehearing, plaintiff likewise never raised on appeal her novel 
albeit confusing argument that because she allegedly "presented a 
prima facie case" below she is somehow entitled to a new trial 
before an unbiased jury. Either this obtuse argument allegedly 
supported by plaintiff's citations to evidence she believes favors 
a verdict in her favor (1) was never raised in plaintiff's initial 
briefs on appeal and thus should not be considered by this Court 
now, or (2) is merely a restatement of plaintiff's previously 
offered "insufficiency of the evidence" claim which failed and 
still fails to meet this Court's rule requiring plaintiff to first 
marshall evidence in favor of the jury's verdict. 
Since under either theory plaintiff cannot be allowed to 
attempt by her petition for rehearing what she chose not to urge in 
her original briefing on appeal, plaintiff's petition for rehearing 
must be denied. 
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POINT II 
EVEN IF THIS COURT CHOOSES TO ANALYZE THE 
ISSUES RAISED BY PLAINTIFF FOR THE FIRST TIME 
IN HER PETITION FOR REHEARING. THIS COURT 
APPLIED THE WELL RECOGNIZED AND CONTROLLING 
HARMLESS ERROR STANDARD OF REVIEW INVOLVING 
JURY VOIR DIRE ISSUES 
Even if this Court chooses to consider the new arguments 
plaintiff raises for the first time in her petition for rehearing, 
plaintiff's petition for rehearing cannot be granted as a matter of 
law. It is a well recognized appellate review principle that the 
harmless error analysis applies in considering whether a trial 
judge's failure to pose questions on voir dire to the jury 
necessitates a retrial. Indeed, in concluding that it was harmless 
error for the court to refuse to voir dire prospective jurors about 
whether they would be influenced by testimony which would be 
presented at trial, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals quoted the 
other courts as observing: 
"All circuits appears to be in agreement that 
the refusal to ask the question of whether the 
prospective jurors would be unduly influenced 
by the testimony of a law enforcement officer 
does not always constitute reversible error: 
that question hinges upon such factors as the 
importance of the government agent's testimony 
of the case as a whole; the extent to which 
the question concerning the venire person's 
attitude toward government agents is covered 
in other questions on voir dire and on the 
charge to the jury; the extent to which the 
credibility of the government agent-witness is 
put into issue; and the extent to which the 
testimony of the government agent is 
corroborated by non-agent witnesses• " 
United States v. Gelb. 881 F.2d 1155, 1164 (2d Cir. 1989) (emphasis 
added) (quoting United States v. Baldwin. 607 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 
1979)). Thereafter the court ruled that if the trial judge 
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"committed an error by not questioning jurors about the influence 
of official testimony, it was harmless" given the totality of the 
evidence and circumstances in that case. See id. at 1165 (emphasis 
added). This rule that the harmless error standard applies in 
cases where a trial court allegedly fails or refuses to pose 
questions on voir dire has been repeatedly recognized. See, e.g., 
United States v. Noone. 913 F.2d 20, 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1990) (no 
reversible error involving court's questioning on voir dire 
applying both harmless error and plain error standards); United 
States v. Victoria-Pequero, 920 F.2d 77, 84 (1st Cir. 1990) (trial 
court's refusal to ask prospective jurors questions on voir dire 
amounted to harmless error given the government's strong case, 
testimony presented, the trial judge's rulings and the voracity of 
other testimony); United States v. Nash. 910 F.2d 749 (11th Cir. 
1990) (court's admonitions to jury rendered harmless any error 
resulting from its failure to ask proffered questions); United 
States v. Groce, 682 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1982) (United State 
Supreme Court rejected per se reversible error rule when trial 
court refuses to question prospective jurors about racial or ethnic 
prejudice and indicated that case-by-case analysis of all 
circumstances is required in determining whether error in refusing 
to question juries in voir dire is harmless); Chase v. United 
States, 468 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1962) (even if trial judge abused 
his discretion in conducting voir dire by failing to ask jurors 
questions proposed, omission was harmless error); United States v. 
Pappas. 639 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1980) (trial court's refusal to 
ask questions in voir dire was harmless error); Horsey v. Mack 
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Trucks, Inc., 882 F.2d 844, 846-49 (3d Cir. 1989) (court did not 
commit per se reversible error when it refused to ask jurors 
insurance questions posed and court's failure to conduct voir dire 
as suggested did not constitute manifest injustice sufficient to 
establish plain error). 
And in analyzing a decision by the United States Supreme Court 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cannon v. Lockhart, 850 F.2d 
437, 439-41 (8th Cir. 1988), noted that the harmless error test 
even applies in a felony murder case where a juror inadvertently 
fails to disclose on voir dire information which would assist 
counsel in exercising peremptory challenges and which error 
defendant claimed denied him his constitutional right to a fair and 
impartial jury. 
Importantly, this case as with the others noted above involved 
analogous critical liberty rights and claims of constitutional 
deprivation of rights to a fair and impartial jury trial. Yet in 
addressing these issues and claims, the United States Supreme Court 
has reiterated: 
A litigant is entitled to a fair trial but not 
a perfect one, for there are no perfect 
trials. . . . We have also come a long way 
from the time when all trial error was 
presumed prejudicial and reviewing courts were 
considered "citadels of technicality." The 
harmless-error rules adopted by this court and 
congress embody the principle that courts 
should exercise judgment in preference to the 
automatic reversal for "error" and ignore 
errors that do not affect the essential 
fairness of the trial. 
See McDonouah Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood. 464 U.S. 548 
(1984), 553. Thereafter, in acknowledging the importance of voir 
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dire in assisting parties in exercising peremptory challenges, 
Justice Rhenquist delivering the opinion of the Court stated: 
A trial represents an important investment in 
social resources, and it ill serves the 
important end of finality to wipe the slate 
clean simply to recreate the peremptory 
challenge process because counsel lacked an 
item of information which objectively he 
should have obtained from a juror on voir dire 
examination. 
See id. at 555-56. And, although Greenwood involved a juror's 
nondisclosure of information on voir dire, it is as analogous to 
this situation as those cases cited by plaintiff in her petition 
for rehearing involving error in forcing counsel on a case to 
exercise a peremptory challenge when the voir dire indicates the 
juror should have been removed for cause. See cases cited in 
Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing at pages 2-5. 
Also, courts have routinely applied the harmless error test in 
other analogous situations involving claims of impropriety 
affecting the constitutional right to a jury trial. See, e.g., 
Pappas. 639 F.2d at 3 (court's refusal to permit lawyers or court 
reporter to attend side bar exchange with jurors during voir dire 
was harmless error); United States v. Alessandrello, 637 F.2d 131 
(3d Cir. 1980) (exclusion of defendant during jury selection 
harmless error given circumstances of case); United States v. 
Lussier, 929 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1991) (failure to comply with 
federal statute regarding jury selection harmless error); United 
States v. Pavne, 944 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1991) (failure to give 
jury instruction harmless error); United States v. Butler, 822 F.2d 
1191 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (jury conduct was harmless error); Davis & 
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Cox v. Suma Corp., 751 F.2d 1507 (9th Cir. 1985) (harmless error 
occurred in striking request for jury trial); United States v. 
Vallei-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1977) (nonconstitutional 
errors are measured against less than a per se reversible error 
standard)• 
In addition, although plaintiff essentially urges this Court 
to rule that any error involving the jury selection process must be 
prejudicial and require automatic reversal, error involving the 
jury voir dire process has not been articulated by our courts as 
per se prejudicial and the cases plaintiff cites in support of her 
proposition are inapposite and ignore the analyses of applicable 
Utah case law. While there is not space to fully analyze the 
inapposite nature of the cases plaintiff cites in support of her 
position, a plain reading of those decisions clearly indicates as 
such.1 Also, in the cases plaintiff cites the Court did not 
discuss the harmless error analysis in reference to the voir dire 
issue now posed by plaintiff for the first time in her petition for 
rehearing. And there is no doubt that the issue of whether a 
xFor instance, in In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), the 
Court held that the judge at a judge grand jury hearing could not 
later preside at a contempt hearing. The case of Miller v. City of 
Mission, Kansas, 705 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1983), likewise considered 
an issue involving a public hearing. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 
202 (1965), the Court held that removing jurors based on race is 
violative of the Constitution, and in Hornsby v. Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, 758 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the Court actually 
applied the harmless error analysis in some respects. See 758 P.2d 
at 934 n.3. Also, in State v. Bailev, 605 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980), 
and Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975), the Utah 
Supreme Court merely held that forcing a defendant to remove by 
peremptory challenge jurors whose answers to voir dire mandated 
removal by cause was prejudicial error. 
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directed verdict was properly entered as analyzed by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Management Commission of Gravstone Pines 
Homeowners Association v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 
1982) (cited by the plaintiff) is entirely different from the issue 
of whether the trial court's refusal to pose questions in voir dire 
is harmless error. 
More importantly, plaintiff has erred in her petition for 
rehearing in implying that the Utah Appellate Courts have applied 
a different test when the jury selection process is involved and 
that all of the cases cited by this Court in its issued decision 
herein are distinguishable since they Hall involve the exclusion or 
admission of evidence." See Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing at 
pages 2-5. This is wrong. In entering its decision in this case, 
this Court correctly set forth the standard that 
in order to reverse [the Court] must also find 
the error was sufficiently prejudicial to 
plaintiff to merit a new trial. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 61 (1991); see State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116, 120 (Utah 1989); Borkoski v. Yost, 182 
Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688, 695 (1979). Further, 
the party seeking the new trial has the burden 
of showing that the error was not harmless. 
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 
1987). 
Evans v. Dotv, 171 U.A.R. 43, 43 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Contrary to 
plaintiff's allegations in her petition that this Court lacks a 
basis for its determination that the harmless error standard 
applied, the above-noted quote demonstrates ample support for this 
Court's correct decision. Indeed, Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure cited herein by this Court is entitled "Harmless 
Error" and expressly indicates that the harmless error standard 
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applies in considering any "error or defect in any ruling or order 
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the 
parties.- (Emphasis added.) And certainly the Court's refusal to 
give requested voir dire instructions falls within the Rule 61 
standard of a ruling or order omitted by the court.2 Further, as 
also cited as support by this Court in its opinion the Otah Supreme 
Court in State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989), has held that 
the harmless error analysis applies in considering analogous 
critical constitutional claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Id. at 118-19 and 124 at n.5. And this fact entirely 
controverts plaintiff's erroneous statement that "Verde [cited by 
this Court in its opinion] and the cases cited therein all involve 
the exclusion or omission of evidence." Plaintiff's Petition at 
page 3. 
Similarly, this Court also relied in its issued opinion upon 
the case of Borkoski v. Yost, 182 Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688 (1979), 
which had been cited and argued by plaintiff on appeal. As this 
Court is intimately aware, in Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), this Court found the reasoning in Borkoski "compelling" 
and even adopted its analysis and applied it to that case. See id. 
at 459; Evans v. Dotv, 171 U.A.R. 43, 49 n.4 ("This Court has 
previously considered Borkoski persuasive."). Importantly, 
however, although this Court has already found Borkoski compelling 
and has adopted its analysis and although on appeal plaintiff 
herein even urged application of that case, plaintiff has failed to 
2Obviously, plaintiff cannot claim that this rule does not 
govern the procedure in Utah's appellate courts. Cf^ Utah R. Civ. 
P. 1. 
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acknowledge that Borkoski applied the harmless error analysis to 
the very voir dire error plaintiff now claims for the first time is 
prejudicial per se. In fact, although the Court in Borkoski 
acknowledged the constitutional right of a fair and impartial jury 
and recognized the claim that the trial court erred in not allowing 
examination of the jurors as to whether any had been exposed to 
national campaigns by leading insurance companies, the Court ruled: 
Unfortunately, the foregoing conclusions do 
not avail Borkoski on this appeal. Even 
though we accept Borkoski's arguments, it is 
undeniable that the purpose of the 
advertisements was to reduce the amount of 
damages awarded by a jury. At no point is it 
suggested, either by Borkoski or in the 
advertisements themselves that juries should 
not find a party negligent in the first place. 
The ads speak only to damages, not liability. 
Here, the jury found defendant doctors not 
liable at all. The jury did not even reach 
the question of damages. In such a case, 
Borkoski's arguments lose their vitality, and 
any error committed must be viewed as harmless 
and not grounds for reversal. Rule 61, N.R. 
Civ. P. 
594 P.2d 695 (some emphasis deleted and emphasis added). Also, 
this Court in its decision in this matter lastly cited the Utah 
Supreme Court decision of Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 
1987), wherein the Court applied Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the harmless error analysis against the defendants' 
analogous claim that they were denied a fair trial when the trial 
court failed to explain to the jury defendants' absence on the 
final day of the trial. Id. at 153-54. 
Not only then does this Court's issued decision in this matter 
clearly provide ample support for its correct conclusion that the 
harmless error standard applies, but the Utah Supreme Court has 
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also otherwise applied the harmless error test in considering 
analogous issues involving the inviolate constitutional right to a 
jury trial. See, e.g., Verde. supra; Welch Transfer & Storaaing v. 
Oldham, 663 P.2d 73, 76 (Utah 1983) (denial of a jury trial was 
harmless error as a matter of law given facts presented); Goode v. 
Dayton Disposal, Inc., 738 P.2d 638, 639-41 (Utah 1987) (any error 
committed by trial court in refusing to give plaintiff's requested 
instruction was harmless given facts in case); accord Ashton, supra 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring and dissenting and joined by JJ. Durham 
and Stewart) (error in jury instruction did not require reversal 
and was harmless error and not abuse of discretion). 
Given the foregoing, there can be no question that this Court 
has applied the proper standard of review in this case as set forth 
by court rule, case law urged by the plaintiff herself on appeal 
and previous decisions by the Utah Appellate Courts. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME 
IN HER PETITION CONCERNING THE PRIMA FACIE 
CASE STra AT.T.POBDLY PRESENTED LIKEWISE LACKS 
MERIT 
Plaintiff's argument raised for the first time in Point II of 
her Petition for Rehearing should not be considered by this Court 
for the reasons stated in Point I, supra. Nevertheless, if the 
Court chooses to evaluate the same, plaintiff's petition for 
rehearing should not be granted for the following reasons. 
First, although plaintiff states that Mthis court improperly 
invaded the province of the jury by holding that a second jury 
would reach the same result as the first," in actuality this Court 
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ruled that(l) due deference must be accorded the jury and its 
decision; (2) plaintiff has not met her burden of marshaling the 
evidence supporting the verdict before she is allowed to 
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the same; 
and (3) it is not convinced that had the trial judge inquired on 
voir dire as plaintiff requested/ the jury verdict in this case 
with this jury and this evidence "would be different." See Evans 
v. Doty, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. at 48. Contrary to plaintiff's 
opinion/ such conclusions properly recognize the sanctity of the 
jury process and its verdict and the jurisprudential error that 
occurs when an appellate court "second-guesses" the same. 
Second/ plaintiff has offered no legal support for her 
allegation that the mere presentation of a prima facie case somehow 
entitles her to a new trial before an unbiased jury. And plaintiff 
has likewise improperly leaped to the conclusion that this jury was 
biased when the record is devoid of evidence to support this claim. 
Finally/ plaintiff seems to misunderstand the critical 
principle controlling this Court's review on appeal and her failure 
to meet her responsibilities in respect to that standard of review. 
Indeed/ if plaintiff's claim is not a new argument untimely stated 
for the first time in plaintiff's petition for rehearing/ it must 
be a restatement of plaintiff's claim in her initial brief that 
"the trial court abusefd] its discretion in denying plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial where the jury verdict was contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence and was apparently based on 
speculation." See Plaintiff's Initial Brief at page 2. However/ 
as set forth in this Court's opinion/ before plaintiff can attack 
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the verdict and claim it was based on speculation, plaintiff must 
marshal all the evidence in support of the verdict.3 Nevertheless, 
plaintiff failed to marshal the evidence below and now merely 
recites in her petition for rehearing her view of evidence which 
allegedly supports allegations raised in her complaint. Indeed, it 
is as if plaintiff again expects that by merely recanting evidence 
in support of her claim she can somehow convince the Court to 
ignore its controlling standard of review and speculate that the 
jury should have properly returned a verdict for her. 
Given the nonsensical nature of plaintiff's second point in 
her petition for rehearing and the fact that it is raised for the 
first time, this Court should deny plaintiff's petition. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's arguments raised for the first time in her 
petition for rehearing should not be considered by this Court as a 
basis for granting the same. Further, on their merits, plaintiff's 
arguments fail given the controlling principles of law and the 
facts as they exist in this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of November, 1991. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
^ DavitfTi. Epperson 
Jaryl L. Rencher 
Attorneys for Defendant Dr. Doty 
3Dr. Doty reiterates that the evidence clearly supports the 
conclusion that the trial court's verdict was proper. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CORRINE EVANS by and through 
her guardians ad litem J. BLAKE 
EVANS and DONALEE J. EVANS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
DR. DONALD R. DOTY, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
(Subject to Assignment 
to Court of Appeals) 
Case No. 
Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, plaintiffs-
appellants hereby submit the following Docketing Statement: 
1. Jurisdiction. This is an appeal in a medical malpractice case. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1989). 
2. Nature of Proceeding. This appeal is from the final order of the district 
court. 
3. Date of Judgment. The trial occurred from May 9 to May 15, 1989. 
The formal Judgment on the Verdict was entered on May 25, 1989. Plaintiffs served a 
Motion for Judgment N.O.V. or New Trial on May 18, 1989. The Order Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for JNOV or New Trial and Order Modifying Costs Award to 
Defendant was entered on September 12, 1989. Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal 
on October 12, 1989. 
4. Statement of Facts. Defendant was employed by plaintiffs to perform an 
operation on Corrine Evans to correct a silent patent ductus on the left aricular vent 
of the heart. Corrine was two years old at the time of the surgery. During the 
surgery, defendant severed the left recurrent laryingeal nerve, resulting in a com-
pressed airway and a paralyzed left vocal chord. The injury cause is permanent and 
debilitating. 
5. Issues Presented, 
a. Were plaintiffs entitled to a directed verdict where the expert 
testimony established and the defendant admitted that the most probable cause of the 
injury was defendant's negligence in severing Corrine Evans* nerve and that the 
possibility of a non-negligent severing of the nerve was so remote as to be specula-
tive? 
b. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' 
motion for a new trial where the great weight of the evidence was in favor of 
plaintiffs, the defense counsel made improper and prejudicial closing arguments, and the 
jury deliberations were so short that the jury could not have thoughtfully weighed the 
evidence? 
2 
c. Did the trial court abuse its discretion, or apply the wrong 
standard in exercising its discretion, in refusing to allow plaintiffs* counsel to directly 
question prospective jurors during voir dire examination? 
6. Assignment to Court of Appeals. This case is subject to assignment to 
the Court of Appeals. Plaintiffs elect to present no arguments as to whether the case 
should be so assigned. 
7. Determinative Statutes. Plaintiffs are not aware of any statutes, rules, 
or cases which are determinative of the issues presented on appeal. 
8. Related or Prior Appeals. There are no related or prior appeals. 
9. Attachments. 
a. Judgment on the Verdict. 
b. Motion for Judgment N.O.V. or New Trial. 
c. Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for JNOV or New Trial and 
Order Modifying Cost Award to Defendant. 
d. Notice of Appeal. 
DATED this Z fe^dav of October, 1989. 
JACKSON HOWARD, 
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to 
the following, postage prepaid, this 3 * ^ dav of October, 1989. 
David H. Epperson, Esq. 
Hanson, Epperson & Smith 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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David H. Epoerson, #1000 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. 3ox 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CORRINE EVANS, by and through 
her guardians ad litem J. 
BLAKE EVANS AND DONALEE J. 
EVANS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DR. DONALD B. DOTY, 
1 
Defendant. ) Judge John A. Rokich 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial before 
a jury in the court of the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge of the 
Third Judicial District Court, on May 9, 10, 11, 12 and 15, 1989; 
plaintiff Corrine Evans having appeared in person and by and 
through her guardians ad litem, J. Blake Evans and Donnalee J. 
Evans, and being represented by counsel, Jackson Howard, Esq. and 
Kevin Sutterfield, Esq.; and the defendant, Dr. Donald B. Doty, 
having appeared in person and by his counsel, David H. Epperson, 
Esq., and evidence having been produced by each on behalf of the 
plaintiff and the defendant, and the Court having empanelled the 
JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT 
Civil No: C36-8392 
jury, and having instructed the jury on the law applicable to the 
issues raised upon the pleadings of the parties, and the Court 
having submitted said issues to the jury on a special verdict, 
and counsel having argued on behalf of the respective parties and 
there jury having thereupon retired to consider the matter, after 
deliberation thereon the jury returned a Special Verdict as 
follows: 
We, the jury in the above entitled 
action, answer the questions submitted to 
us as follows: 
1. At the time and place of the 
incident in question and under the 
circumstances as shown by the evidence, 
was the defendant Dr. Donald B. Doty 
negligent? 
ANSWER; Ho. 
2. Was such negligence a proximate 
cause of injury to plaintiff, Corrine 
Evans? 
ANSWER: No. 
• * * 
Dated and signed this 15th day of May, 
1389, at Salt Lake City, Utah. David D. 
Williams, Foreperson. 
Thereafter, the Special Verdict of the jury having been 
received by the Court and the jury having been polled, and the 
above answers having been unanimously affirmed by all eigiit of 
the eight jurors, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant, 
Dr. Donald B. Doty, i s awarded judgment in his favor and against 
the p l a i n t i f f , no cause of action; together with costs in an 
amount to be determined by the Court upon submission of Aff idavit 
and Memorandum of defendant. 
DATED t h i s ^CH~ day of May, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
HOtf. JOHN A. ROKICH 
District Court Judge 
-3-
MAILED POSTPAID a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
this 3^)~~ day of May, 1989, to: 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
P. 0.- Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
• >• ' M*-
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JACKSON HOWARD (1548) and 
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD (3872) for 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 Ease 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (802) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CORRINE EVANS, by and through 
her guardians ad litem, J. 
BLAKE EVANS and DONALEE J. 
EVANS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DR. DONALD B. DOTY, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT N.O.V. OR 
NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. C86-8392 
Pursuant to the provisions of Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b) and 59, plaintiff hereby 
moves the Court for entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alterna-
tive, for a new triaL The grounds for this motion are set forth in the Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities filed herewith. 
DATED this If) day of May, 1989. 
JACKSON HOWARD a n ^ ^ 
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD, for 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to 
the following, postage prepaid, this VQ day of May, 1989. 
David H. Epperson, Esq, 
Hanson, Epperson & Smith 
175 South West Temple 
#650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
, f 
Attorneys for Defendant Qal 
^H7R 
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ETARY 
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D a v i d H. Eppe r son , #1000 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A t t o r n e y s f o r Defendant 
4 T r i a d C e n t e r , S u i t e 500 
P . 0 . Box 2970 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84110-2970 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CORRINE EVANS, by and through 
h e r g u a r d i a n s ad l i t e m J . 
BLAKE EVANS AND DONALEE J . 
EVANS, 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
vs . 
DR. DONALD B. DOTY, 
Defendant . 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR JNOV OR NEW 
TRIAL AND ORDER MODIFYING 
COST AWARD TO DEFENDANT 
C i v i l No: C86-8392 
Judge John A. Rokich 
P l a i n t i f f ' s motion for JNOV or new t r i a l and t o t a x c o s t s 
came on r e g u l a r l y f o r hearing before t h e Honorable John A. 
R o k i c h , Judge o f the Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court, on August 3 , 
1989 a t 9:15 a.m. Corrine Evans and her guardians ad l i t e m , J . 
B l a k e Evans and Donalee J . Evans were p r e s e n t and were 
r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e i r a t torney , Jackson Howard, Esq. Defendant 
Donald B. Doty, M.D. was present and was r e p r e s e n t e d by h i s 
a t t o r n e y , David H. Epperson, Esq. The Court, h a v i n g r ev i ewed the 
memoranda o f f a c t and law f i l e d by each p a r t y i n support of t h e i r 
respective positions, and the Court having heard oral argument 
from counsel for each party, and the Court having taken the 
matter under advisement; 
And the Court having issued a written opinion on August 17, 
1989 finding as follows: 
The Court now rules on the matters heretofore 
under advisement to wit: 
"Plaintiff's motion for judgment NOV or new 
trial is denied there was substantial 
evidence presented to the jury upon which to 
support their verdict. 
The jury, based upon the testimony of the 
experts, could and evidently did conclude 
that the surgical procedure of reflection 
and peeling back the tissue from the ductus 
was appropriate; that in such a procedure, 
the nerve could be stretched to a point which 
would cause the nerve to cease to function 
and injury could occur without negligence on 
the part of the defendant. 
Defendant's motion to strike memorandum of 
costs and disbursements or tax costs is 
granted in part, defendant is entitled to his 
jury fees of $50.00, witness fees to wit; 
$14.00 per day plus mileage at .30 cents per 
mile." 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion 
for judgment NOV or new trial is denied; and 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant is awarded costs to 
include jury fees of $50.00, witness fees of $14.00 per day, plus 
-2-
mileage at .30 cents per mile 
Orsmond, Dr. William Gay, and 
DATED this tl day of 
for the appearance of Dr. Garth 
Dr. Dean ZoBell. 
August/ 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
*/ 
HON. JOHN A. ROKICH 
District Court Judge 
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MAILED POSTPAID a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
this day of August, 1989, to: 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
P. 0. Box 778 
Provo," Utah 84603 
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CORRINE EVANS by and through 
her guardians ad litem J. 
BLAKE EVANS and DONALEE J. 
E V A N S , 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DR. D O N A L D R DOT Y, 
Defendant 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No, C86-8392 
Judge John A. Rokich. 
• Plaintiffs hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah Lrom the 
Judgment on the Verdict entered on, May 25, 1989, and the Order Denying Plaintiffs 
J. a I: • 11 J I fO "I!i 3i I I" : • a I i la 1 a n ::i Or d :M: I! lodif ;; > ing Cost \ wz 'niprr I 
September 12 , 1989, entered b'j the Thi rd Judicial District Cotut ji ^ ^ A ' County, 
State of Utah, the Hon. John A. Rokich, and from all other adverse rulings and orders 
in this matter. 
DATED this / / day of October. 1989. 
JACKSON ^ HOWARD, ^ 
KEVIN J. SLTTERFIELD and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to 
the following, postage prepaid, this / 7— day of October, 1989. 
David H. Epperson, Esq. (1000) 
Hanson, Epperson & Smith 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P. 0. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CORINNE EVANS, by and through : 
her guardians ad litem 
J. BLAKE EVANS and : Case No. 900132-CA 
DONALEE J. EVANS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Oral Argument 
: Priority 16 
DR. DONALD B. DOTY, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The jury ente'red its verdict on May 15, 1989 (R. 162, 164) 
and a formal Judgment on the Verdict was entered on May 25, 1989. 
(R. 295-97.) Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment N.O.V. or New Trial 
was served on May 18, 1989. (R. 280-81.) The motion was denied 
by order entered September 12, 1989. (R. 327-3 0.) Plaintiff's 
Notice of Appeal was filed October 12, 1989. (R. 331-32.) The 
Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Anno-
tated § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1990). The Supreme Court transferred 
the case to this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. fi 78-2-2(4). 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to 
allow the plaintiff to voir dire the jurors concerning their 
exposure to information relating to a claimed insurance crisis and 
to tort reform arguments? The issue is reviewed by this Court for 
an abuse of discretion. Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 457 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to 
allow plaintiff to voir dire a juror regarding discussions between 
the juror and his wife relating to the wife's employment as an 
insurance adjustor? This issue is reviewed by this court for an 
abuse of discretion. Id. 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial where the jury verdict was 
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence and was 
apparently based on speculation? The standard of review is for an 
abuse of discretion. Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, 
rules, or regulations whose interpretation is determinative of 
this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a civil action to recover 
damages for medical malpractice. 
2 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Plaintiff 
filed her complaint on November 4, 1986. (R. 2-5.) Following 
discovery, the case was scheduled for trial commencing May 9, 
1989. (R. 60-63.) Shortly before trial, on April 14, 1989, 
defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude documents 
referring to claimed settlement negotiations. (R. 71-78.) The 
court granted the motion on the opening day of trial over plain-
tiff's objections. (Tr. vol. 7, pages 50-53.) 
The case was tried before a jury on May 9-11, and May 15, 
1989. (R. 116-19, 164.) Following the instructions and closing 
remarks, the jury retired to deliberate. (Tr. vol. 8 p. 50.) 
Plaintiff immediately called the court's attention to the fact 
that during closing arguments defense counsel had argued to the 
jury that the defendant "did the best he could.11 fid, pages 50, 
42.) The court recalled the jury and instructed them that it was 
not a defense that the defendant did the best he could. (Id. p. 
52; R. 218.) The jury thereafter returned to deliberate, and 
following only 20 minutes of deliberation returned with a verdict 
against the plaintiff. (Tr. vol. 8, p. 58; R. 262-63.) 
Plaintiff served her Motion for Judgment N.O.V. or New Trial 
on May 18, 1989. (R. 280-81.) A formal Judgment on the Verdict 
was entered May 25, 1989. (R. 295-97.) Following oral argument 
on the motion (R. 325), the court denied the motion by order 
entered September 12, 1989. (R. 327-30.) Plaintiff filed her 
notice of appeal on October 12, 1989. (R. 331-32.) 
3 
C. Statement of Facts. Plaintiff Corinne Evans 
(hereinafter ,fCorinne") was born January 6, 1982, six weeks 
premature. (Tr. vol. 1, p. 9.) She suffered from Downfs Syndrome. 
(Tr. vol. 3, pages 4-5.) In October, 1983, she was hospitalized 
for pneumonia. (Id. p. 6.) It was subsequently discovered that 
she also had reversible pulmonary hypertension, which is an 
increase in the pressure in the artery leading from the heart to 
the lungs. (Id., p. 14.) She was placed on night time 
supplemental oxygen in an effort to relieve the hypertension. 
(!£• i P* 15-16.) It was ultimately determined that a cause of the 
hypertension was a patent ductus arteriosus. (Id. 18-21.) The 
ductus arteriosus is a blood vessel which normally functions to 
bypass the lungs of an infant prior to birth, when the lungs are 
not used. (Tr. volr 2 (Doty), p. 54.) After birth the lungs start 
operating and oxygenating blood, and the ductus normally spon-
taneously closes. (Id. p. 55.) In some patients the ductus fails 
to close, resulting in a condition called a patent ductus arterio-
sus, or PDA. (Id.) A common effect of a patent ductus arteriosus 
is a marked increase in the normally low pressure in the pulmonary 
artery leading into the lungs. This condition is called pulmonary 
hypertension. (Id., p. 55-57.) 
Defendant was selected to operate on Corinne to correct the 
patent ductus. The surgery was conducted on March 30, 1984; 
Corinne was two years two months old at the time. (Id., p. 22; 
Tr. vol. 3 (Glade) p. 23.) 
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At issue in this case is damage to the recurrent laryngeal 
nerve, which normally runs along the surface of the ductus. (Tr. 
vol. 2 (Doty) p. 33.) 
The nerve was permanently damaged during the surgery. fid, 
p. 25, 113.) The testimony relating to how the injury occurred 
is discussed below in connection with the argument. As a result 
of the injury to the nerve, Corinnefs left vocal cord is perma-
nently paralyzed (Tr. vol. 3 (Glade) p. 33.), and she has an 
inspiratory stridor, which is a noise when breathing. (Tr. vol. 
3 (Glade) p. 25.) The paralysis affects her voice (Tr. vol. 2 
(Doty) p. 112), but the paralysis also mostly affects her ability 
to breath. The paralysis causes the left vocal cord to fail to 
open during breathing (Tr. vol. 1 (White) p. 42), and as a result 
Corinne received twenty-four hour a day oxygen therapy for two and 
one-half years (Id. p. 66; Tr. vol. 3 (Glade) p. 42, 53), and 
continues to need night time oxygen to prevent further pulmonary 
hypertension. (Tr. vol. 1 (White) p. 24-25; Tr. vol. 3 (Glade) 
p. 69, 122-23.) There is no further surgery which would be 
advisable to correct the situation (Tr. vol. (White) p. 74), and 
it is possible that Corinne will need night-time oxygen the rest 
of her life. (Id. p. 75.) Corinne*s medical expenses at the time 
of trial were approximately $40,000.00. (Trial Ex. 40-P, 65-D.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff contends she did not have a fair trial. Plaintiff 
was denied the right to adequate jury voir dire concerning jury 
exposure to tort reform information. Utah case law holds that 
questioning such as that requested by plaintiff should be liber-
ally allowed, and is required where plaintiff has submitted 
evidence of specific publications which contain tort reform or 
insurance crisis information. Plaintiff presented such evidence, 
but was improperly denied the right to question the jury concern-
ing it. 
Plaintiff was further improperly denied the right to question 
two prospective jurors concerning information they may have 
received regarding tort reform or the insurance crisis. The 
spouse of one prospective juror was an employee of an insurance 
company, and the other prospective juror lived with a physician. 
The evidence established that there were three possible 
causes of the injury to plaintiff, all of which were under the 
exclusive control of defendant. Two of the possible causes would 
have involved negligence by the defendant. Defendant testified 
he did not know which of the three possible causes occurred, but 
believed it was the one possibility which did not involve negli-
gence. The jury, after only 20 minutes of deliberation, agreed 
with defendant's speculation. 
The great weight of the evidence in this case showed that the 
plaintiff's injury was caused by the negligence of the defendant. 
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The trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff1s 
motion for a new trial. The abuse of discretion is particularly 
apparent when coupled with the errors in jury voir dire. In 
addition, the jury deliberated only 20 minutes, evidencing a 
failure to adequately consider the evidence and suggesting an 
improper or partial jury. 
Plaintiff did not receive a fair trial, and this case should 
be remanded for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY RESTRICTED VOIR DIRE 
OF THE JURY. 
The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion Zu Failing To Allow 
Questioning Of The Jurors Regarding Exposure To Tort Reform And 
Insurance Crisis Propaganda. 
Plaintiff submitted a list of proposed voir dire questions 
and requested that the prospective jurors be questioned concerning 
their exposure to claims of a need for tort reform or to claims 
of an insurance crisis. Some of the specific areas of inquiry 
were as follows: 
13. Have you read magazine or newspaper 
articles or other literature about medical 
negligence? 
14. Did any of you read Time magazine 
in March, 1986? 
15. Have you ever signed any petition 
on the issue of negligence? 
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16. Have you seen anything in your 
doctors office about negligence? 
17. Have you discussed this subject with 
your family doctor or friends? 
(R. 137-44.) 
Rather than complying with plaintiff's request to ask who had 
been exposed to insurance and tort reform propaganda, the trial 
court only inquired concerning the ultimate conclusion of whether 
persons believed they were biased as a result of such information. 
The court asked the following: 
Now, many of you have heard and read articles, 
and there have been television programs, with 
regard to negligence on the part of doctors. 
Do any of you have any strong feelings as a 
result of seeing or reading anything about 
medical negligence that would make it so that 
you couldn't be fair and impartial here today? 
(Tr. vol. 7 (jury selection) pp. 30-31.) 
In response to the courtfs question, two prospective jurors 
did assert that they were biased (Id.), and the jurors were 
excluded for cause. (R. 152.) While the court's question may 
arguably have been sufficient to determine whether a juror should 
be excused for cause, it was not sufficient to allow plaintiff to 
meaningfully exercise her peremptory challenges. Plaintiff 
renewed and preserved her objection at the conclusion of voir dire 
examination. (Tr. vol. 7 (jury selection) p. 48.) The claim of 
error is reviewed by this court for an abuse of discretion. Doe 
v. Hafen. 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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The voir dire examination of a jury has two purposes. The 
first is "the detection of actual bias/1 and the second is "the 
collection of data to permit informed exercise of the peremptory 
challenge.w State v, Tavlor. 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983) 
(citations omitted). The distinction between the two purposes of 
voir dire was further explained by the court in State v. Worthenr 
765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988) as follows: 
Although a trial judge has some discre-
tion in limiting voir dire examinations, that 
discretion should be liberally exercised in 
favor of allowing counsel to elicit informa-
tion from prospective jurors. Indeed, the 
fairness of a trial may depend on the right 
of counsel to ask voir dire questions designed 
to discover attitudes and biases, both con-
scious and subconscious. even though thev 
would not have supported a challenge for 
cause. . . . Juror attitudes revealed during 
voir dire may indicate dimly perceived, yet 
deeply rooted, psychological biases or preju-
dices that may not rise to the level of a for-
cause challenge but nevertheless support a 
peremptory challenge. 
765 P.2d at 845 (citations and quotation marks omitted, emphasis 
added). 
The trial court in this case may have adequately covered the 
first purpose of voir dire, but ignored the second. 
Numerous Utah cases have addressed plaintiff requests for 
jury voir dire examination concerning exposure to tort reform and 
insurance propaganda. The issue was most recently considered in 
Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The plaintiff 
in that case sought to have the jury questioned concerning tort 
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reform propaganda, or "newspaper and magazine articles that blame 
the high cost of insurance and the resulting loss of certain 
medical personnel on large-dollar jury damage awards." 772 P.2d 
at 458. The trial court denied the requested examination, and the 
Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the case of Borkoski 
v. Yost. 182 Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688 (1979). The £oe court stated 
as follows: 
In Borkoski. the Montana Supreme Court 
balanced the problem of selecting an impartial 
jury, after exposure to such articles, against 
the prejudice injected into the trial by the 
questioning itself, particularly where the 
extent of the exposure was not initially known 
to the court. Borkoski held that before any 
specific questioning about the articles would 
be allowed, either of two alternative types 
of preliminary questions must be asked: 
"[W]hether the prospective juror has heard of 
or read anything which might affect his 
ability to sit as an impartial juror or 
whether the prospective juror reads any of the 
magazine or newspapers in which it has been 
demonstrated that the articles had appeared." 
Borkoski. 594 P.2d at 695. 
772 P.2d at 458-59 (ellipses omitted). The £oe court further ex-
plained in a footnote that "in adopting the Borkoski rule, we do 
not imply that counsel must show both prerequisites. The pre-
requisites are alternatives so only one or the other must be 
shown." 772 P.2d at 459 n. 4. 
Initially, it must be observed that the need for balancing 
expressed by the Borkoski court did not exist in the instant case. 
The trial court acknowledged that articles and television programs 
concerning medical negligence existed. (Tr. vol. 7 (jury 
10 
selection) at pp. 30-31.) Where the existence of these types of 
articles had already been interjected into the voir dire question-
ing, the concern of prejudicing the jury by discussing the topic 
is eliminated. The court should have accordingly been more 
inclined to allow additional questioning into this area. This is 
especially so where two prospective jurors indicated avenues by 
which they may have been exposed to such propaganda over a period 
of time. Potential juror Grice lived with a physician. (Id. p. 
12.) Potential juror Kuhn, who was eventually empaneled on the 
jury,*was married to an employee of an insurance company. (Id. 
p. 8, 45, 48.) 
Even under a strict reading of the Borkoski standard, the 
trial court's limitation of jury voir dire cannot be justified. 
Plaintiff identified at least one specific magazine which had 
contained assertions of a link between high damage awards and the 
cost of insurance. A copy of the article, which appeared in a 
March, 1986 issue of Time, is attached in Appendix MAM. Plaintiff 
proffered additional specific publications, but the trial court 
refused the proffer. (Tr. vol. 7 (jury selection) at p. 48.) 
Under the circumstances of this case, where plaintiff had laid an 
adequate foundation, the trial court was required to allow plain-
tiff to question the jury regarding their exposure to these types 
of publications. It was not enough to simply inquire whether the 
jurors felt they were biased. The insidious nature of such 
publications is that their effect may be subconscious. The trial 
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court clearly erred in failing to allow plaintiff to inquire into 
those areas. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that she has the burden of also 
showing that the erroneous limitation of jury voir dire prejudiced 
the plaintiff. Utah R. Civ* P. 61. The record in this case 
demonstrates that the error was not harmless. As demonstrated 
more fully below in Point II of this brief, there were three 
possible ways in which the injury to plaintiff1s recurrent 
laryngeal nerve could have been damaged: the nerve could have 
been severed by the defendants scalpel, the nerve could have been 
ligated along with the ductus, or the nerve could have been 
spontaneously damaged as a result of the tension on the nerve and 
the movement of the ductus during the operation. Dr. Doty ack-
nowledged that he might be considered negligent if the nerve was 
damaged through the first two methods. Only Dr. Doty was in a 
position to know how the nerve was damaged, and he testified that 
he had no way of knowing how the damage actually occurred. He 
understandably opined, however, that he believed it occurred in 
a non-negligent fashion. 
Where the verdict of the jury was thus dependent upon the 
jury adopting the defendants speculation as to the cause of the 
injury, it cannot be said that the error in limiting jury voir 
dire was harmless, especially in view of the fact that the entire 
jury deliberations in a lengthy trial with more than seventy 
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exhibits were only 20 minutes. Plaintiff is entitled to a new 
trial before an impartial jury, 
POINT II 
THE VERDICT WAS CONTRARY TO THE GREAT WEIGHT OF 
THE EVIDENCE AND PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL. 
The granting of a new trial based on sufficiency-of-the-
evidence grounds represents an issue of fact. Therefore, in this 
circumstance, the trial court is vested with "some" discretionary 
powers, and the appellate court should "reverse only when that 
discretion is abused." Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 
1988). The general rule is that the reviewing Court "will presume 
that the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised 
unless the record clearly shows the contrary." Goddard v. 
Hictafian. 685 p.2d 530, 534 (Utah 1984) (quoting State Road Commis-
sion v. General Oil Co., 22 Utah 2d 60# 62, 448 P.2d 718, 719 
(1968)(emphasis added). Furthermore, an appellate court will 
reverse if "it is reasonably convinced by the court record that 
the trial judge's ruling probably amounts to a substantial miscar-
riage of justice." Worthinaton v. Bvnum, 305 N.C. 478, 290 S.E.2d 
599, 603 (1982). 
In determining whether there has been a substantial mis-
carriage of justice or whether the trial court abused its discre-
tion in failing to grant a new trial on an insufficiency-of-the-
evidence challenge, the. Court must review the evidence "in the 
light most favorable to the party who prevailed [at trial]. . . 
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." If the Court concludes that "the evidence is insufficient to 
support the verdict," the Court must reverse. Hansen 761 P.2d at 
17. The moving party carries the burden of proof and "must 
marshall all the evidence supporting the verdict" and then show 
that the evidence cannot support the verdict. Price-Orem Inv. Co, 
v. Rollins. Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1986). 
A review of the record shows that on direct examination the 
defendant and his expert admitted that the recurrent laryngeal 
nerve was damaged during the surgical procedure performed by 
defendant Doty. (Tr. vol. 5 (Gay) p. 23; tr. vol. 2 (Doty) p. 
25) . This conclusion was based on the fact that Corinne had no 
pre-operative symptoms which would indicate damage to the nerve 
had already occurred. (Tr. vol. 2 (Doty) p. 79). Defendants 
expert witness, William Gay, testified that he believed the most 
likely explanation for the cause of injury was that "in mobilizing 
the tissues from around the ductus, the stretch was put on the 
nerve and the nerve was damaged in that way." (Tr. vol. 5 (Gay) 
p. 23.) 
After reviewing a treatise which he co-authored, Dr. Gay 
further testified that damage to the recurrent laryngeal nerve was 
one of the more frequently occurring complications in a patent 
ductus procedure. He testified that blunt trauma, which he 
characterized as caused by "putting traction on the nerve" during 
the surgical procedure, would occasionally cause temporary 
paralysis of the nerve. However, Dr Gay further testified that 
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he had never conducted a patent ductus surgery in which blunt 
trauma had caused permanent nerve paralysis. When questioned 
about whether it was possible for blunt trauma to cause permanent 
paralysis, he stated that he was "certain that it could.11 (Tr. 
vol. 5 (Gay) p. 25-26.) 
On cross examination, Dr. Gay again testified that in his 
years of experience, he had never seen permanent paralysis caused 
by blunt trauma to the laryngeal nerve. (Tr. vol. 5 (Gay) p. 
29). When questioned on why, then, he believed that blunt trauma 
was the cause of Corinnefs*paralysis, Dr. Gay stated that he was 
relying on recorded reports. (Tr. vol. 5 (Gay) p. 29). No 
additional evidence of any reports or specific incidents of 
permanent paralysis caused by blunt trauma to the nerve were 
entered into evidence. 
Defendant himself testified that there were three possible 
ways by which permanent damage to the laryngeal nerve could occur. 
The three ways are as follows: 
(1) The nerve could have been severed by an operative 
instrument during the surgical procedure; 
(2) The nerve could have been ligated with the patent 
ductus; or 
(3) The tension and pressure on the nerve itself could have 
traumatized the nerve severely enough to cause permanent damage. 
(Tr. vol. 2 (Doty) pp. 83-34). 
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By the defendant's own admission, the first two 
causes—severing or ligating the nerve—might be negligent. (Tr. 
vol. 2 (Doty) p. 84.) The third cause—blunt trauma severe enough 
to cause permanent paralysis—would be the only non-negligent way 
the injury could have been sustained. Notwithstanding his self-
serving opinion, the defendant proffered no specific evidence or 
cases to establish that blunt traumatization of the recurrent 
laryngeal nerve during patent ductus surgery had ever caused 
permanent paralysis in other patients. 
Defendant was identified as an author of a treatise and one 
of the authorities on this type of surgery. His text and others 
described the fact that the laryngeal nerve should be identified 
and isolated from the area prior to ligation of the ductus, and 
extra care should be taken to make sure the nerve is not involved 
or damaged in the surgery. (Tr. vol. 2 (Doty) p. 19, 21, 24.) 
Notwithstanding this fact, defendant's operative report fails to 
document that the laryngeal nerve was identified or isolated by 
the defendant. (Trial Ex. 9-P, attached in Appendix "B".) 
Plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Robert A. Achtel, testified 
that failure to identify and/or isolate the laryngeal nerve is 
negligent. Dr. Achtel was cross-examined by defendant's counsel 
regarding an article in the Journal of American College of 
Cardiology that referred to two patients who suffered left 
recurrent laryngeal nerve paralysis in association with pulmonary 
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arteriohypertension. There was no surgery involved in either of 
these cases. These were the only documented or identified 
references by any expert to laryngeal nerve damage not caused by 
nerve severage damage or ligation during surgery. Dr. Achtel 
pointed out that these individuals were 37 and 57 years of age 
respectively. He further testified that he had never seen a child 
with a recurrent laryngeal injury caused by internal compression 
or trauma, (Tr. vol. 6 (Achtel) p. 46-47), and that it was unfair 
"to compare apples to oranges; a 57-year-old woman is not the 
same as a little girl." 
In summary, both expert witnesses and the defendant himself, 
agreed that although it was hypothetically possible that blunt 
trauma or compression to the recurrent laryngeal nerve could cause 
temporary and perhaps permanent paralysis, none of the witnesses-
-even with their many years of experience and authorships—could 
identify even one case of which they had knowledge where such an 
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injury had been the result of patent ductus surgery. Furthermore, 
although there was testimony by defendants expert that he had 
read reports which led him to conclude that the paralysis could 
be caused by unavoidable trauma and not by a negligent severing 
or ligating of the nerve, there was no supporting evidence 
proffered, nor was there even one case cited as an example. 
The great weight of the evidence compels the conclusion that 
Dr. Doty was negligent in his treatment of Corinne. The only 
theory upon which the jury could have found in favor of the 
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defendant—the blunt trauma or compression theory—was clearly 
against the weight of the evidence and required the jury to 
improperly speculate as to the cause of the paralysis. When the 
evidence is factually insufficient to support a finding of vital 
fact—in this case, that Corinnefs paralysis was caused by 
compression or trauma—or the verdict is so against the great 
weight and preponderance of evidence as to be manifestly unjust, 
the jury verdict should be set aside and a new trial ordered. 
Malone & Hvde, Inc. v. Hobrecht. 685 S.W. 2d 739 (Tex. App. 1985). 
Because H[t]he district court fhas the power and duty to 
order a new trial whenever . . . the action is required in order 
to prevent injustice,l,f Kearns v. Keystone Shipping Company. 863 
F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1988) (emphasis added) citing 11 C. Wright & A. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure. 2805; See also 
Worthinoton. 290 S.E.2d at 605, and because injustice was created 
by the jury verdict in favor of defendant Doty, the Court abused 
its discretion in failing to grant a new trial. 
A. The trial court erred in failing to grant plaintiff's 
motion for J.N.O.V. 
Although Ma trial court has some discretion in deciding 
whether or not to grant a new trial . . . [a] trial court has no 
latitude in passing on a motion for a j.n.o.v.; its decision must 
be correct." Hansen 761 P.2d at 17. Therefore, failure to grant 
a motion for j.n.o.v. in a case where such an action is clearly 
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warranted constitutes reversible error on the part of the trial 
court. 
The standard of review is the same for j.n.o.v. as for a new. 
trial. The Court must review the evidence "in the light most 
favorable to the party who prevailed [at trial] • • • ••• If the 
Court concludes that "the evidence is insufficient to support the 
verdict," the Court must disregard the jury verdict* Hansen. 761 
P.2d at 17. See also King v, Feredav, 739 P.2d 618, 620-21 (Utah 
1987) ; Price-Orem Inv. Co, v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc.. 713 
P.2d 55, 57-58 (Utah 1986). The Court should "consider whether 
anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any 
combination of circumstances could be found from which a reason-
able inference could be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." 
McNamar v. Honeyman, 546 N.E.2d 139 (Mass. 1989). However, the 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence must be based on proba-
bilities rather than possibilities and cannot be the result of 
mere speculation • and conjecture. McNamar, 546 N.E.2d at 141; 
Tavlor v. Keith O'Brien. 537 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1975). Thus, a 
j.n.o.v. ruling is justified when the evidence so overwhelmingly 
preponderates in favor of the movant that reasonable persons could 
not arrive at a different conclusion. Anderson v. Gribble. 30 
Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973) . See also Southwestern Stationery 
& Bank Supply, Inc. v. Harris Corp,, 624 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 
1980). 
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In applying these judgment n.o.v. standards to the present 
case, there is clearly insufficient evidence to support the jury 
verdict. As stated above, there was undisputed expert testimony 
that permanent nerve damage, such as that sustained by Corinne, 
was consistent with litigation or severance of the left recurrent 
laryngeal nerve* All experts agreed that these two probable 
causes of the injury were breaches of the standard of care. 
The third possibility—that the permanent paralysis of the 
vocal chord resulted from trauma or tension placed on the nerve 
during the patent ductus surgery—was so remote that for the jury 
to base its verdict on this theory required prohibited speculation 
and conjecture. Although the experts agreed that it was 
hypothetically possible for such an injury to occur, none of the 
experts could refer to a single case in which blunt trauma resul-
ted in permanent nerve damage. Defendant testified that the 
injury occurred during the operation, that it had to have been the 
result of some type of manipulation, that he was the only one who 
knew what took place in the operation, and yet he had no explana-
tion for what happened to damage the nerve. (Tr. vol. 2 (Doty) 
p. 27.) As such, the jury verdict was based on possibilities and 
conjecture and not upon probabilities as required. See McNamar, 
546 N.E.2d 139; and Tavlor. 537 P.2d 1022. 
In short, the evidence in plaintiff Corinnefs favor on the 
issue of liability was so overwhelmingly preponderant that a 
judgment for Corinne was the only reasonable conclusion that could 
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have been reached. Therefore, the trial court erred in failing 
to grant judgment n.o.v. 
B. The haste in which the jury made its decision was 
evidence of a casual and nondeliberative process which brings into 
the Question the validity of the verdict. 
The trial in this case extended over four days. Seventy-two 
exhibits (R. 154) and 27 instructions (R. 200-30) were submitted 
to the jury. The jury was cautioned to not make a hasty decision. 
(R. 228) , but nonetheless returned with a verdict after only 20 
minutes1 absence from the courtroom. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that brief jury deliberation may not 
always, in itself, be a sufficient basis to support a new trial 
motion. Under the circumstances of this case, however, "where 
brief jury deliberation is coupled with a verdict that is contrary 
to the great of the evidence . . • it creates a situation where 
the district court has an affirmative duty to set aside the 
verdict.11 Kearns v. Keystone Shipping Co.. 863 F.2d 177, 182 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (citing Borras v, Sea-Land Services. Inc.. 586 F.2d 
881, 887 (1st Cir. 1978)). 
Brief jury deliberation can indicate a lack of full 
consideration of all issues in the case. In Kenan v. Moore, 142 
Fla. 489, 195 So. 167 (1940), a simple (uncomplex) negligence suit 
against a railroad company, the court found that "the record as 
a whole indicates that the jury could not in sixteen minutes have 
duly considered the evidence adduced and the charges of the court 
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under the issues of the case," Jd, at 169. In the present case, 
the jury verdict was clearly against the great weight of the 
evidence. There were over 70 exhibits in the case and yet the 
jury deliberated less than 20 minutes. The jury could not have 
duly considered the evidence. 
In Turner v. Cotham, 361 Mich. 198, 105 N.W.2d 237 (I960), 
the trial court granted a j.n.o.v. based on the short deliberation 
time of the jury. The jury in Turner had reached their 
conclusions as to the fault of the defendant in the guest 
passenger action against the host, but were having difficulty 
determining an appropriate amount for damages. The jury returned 
to the courtroom for court instruction regarding the measure of 
damages. At that time, plaintifffs attorney suggested a §17.700 
figure to the jury. After deliberating only fpijr minutes, the 
jury returned with a damage verdict of $17,700, In granting the 
j.n.o.v., the trial court found that "[tJTiis action by jury shows 
conclusively that the jury either did not understand or did not 
give any attention to the charge of the court regarding the 
damages to be awarded. The defendant was entitled to have tn£ 
jury give deliberate consideration to the amount of the damages 
that the plaintiff sustained. This certainly was not done.11 
Turner. 105 N.W.2d at 237. 
A similar occurrence arose in the present case. The jury was 
dismissed for deliberation at the end of the trial. In response 
to Plaintiff's objections for failure to give one jury 
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instruction, the jury was again brought into the court room for 
a supplemental instruction. (R. closing remarks, p. 52.) The 
jury returned to its deliberation and returned in less than twenty 
minutes to submit its verdict for the defendant. It is clear that 
the jury did not give deliberate consideration to the issues at 
bar. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff should be granted a new trial because she did not 
receive a fair trial in the first instance. The absence of a fair 
trial is evident from the combination of (a) an improper and 
restrictive voir dire and jury empaneling process, (b) a verdict 
clearly against the weight of the evidence and based upon conjec-
ture and speculation and (c) a jury deliberation of only twenty 
minutes• 
DATED this day of June, 1990. 
JACKSON HOWARD, 
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
23 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 
day of June, 1990. 
David H. Epperson, Esq. 
Hanson, Epperson & Smith 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 
24 
A P P E N D I X 
MARCH 24.1986 
- ^ ; 
4>% 
surance 
:^?r/:^ -••• 
rsfc3f. *. 
&-^~£h?i 
^ v V f e r v 
*V:**~\ 
ERS" 
-.V.SK'BU ."ir 
'-;S-C*L. 
fc«^ 
rvv-
«•.**» 
\ 
o N *•<- 7 O C H 
203*8 IP OACfca 
N0I1D2S S"bId3S 
oil c •fZ.HOBOO0d81-
SfiSads 
COVER STORY 
Sorry, Your Policy 
Is Canceled 
Those dread words echo with numbingfrequency in an America 
well on the way to insuring itself to a silly, shuddering halt 
TIME MARCH 24 1986 
O n the Hawaiian island of Mo-lokai pregnant women who want a doctor in attendance when they give birth fly to neighboring Oahu or Maui 
The fj\e Molokai doctors who once deliv-
ered babies have stopped doing so because 
malpractice insurance would cost them 
more than the total of any obstetrical fees 
they could hope to collect 
Will County 111. last week closed its 
forest preserves untiJ it can get a new li-
ability policy on them—if that can be 
done at all—and Blue Lake Calif (pop 
1200) has shut us skating rmk parks and 
tennis court Hundreds of other towns in 
California and in New York State are 
"•going bare That is they simply cannot 
get liability insurance 
The Texas sesquicentenrual cattle 
dnve part of the state s celebration of 150 
years of independence from Mexico 
bogged down this month after one day on 
the road because liability insurance cover-
ing the 49 longhorn steers that were in-
volved was doubled and the organizers 
could not afford it The dnve resumed last 
Fnday with onJy 28 steers whose owners 
agreed to pay for the insurance themselves 
Century Cartage Co a small truck 
line out of Atlanta is still in business only 
rate increase for its customers But that 
boost came nowhere near meeting the 
cost of babihtv-insurance premiums that 
doubled to S48 000 last vear and then 
leaped to SI 14 000 at the start of 1986 
Outrageous1 Yes Ridiculous1 In 
many cases Unreasonable1 Certainly 
And yet the examples represent just a 
small sampling from a nstng flood of 
problems growing out of what has become 
a new national ensis Given the litigious 
nature of American society these days 
just about any kind of business profession 
or government ageno is likely to become 
the target of a sun alleging malpractice or 
negligence resulting in personal injury 
That makes liability insurance the kind 
that pavs off on such claims just about as 
vital as oil in keeping the economy func-
tioning But in the past two vears liability 
insurance has become the kind of re-
source thai oil *as in the 1970s prohibi-
tively expensive when it can be bought at 
all The result is a pinch from which few 
can escape—not even liability specialists 
like J B Spence or Robert Rearden 
Spence a Miami lavever is the kind of 
attorney insurers often blame for their 
troubles He has *on and earned a 
healthv slice of several multimiHion-dol-
sued for malpractice or negligence as is 
happening to lawyers more and moie he 
would have to pay any coun-ordered 
damages out of his ou n pocket There is 
no market that will sell me uabilm insur-
ance " says Spence I am going bare and 
it is a frightening prospect 
Rearden president of Duncan Peek 
Inc an Atlanta insurance brokerage 
earns commissions selling policies at soar-
ing premium rates But *hen the time 
came to renew his own professional Labil-
ity pobcy his earner wanted to jack up his 
S13 000 premium bv 8610 *o SI23 000 
Rearden had to scramble to rind another 
company that *ould onh triple his premi-
um cost 'And that s me and I m in the 
insurance business' wails Rearden 
"That s what I mean *hcn I sa> this crisis 
is affecting everybod) 
A nd how After years of eye popping damage awards and shonsigh ted insura nee -com -pany practices the US is in danger of ha\mg its insurance 
canceled The cost of this ensis once gen 
erally hidden is now hitting home The 
S9 1 billion Americans paid last vear in i»-
abiliiv-msurance premiums was almost 
600 higher than the Dgure as reuenfK as 
and Space Administration and the Cen-
tral intelligence Agency. This years total 
is sure to show another giant leap. 
Every American pays: doctors and 
their patients, ski-slope operators and 
their patrons, municipal governments 
and their taxpayers, those who process 
cheese and those who eat pizza, those who 
take the bus and those who lease private 
jets, those who drill for oil and those who 
heat their homes. 
Even more insidiously, the problem 
threatens the very character of American 
life, from the Great Peace March across 
the VS. <which came apart last week in 
the Mojave Desen. partly because of a 
lack of liability coverage) to police patrols 
in New York's suburban Rockland Coun-
ty (suspended last week in the towns of 
Pienmont and Sloatsburg; 13 officers have 
been told to sit at headquarters' desks 
while the towns look for a liability insurer 
to replace one that has gone into receiver-
ship). Factory owners seeking to expand, 
entrepreneurs seeking to launch new en-
terprises, young businessmen seeking to 
set up shop: all are running into an obsta-
cle far harder to surmount than high taxes 
and interest rates in their pursuit of the 
American dream. Liability insurance has 
become their most crippling cost. 
As a result, doctors have been march-
ing on state capitols. some threatening to 
shut down their practices. Industry 
groups and insurance companies have 
launched loud lobbying and advertising 
campaigns. Bills have been introduced or 
passed in all 50 state legislatures to limit 
liability awards or regulate insurance 
practices or both. Congress has held pub-
lic hearings. But federal and state law* 
makers, who have been faced with cutting 
through a jungle of conflicting statistics, 
arcane accounting practices and tangled 
legal theory, have mostly come out baf-
fled. Says South Dakota Republican Sena-
tor Larry Presslen "We have not been 
able to get past the finger-pointing stage." 
Consumer groups point to the insur-
ance companies. When interest rates were 
high, they say. insurers wrote policies 
with little concern about how they would 
make good if claims went up and returns 
on their investments went down. Insurers 
point to the legal system. Juries, they say. 
have been handing out punitive damage 
awards that resemble lottery jackpois. 
Lawyers point to the negligence of Big 
Business It can be redressed, they say. 
only if individuals have a nght to present 
their cases to a jury Businessmen point to 
changing altitudes. The individualistic 
notion of taking risks and accepting re-
sponsibility, they say, has been replaced 
by a sue-everyone-in-sight reaction to any 
accident. What makes the problem such a 
nightmare is that, to some extent, all of 
the finger pointers have a point. 
W hat it finally boils down to is a matter of statistical logic and insurer psy-chology If a few giant jury awards, actual or 
merely possible, can offset the premiums 
on an entire line of insurance, the compa-
nies feel they must raise premiums for ev-
erybody until there is some hope of mak-
ing a profit. This means that premiums 
may bear no relationship to an individual 
policyholders record, and buyers of many 
kinds of insurance are suddenly paying 
three or four tunes as much as they did a 
year or so earlier. Of all places. Hartford. 
Conn., known as the insurance capital of 
the world because so many earners have 
their headquarters there, sa* its own mu-
nicipal liability coverage slashed to only 
$4 million, vs. S31 million in the 1984-85 
fiscal year, despite a 20ft nse in total pre-
miums, to S1.8 million. 
Some insurers are shying away from 
covering certain types of nsks at any 
price. If there is no way of figuring what 
kind of damages a jury might award to the 
parents of a child molested at a day-care 
center, for example, then the companies 
will find it best to stop writing that kind of 
insurance at all. Says James Wood, a 
member of a firm of actuaries whose 
headquarters are in Atlanta: **If you are 
an insurer and have S 100.000 in assets, do 
you want to risk those assets to keep day-
Risky business, life, 
Always has been. 
But is it 
more so these days? 
Must be. The horror 
stories go on and 
on and on. . . 
Lacrossed Up 
As one of only two U.S. makers 
of lacrosse equipment, William 
H. Brine of Milford, Mass., lets 
customers know how to place 
reorders by priming his compa-
ny's phone number on the back 
of each helmet. Now the hel-
mets carry another message: a warning that lacrosse is a 
dangerous game. In 1984, Brine (photo) paid S8.000 annu-
ally forS25 million worth of product-liability insurance. In 
December, he received notice that his premium was going 
up to S200,000 for just $1 million of protection. Brine is 
taking his chances uninsured. "If we have a large judg-
ment against us/* he says, "it could be the end of 
lacrosse/* 
Other sporting-goods manufacturers face similar di-
lemmas: many VS. firms have decided to abandon the 
manufacture of amateur hockey gear. 
Nation 
care centers open'* The an-
swer is probably no. because 
you do noi know what you 
have to charge when you do 
not know what the ultimate 
costs of providing coverage 
nugh: be." Most insurers 
flatly refuse to wnte policies 
to protect companies against 
suits arising from injuries 
caused by environmental 
pollution. They say they 
have no way of gauging the 
nsk. That complicates fur-
thei the question of who will 
pay for cleaning up toxic-
waste dumps. 
The dubious distinction 
of paying the highest increase 
on record may belong to Spe-
cialty Systems Inc.. a Rich-
mond. Ind.. company that 
specializes in removing as-
bestos from buildings Insur-
ers are so terrified of any-
thing having to do with 
asbestos that they canceled 
Specialty's policies three times 
Manufacturers massing to urge product-liability reform on Capitol HHI 
"There are going to be people who are dumb and stupid." 
between 
November 1984 and last April, though the 
nine-year-old company has never been 
sued. Because customers demand proof of 
insurance before they will give Specialty 
any business, the company wound up buy-
ing a S500.000 policy from the Great 
American Insurance Co. of Cincinnati, on 
which it will pay at least S460.000-in pre-
miums, an increase of more than 4.900^ 
over the S9.361 premium on its last full-
year policy. Says Specialty President Fred-
erick Tread way: "About half a million dol-
lars paid to the insurance company for 
virtually nothing.*' 
The situation is studded with an end-
less variety of similar horror stones (see 
boxes). Among the most prominent are 
those that involve municipal services. 
The city council of Blue Island. 111. (pop. 
22.000), last October voted down a 30% 
increase in property taxes thought neces-
sary to pay rocketing liability-insurance 
premiums, and the town expects to self-
insure for the 1986-87 fiscal year, taking a 
chance that a large judgment might force 
taxes up anyway. Five counties in Missou-
ri closed their jails for several weeks last 
fall, sending some prisoners elsewhere for 
incarceration and releasing minor offend-
ers outright. The jails reopened after the 
counties' sheriffs set up a self-insurance 
pool, which was financed by tax money. 
Among professionals, malpractice in-
in 
surance problems have 
plagued lawyers, engineers 
members of corporate 
boards and even clergymen 
A growing number of clerics 
are buying, or having then 
churches buy, policies t0 
protect them against suju 
like the one brought by
 a 
California couple who a\. 
tnbuted the suicide of their 
24-year-old son largely to in-
ept counseling by his pas-
tors. (That particular suit, 
filed in 1980. was dismissed 
for a second tune last year, 
the case is still being ap-
pealed.) Suits against doc-
tors, particularly specialists 
such as obstetricians and 
neurosurgeons, have been 
more successful and have led 
to some of the highest insur-
ance premiums. A typicai 
annual premium for an ob-
stetrician in Los Angeles is 
about S45.000. and for a neu-
Long Island. N.Y., about 
rosurgeon 
$83,000. 
Product-liability insurance presents a 
major problem for the makers of every-
thing from toys to antitoxins. Pertussis 
vaccine for children ran short a year ago 
because Connaught Laboratories sus-
pended production for a nine-month peri-
od during which it could not find insur-
ance at an acceptable pnee Now Lederle 
La bora tones, the only other maker of the 
vaccine, is talking of halting output in 
July if a threatened cutoff of its liability 
insurance materializes. Beech Aircraft 
figures the cost of liability premiums at a 
stunnong S80.000 on each plane it sells. 
Says William Mellon, director of corpo-
Strung Out 
When New York City's Roose-
velt Island was opened for resi-
dential development nearly elev-
en years ago, pan of its allure was 
a tramway that would soon con-
nect the community to midtown 
Manhattan in six scenic minutes. 
That lifeline was cut last month when the tram's liability pre-
mium soared from S800,000 to nearly S9 million a year. Op-
erators shut down the system, forcing some 5250 islanders 
to spend up to an hour commuting on buses and subways. 
After two weeks. New York State assumed responsi-
bility for the tramway under a "self-insurance" plan that is 
increasingly becoming the solution of last resort for mu-
nicipal services. Many legislators, however, are dubious 
about forcing governments to enter the insurance busi-
ness. Meanwhile^the little tram that couldn't, now can—at 
least until somebody sues. 
Bad Trip 
For sponsor PROpeace, the anti-
nuclear Great Peace March be-
tween Los Angeles and Wash-
ington turned out to be a 
movable flop, beset by celebrity 
no-shows, cold weather and a 
lack of funds that last week 
caused the project's collapse. One major headache was the 
inability to obtain a S5 million liability policy required by 
some municipalities along the marchers' route. Because 
they lacked such coverage, 900 or so PROpeaceniks were 
denied the use of a schoolyard in Claremont, Calif., where 
they had planned to camp their third night on the road 
Sponsors of public events ranging from San Francis-
co's Chinese New Year festival to Maine's Fryeburg coun-
try fair have aJso run into trouble securing liability cover-
age. The main reason: the unpredictable nature of claims 
made by audience members, onlookers and participants. 
raie communications: "The 
owner-pilot markei has all 
bui dried up. and one cause 
is the cost of product liabil-
ity It has driven the price of 
a new airplane out of the 
reach of the average person 
who wants to buy one." 
Some commercial fishing 
boats that once sailed out of 
Pacific Northwestern pons 
have been put into dry dock 
because owners could not af-
ford liability-insurance pre-
miums thai commonly have 
doubled in the past year 
or so. 
Rising premiums are 
forcing up prices on a vari-
ety of services too. Ski-lift 
tickets are jumping by S2 or 
S3 at many resorts. Through 
last year Kennestone Hospi-
tal in Manetia. Ga.. insured 
itself for the first SI million 
of any claims that might be 
made and paid a premium of 
S70.000 for additional cover-
age up to a maximum of S10 
million. Now the premium 
has quintupled to S350.000. and on top of 
that ihe hospital has had to come up with 
another SI million for its self-insurance 
trust fund, because the deductible was 
raised to S2 million. Says Executive Di-
rector Bernard Brown: "If you come to 
our hospital, you pay the price. It is being 
passed through." 
Day-care centers, which have become 
an essential pan of American life in an 
era of two-career families, are a striking 
example of how the insurance crunch 
may soon affect the lives of many unwary 
citizens. Operators fume that allegations 
of child abuse at a handful of centers have 
spooked insurers into indiscriminately 
Workers dismantling playground equipment on Chicago's Northwest Side 
Says the insurer: "Park districts are a tembie nsk/or any earner." 
canceling liability policies or demanding 
giant premiums. Mission Insurance 
Group, the chief provider of coverage for 
day-care centers, abruptly pulled out of 
the business last year. The handful of in-
surers that will suil write day-care policies 
insist either on specifically excluding 
claims for damages arising from sexual 
abuse or setting up rules for strict supervi-
sion, such as unannounced visits by spe-
cial investigators. Says Suzanne Grace, 
associate director of the Georgia Day 
Care Association: "The insurers are tell-
ing us. *We don't care what your record 
is.' This business has the perceived risk of 
killing an insurance company." 
There is one area Of* gen-
eral agreement about what 
has caused the insurance cri-
sis: plain old-fashioned 
greed. Ah. bui whose greed? 
Insurers and some of 
their customers blame ag-
gressive lawyers, inventive 
judges and soft-hearted Ju-
nes for twisting legal con-
cepts of negligence into nov-
el shapes to justify excessive 
damage awards to people 
who claim personal injury la 
ton in legal parlancei Ava-
ricious lawyers they argue, 
seek outrageously high dam-
ages for clients who have 
flimsy cases, so that the law-
yers can reap huge contin-
gency fees (if the case fails 
the plaintiffs attorney earns 
nothing, bui if it succeeds he 
commonly takes one-third 
and. on occasion, as much as 
50^ of theauardj Says Ed-
ward Levy, general manager 
of the Association of Califor-
nia Insurance Companies: 
"Lawyers are out to make a 
buck, and they seem to have little concern 
for the overall societal effects of what they 
are doing." 
Plaintiffs' attorneys are every bit as 
willing to point the finger. Insurance com-
panies, they charge, are using deceptive 
tales of excessive damage awards to justi-
fy the exorbitant premiums that they 
charge the public. Says Browne Greene, 
president-elect of the California Trial 
Lawyers Association: "Theu greed takes 
us back to the robber barons of the 19th 
century." Many consumer organizauons 
add that insurers are seeking unjustified 
premium hikes to cover up theu- own bad 
management and poor judgment of nsks. 
City Halt 
Insurance woes have made for a 
sorry spectacle in the Northern 
California seaside village of 
Point Arena (pop. 450). When its 
S2 million liability policy expired 
in July, village officials decided 
to take the chance of going with-
out coverage. A new policy was eventually offered, but at 
50% more than the old rate of S6,700. Point Arena de-
clined. Says Tracy Du Pont (photo): "We would be broke." 
Fearing personal vulnerability in litigation against the 
town, Du Pont's predecessor Kay Spack resigned in Au-
gust. The town council voted to install wry signs at town 
limits warning visitors to "enter at your own risk," but 
abandoned the plan when a motel owner threatened to 
sue. Less wry is the prediction of some experts that two-
thirds of California's 440 towns and cities will be forced to 
operate without liability insurance by next July. 
Overboard 
When the board of Detroit's Ar-
mada Corp. meets these days, 
the directors could easily fit into 
a subcompact car—never mind 
a limo. The company, which 
produces automotive exhaust 
systems, had carried S10 million 
in liability coverage for its ten-member board and 28 cor-
porate officers. Last November it was notified that the rate 
would increase from S45.000 a year to S720.000. Armada 
refused to pay. Fearing exposure to litigation, eight board 
members, including Chairman Jerry D. Luptak (photo), 
resigned last month. (Luptak remained as president.) 
Vice President Lowell Robinson could not recruit 
more than two new directors. Says he: "It's getting very 
difficult to find qualified people." The number of lawsuits 
filed against directors of VS. corporations, by some esti-
mates, has climbed by more than 150% since 1974. 
TIMF W i f t r w ' J iQk* 
Nation 
Americans have always been a liti-
gious people. Bui there does seem to be a 
nse in the number and size of liabilitv 
suits facing every type of company, from 
soccer-ball makers to cigarette manufac-
turers. From 1977 to 1981, the number of 
civil lawsuits in state courts grew four 
times as fast as the population of the U.S. 
And in the decade between 1974 and 
1984. the number of product-liability suits 
in federal courts expanded 680%. The 
first million-dollar verdict did not occur 
until 1962. but there were 401 in 1984. ac-
cording to Jury Verdict Research Inc., a 
private group. The average verdict in 
product-liability cases now tops SI mil-
lion: preliminary figures for 1985 indicate 
that the average verdict in medical mal-
practice cases also exceeded S1 million for 
the first time. These giant awards, insur-
ers say. exert an influence out of propor-
tion to their numbers. They set a target for 
plaintiffs and their attorneys to shoot for. 
and move defendants to offer high out-of-
court settlements rather than take a 
chance on what a jury might do. 
The Association of Trial Lawyers of 
America counters by arguing that the 
Jury Verdict Research figures on averages 
are distorted by a relatively small number 
of huge verdicts. In addition, they say. the 
figures count only the initial outcomes of 
trials that the plaintiffs won. If defendant 
victories, out-of-court settlements and 
verdicts reduced on appeal were factored 
in. say the lawyers, even the avenge level 
of awards would be much lower. ATLA as-
serts that more than two-thirds of the mil-
lion-dollar awards compensate victims or 
relatives for genuinely serious injuries, 
such as death or permanent paralysis, re-
flecting a laudable determination by ju-
ries to see that companies pay the pnee 
for misdeeds that once went unpunished. 
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In some cases, people are successfully 
pressing claims that seem patently silly. 
One example: a man who attempted sui-
cide by jumping in front of a subway 
train sued the New York City Transit Au-
thority, contending that the motorman of 
the subway that hit him had been negli-
gently slow in bringing the train to a 
halt. He won S650.000 in an out-of-court 
settlement. 
Yet much of the lore surrounding the 
subject has been exaggerated. ATLA ana-
lyzed several cases that insurers regularly 
trot out to prove that the system has got 
out of hand and found that the facts did 
not quite support the versions that have 
passed into insurance folklore and public 
print, although one or two. even after cor-
rection, still sound odd. Some examples: 
• According to one frequently cited tale, 
a body builder competing in a footrace 
with a refrigerator strapped to his back 
was injured when one of the straps came 
loose: he sued several defendants, includ-
ing the strapmaker. and won Si million. 
The facts, according to the lawyers 
group: ten athletes competed in a tele-
vised stunt race, each with a 400-lb. re-
frigerator strapped to his back: each re-
ceived a written contract guaranteeing 
that the equipment had been tested for 
safety. Franco Colombo, a world-champi-
on body builder, did fall and suffered total 
knee displacement that required exten-
sive surgery. At the tnal. testimony 
showed that the equipment had never 
been tested on anyone of Columbo's size 
while running (he is 5 ft. 7 in., much 
smaller than anyone else in the race). In 
fact, the engineer for the fitness center 
that developed the contest said that he 
had warned the organizer. Trans World 
International, that the whole race was un-
safe. Columbo did win slightly less than 
SI million from Trans World, but the 
strapmaker was not sued because the 
strap never broke. 
• Another tale allegedly involves a fat 
man with a history of coronary disease 
who suffered a heart attack while trying 
to s u n a Sears lawn mower, sued Sean 
and the manufacturer, contending that 
too much force was required to pull the 
rope, and won SI,750.000 The real story, 
the trial lawyers point out. is that a 32-
year-old doctor, who had no history of 
bean trouble, fell victim to a heart attack 
after futilely yanking the lawn mower's 
starter cord 15 times. A Philadelphia jury 
found that the mowers exhaust valve 
failed to meet the manufacturer's own 
specifications, hindering stan-up to the 
extent that the rope indeed had to be 
pulled with excessive force. The jury did 
award SI,750.000. but the case was subse-
quently settled for an undisclosed amount. 
Birth Pangs 
m*Mi% Six out of every ten babies born in Rhode Island draw their first 
breath in the Women & Infants' 
Hospital of Providence, a 102-
year-old institution that handles 
only obstetrical and gynecologi-
cal cases. The facility also takes 
high-risk cases from nearby hospitals, a practice not calcu-
lated to attract insurance salesmen. Women &. Infants' has 
managed to hold on to a S3 million primary malpractice 
policy, but it has been trying vainly since last October to 
renew its S10 million supplemental coverage. 
No field in medicine has been harder hit by the insur-
ance crisis than obstetrics. According to the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 73% of its 
24,500 members have been sued for malpractice at least 
once. To escape the soaring cost of malpractice protec-
tion, some 3,000 ob-gyns have abandoned the specialty. 
Crying Shame 
The Edith B. Jackson child-care 
program operates seven day-
care homes, a nursery school 
and toddler center for some 45 
children in New Haven. Conn. 
Affiliated with Yale University, 
the widely recognized project 
has not incurred a single insurance claim in 13 years in 
business. Yet last year the program's liability coverage was 
canceled, and the only substitute policy available, for 
S2,400, is six times the 1984 premium and specifically ex-
cludes coverage for child abuse. 
Co-Director Judy Silverman (left in photo) charges 
that underwriters are unduly skittish about day care be-
cause of a few widely publicized child-abuse cases. But 
even she is worrie± *We try to be very careful," she says, 
"but I am uneasy. If a case of abuse came up and we were 
sued, my co-director and I could be held responsible." 
Nation 
• Another oft-u*ed example is of two 
Maryland men who supposedly put a hot-
air balloon into a commercial laundry 
dryer The machine exploded injuring 
both men. who won S885.000 from the 
maker of the dryer What actually hap-
pened is that the men took the balloon to 
a hospital that had laundry equipment de-
signed for industrial purposes The dryer 
vibrated violently and then exploded 
Both men were injured, one required mi-
crosurgery to reattach his hand which 
was almost severed The dryers maker 
had a patent on a device that would have 
stopped the dryer automatically if it be-
gan to vibrate excessively but had de-
clined to install the device on the dryer 
because of the cost Oddly in this case the 
actual award. SI.260.000 exceeded the 
figure usually quoted but the lawyers 
point out that the common account of the 
case ignores the dryer manufacturer s fail-
ure to install the protective device 
• In yet another celebrated case, a bur-
glar supposedly fell through the skylight 
of a school, sued and was awarded 
S260.000. plus S 1.500 a month. The full 
story, it seems, is that a 19-year-old man 
and three friends tried to take a floodlight 
orTthe roof of a California high school as a 
lark, he fell through the skylight and suf-
fered loss of the use of all four limbs, plus 
severe brain damage. The skylight bad 
been painted the same color as the roof 
and was indistinguishable at night, the 
school district knew that it was dangerous 
because someone else had been killed fall-
ing through a similar skylight at another 
school six months earlier, and had sched-
uled the skyhght for repainting It settled 
out of court for S260.000. plus Si.200 a 
month initially, to be increased by 3 ^ 
each year. Still, it seems debatable wheth-
er someone should be so generously com-
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pensated for injuries, even that severe, 
sustained while committing a theft 
Yet whatever the merits of these and 
other specinc cases, the insurance compa-
nies are correct in their basic contention 
an evolution in liability law has led to 
higher jury awards and is at least partly 
responsible for the nse in insurance rates 
One important change* the amounts as-
sessed by junes to compensate for lost 
wages, medical payments and the like 
now make up a small pan of many liabil-
ity awards Junes are increasingly likely 
to add on far larger amounts for noneco-
nomic damages, that is. for such unquan-
tifiable things as pain and suffering. 
Equally significant is the growing size 
of punitive damages, which supposedly 
serve the same purpose as a dont-ever-
do-anything-like-that-again fine of the 
defendant. Junes sometimes find that a 
person s actual damages amounted to 
only a few thousand dollars yet decide ' 
that the corporation at fault should also 
pay punitive damages in the millions In 
one stanling case now awaiting decision 
by the US Supreme Coun. an Alabama 
couple sued Aetna Life SL Casually Co.. 
claiming that it had wrongfully refused to 
pay S 1.650 of the wiles hospital bill A 
jury awarded them punitive damages of 
S3.5 million, or 2.121 times the size of the 
disputed bill 
Couns and legislatures have steadily 
expanded definitions of who can be sued, 
and on what grounds These days you usu-
ally can sue cits hail, despite the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity, which holds that 
governments cannot be sued without their 
consent State laws, and coun interpreta-
tions of them, have granted that consent 
more and more 
Another legal concept being used ever 
more widely is that of stnet liability, 
which makes possible an award of dam-
ages without an> proof of negligence Ini-
ually it was applied, for example, to busi-
nesses conducting abnormally dangerous 
activities Now it has been expanded to 
product-liability cases, a plaintiff need 
not prove that the manufacturer of a 
product was negligent, only that the 
plaintiff was injured while using the prod-
uct in the manner intended. 
More states have also adopted looser 
standards of comparative negligence 
Even if an accident was panly due to the 
plamufTs own negligence, he can success-
fully sue someone else who also bears 
some of the biame. In California, for ex-
ample, a woman who stumbled in a 
church parking lot on the way to a meet-
ing sued the church, the group holding the 
meeting and the city, contending that the 
lot was not lit well enough Although the 
defendants felt she was largely responsi-
Truck Stop 
Tom Leonard's Miami-based 
trucking firm, founded bv his 
grandfather in 1919. was be-
sieged in recent years b> a fleet of 
problems, includmgsharptax in-
creases and pnee competition. 
The company (1984 sales: S21 
million) managed to work around all of them but one: find-
ing the S5 million in liability insurance it was required to 
carry. Because many Leonard trucks hauled pans of the 
apace shuttle, rockets and other explosives, underwaters 
kept hiking rates, limiting coverage and finally refusing to 
provide sufficient insurance at any pnee. When his cover-
age expired last July, Leonard simply shut down. 
Insurance is scarce for earners of any hazardous materi-
als, especially if flammable or toxic. "Companies used to 
w rue us up with no problem/' says Leonard. "But when 
rates changed, we may as well have been child molesters." 
Sawed Off 
The saws, lathes and other 
woodworking equipment manu-
factured by the Oliver Machin-
ery Co. of Grand Rapids are de-
signed to last for years. That sign 
of good workmanship is anathe-
ma to insurers, who shun haz-
ardous products that can lead to lawsuits over long periods. 
"A machine may be 50 or 60 years old, been through a 
number of owners." says Company President Dana Bald-
win. "But if someone gets hurt on it, we will get sued." 
Largely because of that exposure, Oliver's product-liability 
premium quadrupled this year, from S72,000 to S282,000. 
Oliver swallowed its rate hike, but others cannot; 34 of 
the 113 members of the Wood Machinery Manufacturers 
of America have left the business. In their place arc small, 
single-product companies that do not have the same long 
insurance "tail" that often gets caught in lawsuits. 
Nation 
ble. ail three agreed 10a settlement paving 
her $80,000. 
Perhaps the thorniest concept, one 
that has become a growing factor in many 
cases, is called "joim and several liabil-
ity.** It allows a plaintiff to sue everyone 
who might share in the responsibility for 
an accident, and if any one of the defen-
dants is found to be partially at fault, that 
defendant may be forced to pay the entire 
judgment. Originally, it was applied to 
wrongdoers who had acted in concert, but 
now is more often invoked against defen-
dants who acted independently. In prac-
tice, it increasingly means that awards fall 
most heavily on the defendant with "deep 
pockets." often the one carrying the most 
insurance. The doctrine is now in force in 
nearly all states. 
One way to show how these concepts 
work—and the effects they can have on 
insurance coverage—is through a classic 
case settled last year that began with a 
child's fall and ended with most of Chica-
go's parks being stripped of certain kinds 
of playground equipment. It began in 
1978 *hen two-year-old Frank Nelson 
fell through a wide space at the top of a 
slice in a city playground and struck his 
head on the pavement 11 ft. below. He 
suffered severe brain damage: the left side 
of his body is still paralyzed, and his 
speech and vision are impaired. Nelson's 
family sued the manufacturer of the slide, 
the contractor who installed it and the 
Chicago Park District. Lawyers contend-
ed that the district had been negligent in 
failing to warn against use of the slide by 
small children, in not providing proper 
supervision of the playground and not 
putting a softer surface under the slide. 
Officials of the park district and its in-
surer. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. of 
Baltimore, still contend that the primary 
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responsibility for the accident fell on 
Frank's mother: she allowed the boy to go 
on a slide he was too young to use. and 
should have been watching him more 
closely. But they never formally accused 
the mother of negligence in pretrial pro-
ceedings: such an argument would not 
have succeeded unless they also could 
have convinced a jury that the park dis-
trict bore no blame whatever. In this case 
the park district was the defendant with 
the deep pockets— S50 million in liability 
insurance—and Fidelity was afraid that it 
would be hit with the largest share of any 
judgment. Paul Jacob, the insurer's Chi-
cago branch manager, notes that in Illi-
nois a defendant who is found to bear any 
part of the responsibility for an accident 
can be liable for all of a damage award. 
Says he: "Showing that any defendant is 
not \9c negligent is virtually impossible." 
Unwilling to risk paying the damages 
a jury might award 10 a child who had 
been so severely injured. Fidelity offered a 
settlement. It proposed to put up $1.5 mil-
lion to buy an annuity that will make pay-
ments each year to Frank Nelson for the 
rest of his life. The family accepted, and 
the case was closed without tnal. 
But that is not quite the end of the sto-
ry. Fidelity at first canceled the park dis-
trict's insurance, but eventually renewed 
for much less coverage at a greatly in-
creased premium. "Park districts are a 
terrible nsk for any earner to have to as-
sume." explains Jacob. Finally, the park 
district, gun-shy because several suits are 
still pending against it. began tearing 
down all jungle gyms and slides over 61/: 
ft. high and caning them out of the city s 
513 playgrounds. "Accidents happen no 
matter what you do." says Park Dtstnc; 
Treasurer Jack Matthews. "In the past, 
when Johnny fell off the swings, the park 
superintendent took him to the hospital, 
and that was the end of it. Nov. the parks 
are inundated with suits." 
Such cases show how complex and 
changing legal doctrines can increase the 
nsks faced by insurance companies and 
make those risks more unpredictable. But. 
as consumer advocates point out. they do 
not explain the full story. The legal doc-
trines in question have been evolving for 
many years. The nse in the number of 
personal-injury lawsuits and the size of 
jury awards has also been gradual. But 
apart from medical malpractice insur-
ance, which has been a headache for both 
doctors and insurers for at least a decade, 
it is only in the past two years that liability 
premiums have exploded and policies 
have been canceled wholesale. 
What happened0 Lawyers and con-
sumer activists charge that insurers are 
paying the price—or. rather, trying to 
Stiff Drinks 
From 5 to 6 p.m., the price of a 
Heineken beer at the Red Blazer 
restaurant in Concord. N.H.. 
was S14.75 instead of the usual 
S2.25, and a Beefeater's martini 
cost S40. Inflation? Son of. The 
Red Blazer and some 400 other 
New Hampshire bars sponsored an Unhappy Hour last 
month to dramatize the rising cost of liability insurance for 
liquor retailers. The restaurant's premium had been hiked 
from SL000 to S12.000 annually, and its owner hoisted bar 
tabs in protest. As courts have held tavern owners at least 
partly responsible for damage caused by intoxicated cus-
tomers, retail liquor outlets have felt the squeeze from in-
surance companies. But Unhappy Hour prices are not likely 
to become permanent: New Hampshire Insurance Com-
missioner Louis Bergeron argues that( higher premiums 
have actually raised bar costs no more than 18c a dnnk. 
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When a late-winter storm 
dumped nearly 100 in. of snow 
on California's Sierra Nevada 
range near Lake Tahoe in March 
1982, operators of the Alpine 
Meadows ski area closed down 
their 13 lifts and warned guests 
not to venture onto the slopes. When an avalanche struck. 
however, it did not bury the ski trails but the parking lot and a 
ski-patrol building, killingseven people. The familiesof three 
victims sued Alpine Meadows for S10 million in damages. 
Last December a jury decided that the reson was not re-
sponsible for the tragedy. Nevertheless, Alpine Meadows 
did not emerge unscathed: legal fees for the trial totaled some 
S700.000, and the resort's 1986 liability premium doubled, to 
nearly S800,000. Like other businesses hit with major cost in-
creases. Alpine Meadows passed on the added expense. It 
raised the price of a one-day lift ticket from S24 to S26. 
make me puonc pay the price—for their 
own mismanagement and bad judgment. 
Liability uisurance has always been a no-
toriously cyclical industry. Says Robert 
Hunter, head of the National Insurance 
Consumer Organization: "At the lop of 
the cycle you write {policies fori every-
body, no matter how bad. and at the bot-
tom you cancel everybody, no matter how 
good. Its a manic-depressive cycle." 
Harsh words, but again containing 
some truth. In the best of times, property 
and casualty insurers, the kind that issue 
liability policies, rarely make much mon-
ey on underwriting: the premiums collect-
ed have exceeded claims paid in only two 
of the past ten years. Most of their profits 
come from investing the premiums they 
collect. Five years ago. when the prime 
rate, keystone of the VS. interest-rate 
structure, hit an incredible high of 21 lArc. 
such investments paid off very, very well. 
Insurers grudgingly concede that they 
went all out to attract premium income 
that could be invested at those towering 
interest rates. They wrote liability policies 
that posed a high nsk at premiums low 
enough to almost guarantee an underwrit-
ing loss: competitive rate-cutting slashed 
seme premiums by 20rc or more. But the 
insurers never got the bonanza they ex-
pected. Underwriting losses rose faster 
than investment income grew even when 
interest rates were at their peak. 
Then the bottom fell out. Interest 
rates began tumbling in 1981: the prime is 
now at an eight-year low of 9**. Under-
writing losses ballooned. Foreign reinsur-
ers—Lloyd's of London is the biggest-
thai indemnify most American casualty 
companies against extraordinary losses. 
cut back sharply or ran away from the 
business entirely, leaving the American 
firms to shoulder the losses alone. Finally, 
in 1984 underwriting losses swallowed up 
investment income entirely and. accord-
ing to industry statistics, property-casual-
ty insurers suffered an overall pretax loss 
of S3.8 billion. It was the first red-ink fig-
ure in nine years. In 1985 the pretax loss 
increased to 55.5 billion. Some 40 liability 
insurers have become insolvent in the 
past two years. 
Like the figures on jury verdicts, the insurers' profit-and-loss sta-tistics are in sharp dispute. Con-sumer advocates insist that if ad-justments are made for some 
quirks in insurance accounting (primarily 
involving the treatment of taxes, divi-
dends and the rising paper value of invest-
ments), the industry made a net profit ev-
ery year. The Insurance Information 
Institute, indeed, has acknowledged an 
industry profit after taxes of SI.7 billion 
last year, which it contends still amounts 
to a poor return. 
The National Insurance Consumer 
Organization maintains that the true fig-
ure was S3 billion.Given that, the indus-
try's critics argue, the premium increases 
now being posted go far beyond what is 
justified Sneers Gerry Spencc. a famed 
Wyoming trial lawyer (no relation to Mi-
In the Pool 
M any Americans have experienced the insurance crisis only at second 
j hand, in the form of rising prices for 
! goods and services ranging from ski-
! lift tickets to medical care. When in-
| sunng their homes and cars, most con-
sumers for once have largely escaped 
the cost crunch. Liability coverage for 
drivers and homeowners has risen an 
average of only 7Vi% annually since 
j 1980. about the same as inflation. Says 
Sean Mooney. chief economist for the 
industry-supported Insurance Infor-
j maiion Institute: "Personal-liability 
premiums haven't taken a quantum 
leap, and I don't expect them to." 
Behind this stability is a basic prin-
ciple of underwriting: the larger the 
pool of premium payers, the less the 
shared risk. Out of 131 million VS. car 
owners. 90% carry at least some liabil-
ity protection, creating a kitty of $49 
billion in 1985 against $40 billion in 
claims. Similarly, 55 million VS. 
homeowners paid S15 billion in premi-
ums last year to offset SI 1.6 billion in 
claims. This huge pool of consumers 
also makes risk much more predict-
I able—and therefore rates lower—than 
for narrower lines of insurance. Auto-
i mobile-accident law is relatively well 
established, leaving juries with few op-
! ponunities to award damages wildly 
J out of line from similar cases. 
j Personal-liability insurers can still 
I be jarred by novel rulings. In 1984 the 
j New Jersey Supreme Court held that 
homeowners, like saloon keepers, are 
responsible for accidents caused by in-
toxicated guests. So far. the ruling has 
had no effect on insurance rates. 
I though companies warn that further 
j widening of homeowner liability could 
eventually increase premiums. 
j Nor do all consumers feel that per-
j sonal liability rates are being shared 
j equitably: eight California plaintiffs 
j have filed suit seeking to overturn the 
I states 1984 mandatory automobile in-
j surance law. claiming that policy writ-
ers charge excessive rates to residents 
of high-nsk neighborhoods, usually in 
inner dues, even if applicants have 
spotless driving histories. While the 
I case is pending. California authorities 
j have slopped enforcing the manda-
tory-coverage statute, which had re-
1
 duced the state's 1.9 million uninsured 
vehicles by more than half 
ami's J B Spencer. "What the insurance 
companies have done is to reverse the 
business so that the public at large insures 
the insurance companies." Consumensts 
often point to the judgment of Wall Street, 
hardly a Naderue stronghold. Stock trad-
ers bid up the price of property-casualty 
insurance shares an average of about 50?f 
last year, in the apparent belief that the 
industry at minimum is on its way back to 
solid profitability. 
Well, maybe. But that road to recov-
ery threatens, at least for the moment, to 
cnpple large segments of the US econo-
my and be extremely costly for every 
policyholder, taxpayer and consumer Ev-
ery day brings word of new repercussions: 
doctors raising their fees, playgrounds 
closing, swimming meets being called off. 
transit systems facing financial jolts, fra-
ternities having their coverage canceled. 
oil-field service companies closing down. 
Amid all of the attendant finger pointing. 
a serious search is under way for some 
solutions. 
S elf-insurance is a strategy that many businesses, professional people and governments are exploring (or. more often, being forced into). But the experience 
j of doctors indicates it is not much of a so-
' lution. In the mid-1970s, doctors orga-
nized a number of companies, promptly 
dubbed "bedpan mutuals." to write mal-
[ practice insurance at lower premiums. 
j But several of the bedpan mutuals are said 
to be in financial trouble, and as a group 
! they too are raising premiums rapidly. 
I Going bare is an act of desperation: busi-
I ness executives and professionals who are 
I operating without insurance almost unan-
imously voice deep worry that a single big 
lawsuit could wipe them out. 
As might be expected, many are seek-
ing new legislation as a solution. But what 
line should it take? One approach is called 
ton reform, which involves putting limns 
I on damage awards in malpractice, negli-
gence and personal-injury cases Advo-
cates insist that this will allow insurers to 
get enough of a handle on their potential 
nsks to make writing liability policies a 
predictable exercise rather than a crap-
shoot. The leading ideas: 
• Put limits on pain-and-suffenng 
awards and punitive damages Republi-
can Senator Mitch McConnell of Ken-
tucky has introduced a congressional bill 
encouraging states to cap pam-and-suf-
fenng awards at S 100.000 and to require 
that punitive damages be paid to a coun. 
as outright fines are. rather than to a 
plaintiff and his or her attorney 
• Establish stricter standards for proving 
who really bears how much of the blame 
for an accident or injury. Senator John 
Danfonh. a Missouri Republican, is spon-
soring a bill that would set uniform feder-
al standards in product-liability cases to 
replace the present morass of 50 often 
conflicting state laws, it would require a 
plaintiff to prove negligence or fault by 
! the manufacturer 
:
 • Either Abolish the doctrine of joint and 
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several liability or revise it along the lines 
of a proposition that Californians will put 
to a vote on June 3 The proposition would 
make a defendant's share of any pain-
and-suffenng award proportionate to the 
defendant's degree of blame; a defendant 
found 10 bear 25^, say. of ihe responsibil-
ity for an accident or injury could be 
forced to pay no more than 25^ of the 
damages. That would be more equitable, 
but requiring juries to assess proportion-
ate shares of fault among several defen-
dants would add to the complexity of law. 
suits and the tune needed to settle them. 
• Limit contingency fees, so that law-
vers would have less incentive to , 
seek outsize damages for their 
clients. Several states are ponder-
ing variations on a California law 
that sets up a sliding scale in 
medical malpractice cases: an at-
torney can take up to 40/7 of the 
first S50.000 of a judgment, but 
that share dwindles by stages to 
only lOQ of any amount over 
5200.000. 
• Institute some son of punish-
ment, perhaps a fine, for attor-
ned *; who file frivolous suits. At 
minimum, reformers often urge 
adoption of the European system. 
under which the loser of a lawsuit 
usually pays the winner's court 
costs. 
This last idea has yet to gain 
much ground, but different com-
binauons of the others are being 
advanced in several states. The 
National Conference of State 
Legislatures estimates that 
around 1.200 bills have been in-
troduced since last December 
dealing with the insurance crisis 
in one way or another, and most 
contain some sort of ton reform. 
On the federal level, besides the 
McConncU and Dan forth proposals, a 
Reagan Administration study group 
headed by Assistant Attorney General 
Richard Wiliard is expected to recom-
mend a bill limiting pain-and-suffering 
awards and punitive damages: it would 
also establish tighter standards for gaug-
ing fault to govern suits in federal courts. 
(Uncle Sam has more than a bystander's 
interest: the VS. was a defendant in more 
than 10.000 damage suits in fiscal 1985. 
and wound up paying S200 million to 
plaintiffs.) 
Some 600 members of the National 
Association of Manufacturers descended 
on Washington last week to lobby for the 
Danfonh bill, which besides setting na-
tional standards for product-liability suits 
would establish a new procedure for 
speedy out-of-coun settlement of claims 
for economic damages. They first gath-
ered at the Marnott Hotel to swap horror 
stories and pep talks. Under present legal 
rules, "you re afraid to try anything, put 
any new product on the market.'* cned 
Gust Headbloom. president of Michigan s 
Apex Broach & Machinery Co Peter J. 
Nord. president of Schauer Manufactur-
ing Corp. in Cincinnati, which makes bat-
tery-charging machines, drew loud ap-
plause by declaring. "There are going to 
be people who are dumb and stupid and 
screw up no matter what we do." Ohio 
Democratic Congressman Thomas Lu-
ken showed up to cheer on the manufac-
turers. Said he: "Probably no recent issue 
has snow balled so quickly." 
After eating paper-bag lunches, the 
manufacturers boarded buses to Capitol 
Hill to buttonhole legislators from their 
home states. So many Michiganders 
packed into the office of Democratic Sen-
ator Carl Levin that several of the busi-
nessmen had to perch on upended attache 
cases. Levin warned them that "the whole 
spirit of Congress is to get away from reg-
ulation." but promised to take a careful 
look at the Danfonh bill. Plaintiffs* attor-
neys, needless to say. oppose all ton-re-
form plans. They commonly accuse insur-
ers of creating a sense of ensis to enact 
laws that would deny just compensation 
to victims of malpractice or injury. More 
troubling, they insist that all the ton-re-
form ideas would undermine a fundamen-
tal pnnciple of democracy: the idea that 
any citizen should have unrestneted ac-
cess to the courts for redress of any gnev-
ances he might suffer. Roben Ha bush, 
president of the Association of Trial Law-
yers, says of the ton-reform movement. 
"In my 25 years in law. this is as serious a 
threat to the civil justice system as I have 
ever seen. People have decided there is 
going to be a hanging, and it is just a ques-
tion of what tree and what rope." 
In all probability, that senously over-
states the case Present and farther tnal 
lawyers populate state legislatures and 
Congress in numbers large enough to 
wield formidable blocking power. There 
is a question, too. of whether the courts 
would uphold any senous tort reforms 
that might be enacted. One omen, the 
Cook County. III., circuit coun last year 
ruled that major pans of a newly enacted 
law stretching out damage awards in 
medical malpractice cases violated the II-
linois constitution. 
The alternative legislative approach 
to the insurance crisis is tighter regulation 
of insurance companies At the federal 
level, tnal lawyers and consumer advo-
cates are pressing for repeal of the insur-
ance industry s exemption from 
antitrust laws. That exemption 
allows insurers to share informa-
tion and. according to their oppo-
nents, engage in collusive premi-
um-setting policies that would be 
illegal in any other industry. In 
state legislatures, many proposed 
bills wouid enlarge the authority 
of insurance commissioners to 
block arbitrary policy cancella-
tions and gargantuan premium 
increases.. The Florida depan-
ment of insurance has wntten a 
proposed bill that would require 
insurers to disclose what dis-
counts and surcharges they apply 
to premium rates. Without that 
information, says Insurance 
Commissioner Bill Gunter, "the 
rate itself is meaningless." He 
adds. "We think insurers need 
someone to look over their shoul-
der and keep them honest." 
One mildly encouraging sign 
is that a growing number of legis-
lators seem to recognize that, just 
as the crisis has no single cause, it 
cannot have any single solution. 
They are proposing various com-
binations of tighter insurance 
regulation and ton reform. A bill on the 
verge of enactment by the Minnesota leg-
islature would set up "joint underwriting 
associations** to issue liability policies, 
written by the state, to customers who 
could not get commercial insurance: any 
losses would be picked up jointly by the 
state's insurers. But to limit those losses, 
the bill also would restnet punitive dam-
ages, among other ton reforms. 
Some combination of measures seems 
needed, and fast. Anything thai affects 
matters ranging from the pace of oil ex-
ploration to the availability of slides in 
Chicago playgrounds must be taken very 
seriously. The nation, once proud of its 
frontier individualism, has gradually 
adopted a no-risk mentality based on the 
belief that if anything bad happens, some-
one should be made to pay. But as damage 
awards lose any connection to actual 
damages and insurance com pa rues flail 
around anxiously, that someone is turning 
out to be everyone. —By G+ocfe J. Church 
Reported by Am ConsUbb/WMSiwtfton. & 
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,Lo% Angeles 
26 TIME. MARCH M. 19* 
* PLAINTIFFS 
SVAKS. C3RINNE U-72-09 | | g^(7?©^5?2_ I 
PREOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: Patent ductus arteriosus 
POSTOPERATIVE DIACNQSIS: Same 
PROCEDURE: Ligation of patent ductus arteriosus 
SURGEON: D. Docy, H.D. 
ASSISrj&T: C. Barry. H.D. 
FINDINGS AT SURCERY: The l e f t p l e u r a l space was occluded w i t h dense 
adhesions from previous intrapleural infections. 
There was a large patent ductus arteriosus which was three-quarters the diameter of 
the descending thoracic aorta. . 
DETAILS: A lateral thoracotomy incision was made on che 
left side. The chest was entered through the 
bed of the nonresecced 4th rib. We could see that there were dense adhesions between 
the parietal and visceral pleura. We therefore carried our dissection in che extra-
pleural plane which was nearly avascular down to the upper portion of the descending 
thoracic aorta. The ductus arteriosus was identified and freed from the surrounding 
mediastinal t issues. It was iouhly.ligated with 2*0 si lk. A 020 Argyle catheter was 
placed in the extrapleural space for drainage purposes. The periosteum of the fourth 
rib was reapproximated with interrupted mattress st i tch of 2*0 Vicryl. The muscle 
fasc ia l layers were closed with a running st i tch of 3*0 Vicryl. The subcutaneous 
t issue was closed similarly. The skin was closed with a running stitch of 4*0 PDS 
suture. The patient tolerated the procedure well and was returned to the ICU in 
satisfactory condition. 
D. DOTY, K.D. / 
DD/ml 
D: 03/30/84 
T: 04/03/84 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
I. Did the trial court improperly restrict voir dire of the 
prospective jurors concerning possible "tort reform" bias; and 
even assuming that the judge did improperly restrict such, was it 
harmless error? 
II. Did the trial court improperly deny Appellants' motion 
for a new trial, or, alternatively, for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, based on insufficiency of the evidence? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. This is a medical malpractice 
action relating to the surgical repair, by cardio-thoracic 
surgeon, Dr. Donald B. Doty of Salt Lake City, of a patent ductus 
defect in the heart of a two year old infant with downs 
syndrome. 
B. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below. A 
complaint in this action was filed on November 4, 1986. 
Respondent timely filed an answer, and the case was set for jury 
trial on May 9, 1989, with the Honorable John Rokich presiding. 
On May 9, 1989, the potential jurors were subjected to an 
extensive voir dire examination by Judge Rokich and the jury was 
selected after two hours of questioning. The jurors were each 
given personal copies of the trial exhibits which they kept in a 
binder throughout trial. Following the instructions and closing 
remarks, the jury retired to deliberate. Appellant's Counsel 
then asked the court to recall the jury and to add a paragraph to 
an instruction which had been deleted earlier by the court at the 
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request of appellants' counsel. This paragraph stated that it 
was no defense for a physician in a malpractice claim that he 
-did the best he could." The court noted that it had only been 
stricken based upon appellants' own demands, and the court and 
counsel for respondent agreed to a recall of the jury for that 
addition. After the jury was recalled and instructed, they 
returned to deliberate. (Tr. Vol. 8, p. 51.) After a total 
deliberation time of 33 minutes, the jury returned a unanimous 
verdict in favor of respondent, Dr. Donald Doty. The jury was 
then polled, and each juror confirmed this independent and 
unanimous decision. (Tr. Vol. 8, p. 858); (R. p. 262-63.) A 
formal judgment on the verdict was entered on May 25, 1989. 
Appellant filed a motion for new trial or J.N.O.V., which, after 
full briefing and oral argument, was denied by the court by 
minute entry dated August 17, 1989. In denying this motion the 
court found that -there was substantial evidence to support their 
verdict.- (R. p. 326, see Add. A.) A formal order was entered 
on September 12, 1989. (R. p. 327-30.) Appellant filed a Notice 
of Appeal on October 12, 1989. (R. p. 331-32.) 
C. Statement Of Facts. Appellant, Corinne Evans was born 
January 6, 1982, six weeks premature, and suffering from downs 
syndrome and a yet to be diagnosed heart defect known as patent 
ductus arteriosus. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 5.) At approximately 18 
months of age she was hospitalized for three weeks in October and 
November of 1983 at American Fork Hospital with severe pneumonia 
complicated by fluid leaking out into the space between the chest 
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wall and the lung. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 7-8, Vol. 4, p. 35.) This 
fluid caused the left side of the chest in the pleural or lung 
space to be scarred and fibrosed, resulting in one centimeter of 
thickening such that a surgical decortication or clean out was 
considered but was not performed at that time. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 
9-10, Vol. 4, p. 36-39, Vol. 6, p. 25.) (This scarred lung space 
complicated the later surgery by Respondent.) Corinne was placed 
on oxygen and was diagnosed as suffering from extreme pulmonary 
hypertension. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 14.) This causes remodeling of 
blood vessels in the lung and they become fixed, and the blood 
pressure cannot be dropped to normal. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 64, Vol. 
3, p. 115.) This may then lead to right heart failure and 
death. Without surgical closure of the patent ductus, appellant 
would have eventually died from pulmonary hypertension. (Tr. 
Vol. 4, p. 23, Vol. 6, p. 59.) 
Respondent Dr. Donald Doty, a pediatric cardio-thoracic 
surgeon, was selected to operate on the appellant to correct the 
patent ductus arteriosus. Dr. Doty obtained his medical and 
surgical degrees and training at Stanford University Medical 
School. He is a board certified specialist in cardio thoracic 
surgery and prior to coming to Utah in 1983 to join the 
Dr. Russell Nelson, Dr. Conrad Jensen and Dr. Kent Jones group, 
he was on the faculty as a professor at the University of Iowa 
for 11 years with 60% of his practice being pediatric cardiology 
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 2-4, 30, 31.) He had performed more than one 
hundred patent ductus repairs. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 30.) The surgery 
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was timely performed on March 30, 1984 when Appellant was two 
years, two months old. (Tr. Vol. 21, p. 22, Vol. 3, p. 23.) 
All experts, including Dr. Achtel for Appellants, agreed 
that the patent ductus repair itself was successful, despite a 
nerve injury to one vocal cord. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 651, Vol. 3, p. 
71, 126, Vol. 6, p. 59, 60, Vol. 4, p. 70.) 
Appellant suffers from a low pitched voice, but it is not 
distinctly abnormal. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 21.) She appears 
clinically well and has ongoing steady improvement in the left 
vocal cord weakness. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 13.) There is no evidence 
that she will need additional treatment for her ductus 
arteriosus or lungs. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 75.) In fact, if she lived 
at sea level, she would have no need for the small amount of 
night time supplemental oxygen she was on at the time of trial. 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 22.) 
During the surgical repair of the ductus an injury occurred 
to the left recurrent laxyngeal nerve which innervates one of the 
two vocal cords. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 33.) This nerve is located 
right on the ductus and when the ductus is enlarged or 
pressurized that distance is even closer in that individual. 
(Tr. Vol. 6, p. 46, Vol. 2, p. 40.) 
There are reports in the literature of patients having nerve 
palsy effecting one vocal cord merely from stretching of the 
nerve from the pressure of an enlaxged ductus and without 
surgery. (Tr. Vol. 6, p. 46, Vol. 2, p. 40.) 
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At surgery Appellant was found to have a huge pressurized 
ductus three-quarters the diameter of the descending thoracic 
aorta with one quarter the size being most typical. (Tr. Vol. 2, 
p. 38, 39.) 
At trial each expert said it was a known complication of a 
patent ductus arteriosus surgery that damage or injury to the 
recurrent laryngeal nerve could occur. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 29, Vol. 
5, p. 22, Vol. 4, p. 20, Vol. 6, p. 46.) 
Dr. Doty said because of all the prior scaring to the lung 
and chest wall the recurrent laryngeal nerve in appellant's case 
could not be visualized. The recurrent laryngeal nerve is not 
always able to be visualized by the surgeon. (Tr. Vol. 6, p. 15, 
Vol. 5, p. 67.) Dissection and exposure are more difficult with 
previous infection. (Tr. Vol. 4, p. 21.) The experts said that 
a bad result or injury to the nerve, does not mean there was 
negligence involved with the surgery. (Tr. Vol. 6, p. 55, Vol. 
3, p. 29, Vol. 4, p. 20, Vol. 5, p. 23.) 
The experts agreed there were several ways this injury could 
have occurred. One way was pressure of the duct on the nerve, 
(Tr. Vol. 6, p. 49-50.) or pressure from the surgery itself. Dr. 
Achtel, Appellants' expert said he could not render an opinion 
within a reasonable degree of medical probability as to what 
injured the nerve. (Tr. Vol. 6, p. 50.) Injury could have 
occurred by trauma alone. Cutting or tying the nerve was not 
necessary for injury. (Tr. Vol. 4, p. 21.) 
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Dr. Doty and Dr. Gay testified that the nerve injury within 
a reasonable degree of medical probability was caused by ordinary 
pressure or stretching of the nerve in carefully reflecting the 
tissues encasing the nerve away from the ductus and that there 
was no breach of care on the part of Dr. Doty. (Tr. Vol. 5, p. 
22-24, Vol. 2, p. 42, 113-114.) 
SUMMARY OF THK ARGUMENT 
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in limiting 
voir dire questions relating to potential Htort reform" bias. 
To prevail on this claim, Appellants must show both an abuse of 
discretion and that the alleged abuse did not constitute harmless 
error. 
As Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989), makes clear, the questions asked by the trial 
judge, when viewed in their totality, and in context with the 
remainder of voir dire, were substantively responsive to 
Appellants' concerns and were more than sufficient to reveal 
"tort reform" bias. 
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying 
Appellants' motion for a new trial or for Judgment N.O.V. where 
the court found "there was substantial evidence to support their 
[the jury] verdict." The testimony of Dr. William A. Gay, Jr., 
Dr. Garth Orsmond, Dr. Karl White, Dr. Robert Achtel and 
Dr. Doty, provided substantial evidence as found by the court 
that "the surgical procedure of reflection and peeling back the 
tissue from the ductus was appropriate; that in such a procedure, 
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the nerve could hn stretched f" n p< ' ' " i "' * *l 
nerve* f"n .n n -i -1 J in 1 mi i 11 ii'i diiti injury euula occur without 
negligence on I lie part of. the defendant " 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT IMPROPERLY RESTRICT VOIR DIRE 
OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS; AND EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE 
JUDGE DID IMPROPERLY RESTRICT SUCH, IT WAS HARMLESS 
ERROR. 
Althoi In' i J il ! utu.t undertook an 
exhaustive two hou lire of the prospective -jurors, 
Appellants claim the voir dire was ijiadpqiiaf •  I'-'vejl > l a s 
r e ] ill „e< I i : : IHJI i in p r o p a g a n d a *JI"KJ i I M I nt*1 t r i a t j u d g e . 
abused his discretion \u falling to ask several proposed 
questions regarding exposirv ' " *e( 11 n. j T upagandci Jourts 
iNiiifin'iih' ["ecunjii i /'i-Mij i.ne gist of such questions go to the Issue of 
I ential bias against large monetary awards , Oscier, < \\ i 
P 2d at 447 ; see albu » DiX; v • lldf en " " • I"  ""11 -1 ""!fS 457- 5 3 \ Utah 
>. Jlpp, lyiuy | ; Borkoski v. Yost, 594 I3'" I'd U8H, 694-95 (Mont. 
1979), This argument has far less vitality ippeal where as in, 
thi'i ""ase ii;,- I LLJI i 1 J i. y wit;- 1" .m .1 by the jury db opposed to an 
a 1luyediy inadequate damage award. 
The Ura: Supreme Court has *o« 
that the er:.. *; 4 uostantlal anr • • * * 
that there - -
error + *.c~ „ **%i. Avu,d have been iiffer^p* 
Ortega v. Thomas , „d 2jof Joo ; 
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Joseph v, W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saint Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 
348 P.2d 935, 938 (1963); see also State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 
120-21 (Utah 1989). 
To prevail on this appeal, Appellants must show both an 
abuse of discretion in the trial judge's voir dire of the 
prospective jurors and that such error was not harmless. 
A. The Trial Judge Did Not Improperly Restrict Voir 
Dire Of The Prospective Jurors. 
Turning to the first issue of whether the trial judge abused 
his discretion in his voir dire of the prospective jurors, the 
Utah Court of Appeals, in addressing a similar claim "that jury 
voir dire was inadequate to reveal bias related to . . . 'tort 
reform'" propaganda, recently set forth the standard for such 
claims of error, stating: 
Rule 47(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires the court to permit parties to supplement voir 
dire with questions that are material and proper. 
However, the court has considerable discretion to 
-contain voir dire within reasonable limits.w Hornsby 
v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 
932-33 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Whether that discretion 
has been abused is determined from the totality of the 
questioning. Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 457-58 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
Ostler, 781 P.2d at 447. 
Note that in determining the reasonable limits of voir dire 
in these types of circumstances, judges have to balance "the 
problem of selecting an impartial jury, after exposure to such 
articles, against the prejudice injected into the trial by the 
questioning itself . • ." Doe, 772 P.2d at 458; see also 
- 8 -
Borkoski, r,l4 I .,'1 4 M .; Johnson v. Hansen, 237 Or. 1, 389 
,d 330, - i 1 ! 196 ' I . 
The trial court is qiven discretiin i n I1I ; J1 #J t JII i i*it« 
x s a-.: f: i I'm ii " (in.ijjh proposed voir dire as opposed : 
merely attempting to impress on f iu» iur'v f h ^ fact that t;he 
defendant may be covered h^ i inn mi if" I IJJH, I U«J » uu was 
concerned tha t pirn ml ill . -proposed a series of questions 
the obvious purpose of informing the jury about thv ex. t« 
liability insurance ' n ' put. po,M w* . • ' a J taith and the 
;... discretion in refusing 10 ask the 
questions. " Doe , ri I >1 ci h v h i 111 . i ri i 1 1 u r t \ \ j) t«eci 1 1 i 11 
f he recent -r ds\ ' iliubeiu v , Hess> .* f), 1 J«J J 96 (Utah 1989) j 
stated that d furors knowledge of defendants* insurance is 
widely believed tn prejudicial \ < n»i| i " ,i.. n decision" and 
"i mi i nqu i ( y ny \\ \ M J m J t f. must iu.it be intended u» or actually 
convey the impression that defendant Is in (mrf :.u IM<-IH»M M 
Id, at . Plie c o u ^ " n fr1 " i ' J ni-t entirely clear from 
Tim* por i ranscrij: t that the trial court did not attempt to 
accommodate plaintiffs j.u4iiest by some alternate! / phras^tl 
inquiry, " id., at ? I . 
^
n
 Ostier, supra, this court applied this standard to the 
facts i if that case,, stating: 
In ixeu ot the plaintiff's proposed questions, the 
judge informed the venire that plaintiff's claim may 
exceed a million dollars and asked if anyone would 
object to an award of that magnitude. None did. The 
judge also asked if any of the prospective jurors 
believed that people should not resort to the court:;, to 
settle disputes or recover damages for injuries. 
Again, none did. The judge followed wi th a question 
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asking whether any believed they were incapable of 
rendering a fair and true verdict based on the 
evidence. None responded affirmatively* In their 
totality, and in context with the remainder of voir 
dire, these questions are substantively responsive to 
plaintiff's concerns and appear sufficient to reveal 
"tort reform" bias in the manner discussed in Doe, 772 
P.2d at 458-59. Plaintiff, therefore, has not shown an 
abuse of discretion in the court's voir dire of 
prospective jurors. 
Ostler, 781 P.2d at 447 (emphasis added). 
In Ostler, which is the most recent Utah case on this issue, 
this court found that the above quoted questions were "sufficient 
to reveal 'tort reform' bias in the manner discussed in Doe." 
Id. Appellants argument in support of their position or this 
issue principally relies on Doe v. Hafen. (Brief of Appellant, 
pp. 9-12.) 
Turning to the facts of the case at bar, it is obvious that 
the trial judge's questions, when viewed in their totality and in 
context with the remainder of voir dire, were substantively 
responsive to Appellants'concern of potential juror bias against 
large damage awards and were more than sufficient to reveal 
potential "tort reform" bias. In lieu of Appellants' proposed 
questions, Judge John A. Rokich initially stated the following: 
Nowf of utmost importance to me in this trial is 
that we get eight fair - and - impartial jurors. This 
may be the only time these litigants get to have their 
day in court/ and I'm a firm believer that those who 
want to be in court have their day in court and they 
are tried by eight fair - and - impartial people. And 
so, keep that in mind. 
Also, as you answer these questions, keep in mind the 
only basis for your decision in this case, the eight of 
you who are selected, is from the testimony elicited 
from the mouths of people, witnesses, under oath, and 
only those documents that I admit into evidence. You 
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a r e not to take into consideration MM 7 ninei t.jxt. J riuemi/i 
matters to make your decision 
So, with that in mind, your test for being fair and 
impartial is whether you can sit here and listen to the 
evidence and make your decision and afford these 
individuals here today as litigants a fair - and -
impartial trial. So, that's our system and I trust 
that you will keep that in mind so when these people 
leave this courtroom, regardless of how the outcome of 
the verdict is, at least they know they were treated 
fairly and impartially by this court and by the jurors, 
(«jr. v o l ) .••Jompt inm 1.1! P 1  th i« j i n l i |H r i s k e d 1, 
Now, do any of you have any beliefs, religious or 
otherwise, which would not make it possible for you t 
compensate a person for damages that occurred as a 
result of conduct alleged by the plaintiffs' complaint 
here; that is, that the child was injured as a resu It 
of the surgical procedure? 
1
 I . .0 stated 1 
Now, many of you have heard anc rticles, and 
there have been television programs, with regard to 
negligence on the part of doctors. Do any of you have 
any strong feelings as a result of seeing or reading 
anything about medical negligence that would make it so 
that you couldn't be fair and impartial here today. 
(Tr. oJ 7, p 111 1 Lulu jurors indicated that t hey were biased, 
and those -jurors were immediately removed for cause by • he crjui • 
I IM" I. '" " 1 1" 11 1 1 in" |i,u,R,)R 11 1.1 1 iti in i ' I mi hi 1 1  vii Ju t i n 1 I'll |M»ii 
have any btrange feelings about anyone bringing a lawsuit against 
a doctor? (Tr- Vox. J , y . „w. ; None did. The jiiidqt I M 1 
stated 1 
So j my role is to instruct you on the law. Since I 
have to instruct you on the law, I have to ask you, 
despite the fact that you may not agree with the law, 
are you willing to follow the law as instructed by this 
court? Tf not please raise your hand. 
(Tr. "' tal. "', j 1 ! 'I None did. After the above (and other) 
que s t i o n s w 1l r 1:" H S k <i 1 il 11 | n i n j 1 a 1 e j : 
Now, I have one or two more questions and that is, 
and I mentioned this before, but will you be willing to 
try this case fairly and impartially based upon the 
evidence presented in this case without bias or 
prejudice for or against any party? If you can't do 
that, please raise your hand, 
(Tr. Vol. 7, p. 37.) One juror indicated that she could be 
biased, and the court removed her for cause. 
These questions, when viewed in their totality and in 
context with the remainder of voir dire, are clearly 
substantively responsive to Appellants' concerns of bias against 
large damage awards and are more than sufficient to reveal 
potential -tort reform- bias. These voir dire questions asked by 
Judge Rokich were substantially more sufficient than those 
questions, (quoted above), found sufficient on this issue in 
Ostler. See Ostler, 781 P.2d at 447. Here, Judge Rokich's 
questions not only encompassed the areas referred to by the 
Ostler court, they expressly referred to the tort reform 
propaganda. In fact, in expressly referring to the tort reform 
propaganda, there is a strong argument that Judge Rokich went too 
far in his questioning concerning potential tort reform bias and 
thereby prejudiced the Respondent. Accordingly, Appellants have 
not shown an abuse of discretion in the court's voir dire of 
prospective jurors. (Note that during voir dire, exhaustive 
questioning was done by Judge Rokich over a two hour period 
including his substantially covering 63 proposed questions 
requested by counsel for Appellant. (R. p. 137-44.) 
Appellants' argument on this issue, basically relies on the 
Montana case of Borkoski v. Yost, 594 P.2d 688 (Mont. 1979). 
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111 BorkoskiJ( ! 11" f»J ai nt ;i f; t ask.ed the Li id 1 courf, tni 
permission to examine prospective jurors concerninq Lor I re 1 uoii 
propaganda Id., at: 6 90. The district court denied this motion. 
JJJL, if'h e trial in linrrkoski lasted eight day.'i; and after th*' inry 
deliberated for approximately 40 minutes, the jury returned a 
verdict favor Nt* Jefendai After the trie 
the Montana Supreme Cour , C-JL.;. the trict, c , * 
committed reversible error and d e n ^ d Borkoski r x ^ ~ i 
pursue .;- requester line ?i :nquiry. Ld beginninc . r 
their analvsis ^
 rr\ -.-vk 
rneir xni~ agreemer, - w>iair.* :f: >..iui -u^ p- ^ ^ 
voir dire simply enable counse, determine the existence 
ii 
enable counsel At *r :^,elligent peremptory c h a l l e n g e s " 
Id.; see also Doe * - • *: however, the trial court 
uiidi'Ii. I i.n i " .s 
*
 %
 examination •* • >'se :~m:-s --*e due1 reMj,n«J 
»' * *  o -i ***- - **pc+ — * *-" ^  -<* T**"!.^!? *• * " !V"' " rt i e >*"irkos k. i l" Q 4 
/* . dorjcosxi „* * then reviewed 
variou* - deal: re ~- ,* and quoted -he following 
lanouacr - aon Suor^ i| 
In the case at bar there was no preliminary showing 
of any fact that might have made relevant an inquiry 
concerning bias arising out of the relationship of 
verdicts and insurance premiums. Where a line of 
.questioning obviously is going to open up prejudicial 
speculation, . . . counsel must be prepared to show the 
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need which might make such an inquiry relevant, or run 
the risk of an immediate mistrial. Insurance matters 
should.be handled with the same safeguards. In the 
case before us, counsel did not advise the court of the 
existence of recent institutional advertising, or of 
other current propaganda calculated to produce bias on 
the part of jurors in the local co\irt. Thus there was 
no occasion to open up the matter of insurance whether 
innocently or with scienter. We hold that the inquiry 
was improper. 
Id. at 694 (quoting Johnson v. Hanson. 237 Or.l, 389 P.2d 330, 
331 (1964)) (emphasis in original). The Borkoski Court then 
went on to list various factors to be considered before allowing 
a line of inquiry designed to uncover such possible bias, 
stating: 
The holdings in these cases are important in our 
resolution of the situation such as the one presented 
in the instant appeal. The attorney for Borkoski did 
present to the trial court evidence of recent 
institutional advertising by the very insurance 
companies involved in the case; advertising carried in 
popular national magazines at about the time of the 
drawing of the jury panel: advertising calculated to 
produce bias upon the part of the jurors against 
awarding large amounts of damages to personal injury 
plaintiffs such as Borkoski. Under these 
circumstances, we conclude that a line of inquiry 
designed to uncover this possible bias should be 
permitted. 
Id. 
Appellants in this case failed to proffer any "recent" 
prejudicial advertising, only proffered a 1986 article 
concerning tort reform propaganda. (See Brief of Appellants, Add. 
A.) This article was over three years old at the time of voir 
dire, prejudicially emphasized "insurance," and clearly does not 
meet even the Borkoski required showing of potential juror bias 
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t h rough r e c e n t ins! Ifnf i ml Advert i ,n .1111,1 v "l • 1 1" MHUIIN 
propaganda . 
A f t e r making h i s s t a t ement r e g a r d i n g f^rt reform propaganda 
, 1 1 |t Ri-k ""i ,isluM i1 •• t In • 1 in, ' '"I'll " w! « > !*•• 
ai) a r e s u l t ul see ing or* r ead ing any th ing about medical 
n e g l i g e n c e tha t would make iL so that, L/OU c n n l d n ' t bp f a i r and 
i.iiiipd 1  1, id J In" iff Ludd'y l " 1 J 1 nil , 1 in 1 This ques t ion 
meets t h e f u r t h e r i n q u i r y r equ i r emen t s of Borkoski concern ing 
"whether thp prospective? I'lirsr bel ieves 1 sa^h inftter id 11- i" ' > ' 
i t y t c render ,nd impart d r e r i - + " Borkosk: 
P-2d 
i n q u i r i e s <-,.*„ * i« JIK -I :.. .r v responded p o s i ~ : ^ e l y 
i n q u i r y were immediately s t n ^ K . i u i cause bv * 
ueiudii iw-nn inquxx ,. **o, 
t above d i scuss io i r , - j r i Borkoski shows t h a t 
t h e r e were any e r r o r s made * 
hi- |j . f -respondent,
 aw:> appellax, 
djd In O s t l e r , should t ir . - :i ae q u e s t i o n s askeo :?v - u x a i 
cn 11 r *" wh-**- *i ~v«? * l' I „ 'i ha 
remainder m VUJI U I I I J , were s u b s t a n t i v e l y r e s p o n s i v e ten 
a p p e l l a n t s ' concerns and more than s u f f i c i e n t ID r e v e a l " tort 
reform" hi,-*' ifi'ipe! Lin ts , !;!"iei:ef. u, 1. , h .ve r ,.1. shown an abus* ~f. 
d i s c r e t i o n in the c o u r t ' s v o i r d i r e of p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s , 
A J so mole that in a p p e l l a n t s ' b r i e f H-tpy is k i i 
set"\ Lull -juueij I'm sen t ed , ' dh i s sue number 2, w tie then I lie 
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trial court [abused] its discretion in failing to allow plaintiff 
to voir dire a juror regeirding discussions between the juror and 
his wife relating to the wife's employment as an insurance 
adjuster.- There is no separate section in Appellants brief 
dealing with this issue and the only treatment is tangentially 
in Appellants discussion that the judge erred in his voir dire by 
failing to ask appellants proposed questions concerning "tort 
reform" propaganda* (Brief of Appellant, p. 11.) Appellants 
refer to two jurors that they claim "may have been exposed to 
such propaganda." (Id.) They claim that potential juror Grice 
could have been exposed because he lived with a physician. 
However, this question as to potential juror Grice is moot 
because he was excused for cause. They also claim juror Kuhn 
could have been exposed to such because he was married to an 
employee of an insurance company. Mrs. Kuhn actually was a 
secretary (not an adjuster) to the Utah Business Insurance Trust 
Company (which does not write professional liability insurance.) 
(Tr. Vol. 7, p. 8) In any event, as discussed above, the voir 
dire questions asked by the judge, in their totality and in 
context with the remainder of voir dire, were substantively 
responsive to Plaintiffs' concerns and were sufficient to reveal 
"tort reform" bias. Without cause for the court to remove this 
juror, appellant could have dismissed this juror with one of 3 
available peremptory challenges but failed to do. Even assuming 
juror Kuhn was biased, the verdict was unanimous from all 8 
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jurors suggesting there were sr ; * independent juiw-i.* *uv 
f on n *1 «ni q a i n n t
 ([»JL a i ,n 1; 11 f' f" 
II Even Assuming That The Trial Judge Abused His Discretion 
In His Voir Dire Of Prospective Jurors, Such Error Was 
Harmless, 
Pi in
 1;ec:iiLii;c» IIIIJULJ l ine Ul r i l l 
Supreme Court d e c i s i o n s i n t e r p r e t i n g such, p l a c e upon the 
a p p e l l a n t .iwL uiily Liw burden of shrmnnq t h n t tho rn i ,rnn„ error 
11: -^-. tie e r r o r was bulli s u b s t a n t i a l and p r e j u d i c i a l in Llhie 
s ense t h a t t h e r e i s a t l e a s t a r easonab le l i k e l i h o o d t h a t i n t h e 
abs^ v tin iH'iiiii wi HI in MI in in. I mi H "i HI ml I tfeiem i n i 
Or tega , 383 P.2d dl 40Bi' Joseph, 348 P. 2d 418; see a l s o Verde, 
770 P.2d a t 120-21 
J.scretioi i ii i h 1 s 
voir dire * prospective jurors, such error was harmless because 
the "tort reform" propaganda wi. Hi win m I i P I run I iff1 WHTI 
. .• . jpeaxs damages, inn liability, ' Borkoski . 
.2d 695 .L> • cts of the case at barr the "\nry 
unanimous ound r 
even reach tne ques*. ~ci. amages .. e;:;: _«)xrmu: 
must be viewed .-„.- harmless - -rounds . reverse 9uch a 
f indinq -~ --.>ww>. 
Appellant rely Tie court in Borkoski stated; 
Unfortunately, the foregoing conclusions ao uc 
avail Borkoski on this appeal , , Even though -
accept Borkoski's arguments, it is undeniable that the 
purpose of the advertisements was to reduce the amount 
of damages awarded by a jury, At no poi nt is it 
suggested, either by Borkoski or in the advertisements 
themselves, that juries should not find a party 
negligent I n the first place. The ads speak only to 
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damages, not liability. Here, the jury found defendant 
doctors not liable at all. The jury did not even reach 
the question of damages. In such a case, Borkoski's 
arguments lose their vitality, and any error committed 
must be viewed as harmless and not grounds for 
reversal. Rule 61, M.R.Civ.P. 
Id.. at 695 (emphasis in original). 
Appellants' brief appears to treat the alleged error as 
though it concerned liability or whether the doctor was 
negligent. (Brief of Appellant, p. 12-13.) However, as the Utah 
Court of Appeals and other courts have pointed out, such errors 
concern "potential bias against large monetary awards." Ostler, 
781 P.2d at 445; see also e.g. Doe, 772 P.2d at 458-59; Borkoski. 
594 P.2d at 194-95. 
Because the assumed error went to the issue of damages, (not 
liability), and because the jury did not even reach the question 
of damages, the error must be viewed as harmless and not grounds 
for reversal. 
Based on the above authorities and discussion, Judge Rokich 
did not abuse his discretion in his voir dire at the prospective 
jurors; and even assuming he did, such error was harmless. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENTING 
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR FOR JUDGMENT N.O.V. 
WHERE THE COURT SPECIFICALLY FOUND "THERE WAS 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEIR VERDICT." 
In denying Appellant's Motion for New Trial or for Judgment 
N.O.V., the Honorable John Rokich entered the following minute 
entry on August 17, 1989,; 
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Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment N.O.V. or New Trial 
is denied, there was substantial evidence to support 
their verdict, 
The jury, based upon the testimony of the experts, 
could and evidently did conclude that the surgical 
procedure of reflection and peeling back the tissue 
from the ductus was appropriate; that in such a 
procedure, the nerve could be stretched to a point 
which would cause the nerve to cease to function and 
injury could occur" wi thout neg] igence on, the part of 
the defendant. 
I ) • • 
Thus, according to the Judge who pres ided a t t r i a l a mini WHO 
looked fit I I i iPihii-it •., ai". I J. . I «r.l >II.J. I "I I. »• . I neii,« i \ , lere 
was " s u b s t a n t i a l ' evidence tu suppor t the unanimous jury v e r d i c t 
i n ' f a v o r of Respondent Pi DoiirMil !• t y , 
i ed j jy sei. IULIII i.ILL1 iiLandar d f o r review for a 
mot ic . fui ~ new t r i a l in Pea t s v . Commercial S e c u r i t y Bank, 745 
P . 2 d * * J • • uni I r!'IV! i 
A jury's verdict which is the subject of a motion 
u i a new trial will be reversed only if the evidence 
supporting it was completely lacking or so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly 
unreasonable and unjust• Rovlance v. Rowe, 737 p.2d 
232, 234 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). We review the jury's 
verdict in the light most favorable to the prevailing 
party, and accord the evidence presented and every 
reasonable inference fairly drawn from the evidence the 
same degree of deference. Anderson v. Toone, 671 : 
170, 172 (Utah 1983); see Jacobsen Construction Co. v. 
Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc., 619 P.2d 306 , 308 fUtah 
1980) 
Id. at 1192. 
T"l if" sl),ci!'idai',d 1 i n J, ii\ - in, in'" I in considering a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict is set forth in tbe case of 
King v, Feredayf 739 1'. : 'd f, in (Tit.ih n « ,. ;. i lujjy, I.I « :our t 
i ' >iJ i A i i i a I court: should grant a uu»Lion tor judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict if, after viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the non-movant party, it finds that no 
competent evidence supports the verdict. In reviewing the trial 
court's determination on such an issues, this Court must apply 
the same standard.- Id, at 620. In addition to viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the 
court must accord every reasonable inference fairly drawn from 
the evidence the same degree of deference. Anderson v. Toone, 
671 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah 1983); see also King, 739 P.2d at 620-21. 
Respondent called, as an expert witness on the standard of 
caxe Dr. William A. Gay, Jr., a board certified cardio-thoracic 
surgeon who has been associated with the University of Utah 
Medical Center since 1984 when he joined the heart transplant 
team. He served on the faculty at Cornell University Medical 
College from 1971 through 1984 and was Professor of Surgery and 
Surgeon in Chief at the New York Hospital, Cornell Medical 
Center, where he did virtually all of the pediatric cardio-
surgery. (Tr. Vol. 5, p. 1-9.) Dr. Gay testified that appellant 
had a history of infectious complications in the left lung which 
complicated the surgery and which made the extra pleural approach 
the only viable access to the ductus in this particular instance. 
(Tr. Vol. 5, p. 20-21.) He testified it is not always possible 
to identify the nerve because of the operative field and because 
the nerve may be obscured by blood and by thickness of the tissue 
surrounding it. (Tr. Vol. 5, p. 15, 18.) To not dissect out or 
isolate the nerve would be a preferable technique when using an 
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PHI Ira pleux-al approach such as with appellant because the ri€\nn,-« 
is actually on the opposite side oi Liusue under which you n e 
(1 hbei tJ'n, iT' ">, i '"
 r p. ] ' 'he technique o± ret iect ,1 inq 
tne tissues with encased nerve overlying the aorta or ductus is 
an acceptable technique with m u it lion 1 rliimt ml'isfrva! inn il  I In 
nerve and complied with the standard ol cart and practn e nil M 
cardio-thoracic surgeon r performance a patent 
d i i n * I l O i ,1 P | in mi mi i| ' i i i i t 
in that her recurrer, . aryngec - - -s- njured, but this is a 
known risk of the procedure and desrnt* * :--* w , Doty " s 
i . ' i i r e i i . » i n p I i ('ill ii-ii i I i , J 1 
He stated that witln asonable degree oi medical probability 
1.11e most likely exDlanat: II i. i II m 11 
nuibi.l izing the t*.^ *>«>-- rrom around i^*..- •- ^*elU-ti was 
put on the nerve r the nerve was damaged ia* va; | I i . 
i« i > i h i 
instances ul Leiiiporary paralysis oi the recurrent nerve due to 
blunt trauma or due to put"ting traction on xl when mobilizing 
t in R S U P , ( 1 i ' 11 ) 
Dr. Garth Orsmond, a specialist in pediatric cardiology who 
cared for appellant and who "has practiced at the Primary 
I'll i Idren "'» l IlledjcaJ CenLei s m e w I "I h testified that this nerve 
injury was a osk Unit occurs with this surgical procedure, (Tr, 
V o l I , 11 ihiilhl "| DiiTMinq t h o II-1 yenrn I'll •ul' hi-"" id i y 
JL*ldien i Hospital he has had about three or four patients who 
have sustained an injury to the left recurrent laryngeal nerve. 
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(Tr. Vol. 4, p. 67-68.) With Corinne, her prior bleeding into 
the pleura caused scarring, fibrosis and 1 centimeter of pleural 
thickening making the surgery more difficult. (Tr. Vol. 4, p. 
36-38, 10.) Because this vocal cord nerve hooks around the 
surgical area, any trauma to that area including instrumentation 
could cause the injury without tying or cutting the nerve. (Tr. 
Vol. 4, p. 21.) 
The deposition of Dr. Karl White, a cardio-pulmonary 
specialist from Denver, Colorado, was read to the jury. He 
testified as follows: 
Q. (By Mr. Epperson) And from your experience, Dr. 
White, could an injury to the recurrent nerve not 
necessarily involve cutting, but could involve, as you 
just indicated pressure — 
A. Stretching, external trauma, both could induce 
that type of problem, and we have seen that numerous 
times in our practice. 
((Emphasis added.) (Deposition of Dr. White published to jury p. 
*9.) 
Appellants' only expert on the standard of care was Dr. 
[Robert A. Achtel, a cardiologist from Sacramento, California. He 
has watched patent ductus repair operations being done by 
surgeons, but has never personally done such a surgery. (Tr. 
Vol. 6, p. 9, 11.) The full extent of Dr. Achtel's surgical 
training was six months of general surgery training in his junior 
year of medical school, plus "two weeks.H (Tr. Vol. 6, p. 13.) A 
cardio-thoracic surgeon such as Dr. Doty has a four year 
residency in general surgery followed by a two year 
specialization in cardio-thoracic surgery. (Tr. Vol. 6, p. 14.) 
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Hi' Arh to l t e s t i f i e d t h a t Cori.nne Evans had v e r y e x t e n s i v e 
d i s e a s e i u I IIP 11«I I I inn | i) I Mil n HI I ' ." IIH nil J 
e x t e n s i v e s c a r r i n g in t h e c h e s t , making i t r e a s o n a b l e f o r r • 
Doty t" rin n r , e t ho s u r q i c a l a p p r o a c h tha t was u s e d . ( T r . Vol _f p . 
i ,I , I Hi- f u r t h e r Led Li t i -ed rmw \ H < , > ' ' ^frifaiM 
a b s o l u t e l y s e e t h e n e r v e t h a t goes t o l,he v o c a l c o r d s , e s p e c i a l l y 
w i I In in i j in Mi l l id it I M ( • r M r f i ii 11 I I I I 11 I11 «! I '' " i 5 6 , 
67,1 Iheie are twin different techniques or schools ul thought in 
doing this particular patent ductus repair operation, dissecting 
O i l 1 II II II I > II I t 1 1 7 1 I I II III I M M 1 I in I II 1 II III I I I I " I II 11 II I I i ".ill 11 i l l IH ! I I f ' d l I I 1 II 11 II I 
baci, Both of those techniques are appropriate in the discretion 
of the snrqeon I|"T"I Vit'll I p, Sh'-V ) in ftohtel testified 
t h a t iii I'juJinI i : o ' . i u l l H I J I I j mi i v I ! h o n e i v e i l n l m i l I I H . M I I I II it:11 M WOII i 
negligence Involved in the surgery and that this case required 
expert medi ca 1 teal i many t r letermim > whef her I lin • nerve i ii jiiij i: y 
was caused hy negligence oi was merely a I'orapLicaLion or bad 
result , I Plus is not a res Ipsa loquitur rasa by Appellants' 
e x p i . HI in Ijiii i ih J i I I I |i | 1 i ii I 11 II 11 i i I 
Finally, l)r . Doty testified that, the extra pleural approach 
was necessary for Corinne because of her extensive scarri ng which 
d e n x e d UM J mijii.il1 - . ippioaoh at i ubo I In-1 111 e tu ii 1 hpan e IJIII Il iillli i ch. 
required him to develop a space between the chest wall and the 
lining membranes , !"Ti Vol. 2, \ II |i Me indicated thai. inhere 
were two approaches to the operation in a normal patient; 
isolating the nerve or reflecting or separating the tissues 
encas i.nq I, IMP nervp nl 1 of il n , | "Tin ' II 11 I i \ 
Because of Corinne's extensive scarring, the extra pleural 
approach was required. The ductus was observed at surgery as 3/4 
the diameter of the descending thoracic aorta (one quarter being 
more typical.) The nerve could not be isolated and the 
reflection technique was required. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 25, 33, 38, 
70.) 
Finally, Dr. Doty rendered the opinion within a reasonable 
degree of medical probability that his own care complied with the 
standard of caxe of a reasonable and prudent cardio-thoracic 
surgeon in 1984 in Utah and in the United States in performing 
this operation. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 114.) He rendered the opinion 
that the ductus being large and having high blood pressure within 
it, caused tension to be brought to bear on the recurrent branch 
of the vegas nerve, and that during the course of meticulous and 
careful separation and peeling back and reduction of the tissues 
from the surface of the ductus that the nerve probably ceased to 
function. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 113-114.) 
This evidence, together with much additional evidence in the 
transcript demonstrates substantial evidence to support the jury 
verdict. 
Note, Appellants place emphasis on the fact that the jury 
deliberations were short with lengthy exhibits. However the 
transcript will show that the jury deliberated for over 30 
minutes that each juror had a personal copy of the exhibits, that 
they had carefully considered the evidence for four days, and 
that they had been read all jury instructions before retiring to 
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deliberate. The jury was fully apprised of the facts and law and 
the mere fact that the jury took only 33 minutes to deliberate 
does not establish that they did not impartially look at the 
facts or evidence submitted in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above authorities and argument, the trial judge 
properly restricted voir dire of the prospective jurors and did 
not abuse his discretion in denying Appellants' motion for a new 
trial, or, alternatively. Judgment N.O.V. Accordingly, the 
judgment below should be affirmed. 
DATED THIS I I day of September, 1990. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
DAVID H. EPPERSON 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Dr. Donald B. Doty, 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
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MINUTE ENTRY 
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HONORABLE JOHN A ROKICH 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK MTR 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. HOWARD, JACKSON 
D. ATTY. EPPERSON, DAVID H. 
THE COURT NOW RULES ON THE MATTERS HERETOFORE UNDER ADVISE-
MENT TO WIT; 
"PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOV OR NEW TRIAL IS DENIED 
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE JURY UPON WHICH 
TO SUPPORT THEIR VERDICT. 
THE JURY, BASED UPON THE TESTIMONY OF THE EXPERTS, COULD 
AND EVIDENTLY DID CONCLUDE THAT THE SURGICAL PROCEEDURE OF RE-
FLECTION AND PEELING BACK THE TISSUE FROM THE DUCTUS WAS AP-
PROPRIATE; THAT IN SUCH A PROCEEDURE, THE NERVE COULD BE STRETCH 
ED TO A POINT WHICH WOULD CAUSE THE NERVE TO CEASE TO FUNCTION 
AND INJURY COULD OCCUR WITHOUT NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE 
DEFENDANT. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND DIS-
BURSEMENTS OR TAX COSTS IS GRANTED IN PART, DEFENDANT IS ENTI-
TLED TO HIS JURY FEES OF $50.00, WITNESS FEES TO WIT; $14.00 
PER DAY PLUS MILEAGE AT .30 CENTS PER MILE." 
DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO PREPARE THE ORDER ACCORDINGLY. 
CC JACKSON HOWARD 
DAVID H. EPPERSON 
tr1 1 :: 1S39 
David H. Epperson, #1000 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P. 0. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
By L^HtJZ3&«gL 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH 
CORRINE EVANS, by and through 
her guardians ad litem J. 
BLAKE EVANS AND DONALEE J. 
EVANS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DR. DONALD B. -DOTY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR JNOV OR NEW 
TRIAL AND ORDER MODIFYING 
COST AWARD TO DEFENDANT 
Civil No: C86-8392 
Judge John A, Rokich 
Plaintiff's motion for JNOV or new trial and to tax costs 
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable John A. 
Rokich, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, on August 3, 
1989 at 9:15 a.m. Corrine Evans and her guardians ad litem, J. 
Blake Evans and Donalee J. Evans were present and were 
represented by their attorney, Jackson Howard, Esq. Defendant 
Donald B. Doty, M.D. was present and was represented by his 
attorney, David H. Epperson, Esq. The Court, having reviewed the 
memoranda of fact and law filed by each party in support of their 
respective positions, and the Court having heard oral argument 
from counsel for each party, and the Court having taken the 
matter under advisement; 
And the Court having issued a written opinion on August 17, 
1989 finding as follows: 
The Court now rules on the matters heretofore 
under advisement to wit: 
"Plaintiff's motion for judgment NOV or new 
trial is denied there was substantial 
evidence presented to the jury upon which to 
support their verdict. 
The jury, based upon the testimony of the 
experts, could and evidently did conclude 
that the surgical procedure of reflection 
and peeling back the tissue from the ductus 
was appropriate; that in such a procedure, 
the nerve could be stretched to a point which 
would cause the nerve to cease to function 
and injury could occur without negligence on 
the part of the defendant. 
Defendant's motion to strike memorandum of 
costs and disbursements or tax costs is 
granted in part, defendant is entitled to his 
jury fees of $50.00, witness fees to wit; 
$14.00 per day plus mileage at .30 cents per 
mile." 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion 
for judgment NOV or new trial is denied; and 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant is awarded costs to 
include jury fees of $50.00, witness fees of $14.00 per day, plus 
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mileage at .30 cents per mile for the appearance of Dr. Garth 
Orsmond, Dr. William Gay, and Dr. Dean ZoBell. 
DATED this / ^ day of -bntjrt&tr, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
^±1 
JOHN A. ROKICH 
rict Court Judge 
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MAILED POSTPAID a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
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* ••Forneys for Plaintiffs 
0. Box 778 
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